

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

28 June 2012

Mr. Trevor Griffey  
PO Box 2887  
Olympia, WA 98507-2887

Reference: F-2012-01370

Dear Mr. Griffey:

This is a final response and acknowledges your 5 June 2012 letter, received in the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator on 12 June 2012, concerning your 16 May 2012 Freedom of Information Act request for a complete copy of the Central Intelligence Agency report, "Restless Youth," from September, 1968.

We conducted a search of our previously released database and located the enclosed document, totaling 229 pages, which we believe to be responsive to your request. Please be advised that this document was released in connection with earlier requests for records on other subjects.

Since you are entitled to the first 100 pages free of charge, the total cost to you is **\$12.90**. Please send a check or money order in this amount to me, made payable to the **Treasurer of the United States**, citing **F-2012-01370** to ensure proper credit to your account.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michele Meeks", written in a cursive style.

Michele Meeks  
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

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## Restless Youth

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Youthful dissidence, involving students and non-students alike, is a world-wide phenomenon. It is shaped in every instance by local conditions, but nonetheless there are striking similarities, especially in the more advanced countries. As the underdeveloped countries progress, these similarities are likely to become even more widespread.

A truly radical concept of industrial society and its institutions prompts much of the dissidence--but it, alone, does not explain the degree to which young agitators have won a wide following in such countries as France, the Federal Republic and the United States.

Some measure of dissidence is traceable to generational conflict, psychic problems, etc. But most owes its dimension to the number of students, a profusion of issues, and skillful leadership techniques.

The proximate causes are rooted in the university; they are chosen for their appeal, for the support they will engender. However, the confidence of the agitators in the likelihood of their being able to expand a limited protest rests--sometimes fragily--on a growing base of student cynicism with respect to the relevance of social institutions and to the apparent gap between promise and performance.

Perhaps most disturbing of all is the growing belief of the militants--and many less committed young people--in the efficacy of violence as a political device.

The Communists can take little comfort from any of this, even though Moscow and its allies may exact fleeting advantage from the disruption sowed by the dissidents. In the long run, they will have

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to cope with young people who are alienated by the more oppressive features of Soviet life.

Because of the revolution in communications, the ease of travel, and the evolution of society everywhere, student behavior never again will resemble what it was when education was reserved for the elite. The presence in the universities of thousands of lower- and lower-middle-class students has resulted in an unprecedented demand for relevant instruction. Today's students are a self-conscious group; they communicate effectively with each other outside of any institutional framework, read the same books and savor similar experiences. Increasingly, they have come to recognize what they take to be a community of interests. This view is likely to influence their future political conduct and to shape the demands they make of government.

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### Preface

Thanks to riots in West Berlin, Paris, and New York and sit-ins in more than twenty other countries in recent months, student activism has caught the attention of the world.

What are the students in New York, Paris, Rome and Buenos Aires trying to tell us? What do they have in common?

Apprenticed to but not yet part of the "System," the activists and malleable fellow students are not restrained by the sanctions which most adults place on themselves. Pragmatic and searching, they refuse to accept many of the premises of an older age; instead, they retreat to gut reaction. Their mode is indignation.

Some of the activists clearly are unwilling to participate in the political process. Their choice of tactics is dictated by a conscious wish to disrupt. A far larger number wish only to reform our social and political institutions so that they will be more responsive, less ponderous.

The optimism of the anarchists is a hallmark of youth. So, too, are the energy and rebelliousness which provide student protest so much of its thrust. The protesters, after all, are adolescents or post-adolescents; the vehemence of protest cannot be understood without some appreciation of the emotional crises attendant on both stages of development.

Some adolescents rebel against their families, bridging the gap between childhood and maturity within the confines of the family; others displace this rebelliousness on to authorities beyond the home--the school, the law, the state. Some, such as those who were active in the early 1960s in the Civil Rights Movement, succeed in doing so in ways that win the approbation of the community. When this occurs the consequences more often than not are constructive--both for society and the individuals involved.

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This paper is an attempt to explore the reasons underlying student unrest. Part I examines such questions as motivation, history, leadership and tactics.

Part II consists of a series of country chapters chosen to illustrate the influence of local conditions on the evolution of dissent and the many forms it takes. The chapters on France, West Germany, Italy and the Communist states of Europe--the USSR, Poland and Yugoslavia--highlight the remarkable parallels between East and West in patterns of dissent. The chapter on the Netherlands suggests some of the ways an enlightened government in cooperation with the universities can anticipate and may be able to defuse student dissent. Those on Africa, India, Iran, Turkey, and Indonesia explore the problem as it is found in emerging states. The chapter on Japan highlights the consequences of mass education and points to the degree to which the political system in Japan has come to accept student activism as a quasi-legitimate expression of legislative opposition. That on China treats the phenomenon of the Red Guards which all too many commentators see as little more than a Maoist version of the western dissidents. The Argentine chapter discusses the effects of the 50-year-old Cordoba Reform on Latin American education and the efforts of the Ongania regime to depoliticize students; that on Brazil has a more current focus.

This paper does not discuss the broader Peace Movement to which organized student groups contribute manpower, the Communist Party/USA, or any parties of the Left--except insofar as they contribute to student dissent. Nor does it deal directly with the Civil Rights Movement, the latter-day current of Black Power or urban riots or violence in American society. These have been the subjects of study by the President's Commission on Civil Disorders and the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

Neither does this paper discuss such symptoms of alienation as the use of drugs, the so-called hippies or teenage runaways, even though all are symptomatic of many of the same problems which fuel organized dissent.

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PARIS, 11 JUNE 1968



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## RESTLESS YOUTH

Student protest is visible, highly vocal, increasingly militant and feared by many to be interconnected world-wide.

In the last few months, it has closed down several great universities, fomented civil strife and altered political careers in more than twenty countries. Indeed, if one accepts Richard Neustadt's definition of power as "the effective influence upon the conduct of others," then Student Power is no longer a chimera. It is a reality which has similar characteristics even though its form may vary from country to country.

Students are an elite and volatile group--to a great degree imbued with an almost mystical faith in the ability of an aroused "people" to generate reform and with a marked distrust of governmental bureaucracy. They have a knack for being among the first to espouse unpopular causes and have been quick to call society to account for its shortcomings.

Student rebelliousness is not a recent phenomenon. It predates the university: it was commonplace in ancient Athens and in imperial Rome. Socrates complained woefully that the students of his time had "bad manners, contempt for authority, disrespect for older people." In the Thirteenth Century students in Paris elected their professors and the illumined texts of the time describe the rampages of medieval English students who burned lecture halls and sacked nearby villages when their wishes were unheeded.

However, it was not until the early Nineteenth Century, following the rise of the nation-state, that students became an important force for social and political change. They were in the forefront of the revolutions in 1848 in Germany and Austria, went "to the people" in Czarist Russia, and to their deaths or

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exile in 1905. At home and abroad, African and Asian students agitated against colonial regimes during the interwar and post World War II periods.

During the 1950s, aroused students figured in the downfall of Peron in Argentina in 1955 and Perez Jimenez in Venezuela in 1958; students rashly encouraged Imre Nagy and fought Russian tanks in Budapest in October-November 1956, as they seemed prepared to do in behalf of Gomulka during Poland's all too brief "October" of the same year. Rioting Japanese students forced cancellation of President Eisenhower's trip to Tokyo and the ouster of the Kishi Government in 1960. That same year, Korean students were in the van of the anti-Rhee riots in Seoul and in Turkey they took to the streets against Menderes.

In the United States, beginning early in 1960, students supplied much of the manpower and inspiration for the Civil Rights Movement. At first tentatively and then with growing confidence, American students used the sit-in and similar tactics to confront the power structure of the south--appealing for the support of a lethargic but influential public far beyond the confines of Mobile or Birmingham. And they demonstrated to their satisfaction that the tactics of confrontation work; indeed, many came away from Civil Rights with the conviction that only confrontation works.

Student activism depends for much of its strength on the way it is regarded by the adult citizenry. In most Western countries, at least, there has long been a feeling that politics is not a proper arena for students. This notion has been strengthened by the fact that in Europe and the United States student movements hitherto have proved transitory and vulnerable to fragmentation.

The incidence in the past of student demonstrations in widely separated places, the Middle East, Japan, or even Latin America did not excite undue concern in the U.S.--even when such outbreaks impinged briefly on American interests, as in the case of President Eisenhower's abortive trip to Tokyo in 1960. They passed unnoticed by all but a few or were dismissed as some kind of seasonal madness.

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In many countries, however, student political activism has been a more durable phenomenon and because of its durability has been accommodated in the political process. Argentine students won recognition of their political rights and a role in the administration of the universities in the Cordoba reform of 1918. That reform opened the door to many abuses and is at the root of much of the difficulty which besets Latin American education today, but it has served to sanction student political activity to the extent that participation in campus organizations more often than not constitutes entrée to adult careers in government and law. Since World War II, Japanese demonstrations have become so common a tactic of the political opposition that they are taken for granted and occur within guidelines accepted by the public. Japanese student agitators enjoy a quasi-legitimate place in the legislative process. Indonesian students were a bulwark of Sukarno's regime for most of its existence--but turned against him because of his suspected complicity in the attempted Communist coup of 1965. African students are xenophobic; accorded special recognition and privileges, they hunger after more tangible rewards and pose a threat to several governments.

Campus activism may not be the central issue of our times; but none other now excites a greater response. Those who view the dissidents as fledgling conspirators are constrained to blame too permissive parents or lackadaisical teachers. Some point to a general breakdown in public morality for the unease which permeates so many campuses. Others credit the dissidents with reacting to the oppressive demands of an outmoded educational system and to the growing impersonalization of everyday life, to stagnation, to racial injustice. Yet a third group points with alarm to the influence of the mass media, warning that radio and television have a curious "three-dimensional" quality which exposes sham and stimulates discontent. There is no simple explanation.

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Leaders + Issues = Followers

The interplay of emotions, ideologies, and attitudes which constitute the motive force behind youthful dissidence is infinitely complex. Those who would lead the dissidents, or stay a step ahead of them, are constrained to identify and exploit issues which promise the support of a wide following. Quite naturally, some issues prove more meaningful and therefore evoke a greater response. Naturally, too, the issues change or are replaced by broader demands as protest develops and a confrontation with authority ensues. At Columbia University, for example, an ad hoc protest against an administration decision to erect a much disputed gymnasium was transformed by the effects of outside intervention into an assault on the structure of the university itself. But by far the largest number of students who participated toward the close of the crisis were moved to do so out of indignation over what they regarded as police brutality. A similar evolution of issues and substitution of targets took place during the French disorders in May.

This substitution of issues and broadening of demands has been dubbed "expedient escalationism" by Zbigniew Brzezinski. It often begins with a series of minor confrontations between university authorities and a small band of dissenters whose complaints are limited to some facet of university life. The authorities do not entertain whatever proposals the dissenters are advocating--either because they are too far removed from day-to-day developments within the university to appreciate what is occurring or because they are unsure of their own position and prefer to procrastinate in the hope that time alone will solve the problem. The dissenters, rebuffed, become increasingly vocal and search out allies among other students or, crucially, among faculty members who have their own grievances.

There follows a series of "dress rehearsals," such as attempts to interrupt ROTC exhibitions or to mar faculty convocations in honor of visiting dignitaries. In some instances, the dissenters are turned

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upon by student critics and are assaulted--as at Nanterre where a rightist clique, the Occident, several times manhandled leftist students. The authorities respond with minor administrative sanctions or do not act at all out of fear of calling attention to a situation going out of their control.

A spontaneous incident, perhaps the arrest of a student away from the university, electrifies the community. A picket line or sit-in follows, and the students seek to negotiate with the authorities. Rather than confront the dissidents directly, however, the authorities welcome the advent of self-appointed middlemen, often disgruntled faculty members. The brokers attempt to clarify the issues and in doing so prolong the crisis.

Under pressure from all sides, the dissidents seek to legitimize their stance by demanding more and more, particularly if authorities dribble out piecemeal concessions which have only a negative impact, thus buttressing the popular view that they have lost the initiative. Reconciliation becomes impossible, and the authorities, after having sought to avoid confrontation, rashly invoke force without regard to its ultimate consequences. Bystanders are involved, sometimes injured, and a cause celebre results.

Sociologists have come to call the process by which more and more participants are drawn into protest radicalization. There is little agreement over the dynamics involved--and less evidence that any great number of students remain radicalized once the initial exhilaration of combat is past.

Certain considerations become extremely important to the leader. He must seek to sustain the protest, flexibly moving it to new ground when the occasion permits. To achieve this escalation, he must be prepared to welcome and adjust to the participation of a variety of people--negotiators, the voices of authority, public commentators, etc. Their involvement will tend to broaden the protest, spread its effects, and touch a multiplying number of people--students and non-students alike--each at his own level or point of sensitivity.

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In every country the militants are a small minority, but a minority able to weave a strand of vague, inchoate resentments into fulminant protest. The leaders of protest have learned that there is much to protest about. The reasons for this go beyond the revolution in communications or mere leadership techniques. They have to do with the gulf between society's institutions and the people those institutions are designed to serve. Next to the surface almost everywhere are complaints which grow out of the conditions of student life and a demand for university reform. Poor administration-faculty-student relations, inadequate facilities, outmoded curricula, bureaucratic licensing requirements, "sudden death" examinations for the purpose of reducing swollen enrollments--all provide fuel for discontent.

And there are issues which grow out of the image which students have of society--its impersonality, bureaucracy, and the ponderousness of its political dynamics. The real activists view the university as only a proximate cause, the foe close at hand. For them, the real enemy is distant from the scene. It is society organized for efficiency at the expense of the individual, a treadmill that destroys initiative and traps the unwary.

In an era of global stalemate, they find the slogans of the Cold War singularly unconvincing, the resurgence of the 19th Century nation-state in De Gaulle's Fifth Republic anachronistic, and the participation of ruling and opposition parties in coalition governments which sometimes have the parliamentary support of Communists as proof that latter-day politics are a charade.

These attitudes, particularly in Europe, are a consequence of the failure of social and political institutions to accommodate themselves to the remarkable economic strides of the postwar period, the absence of compelling ideological issues, such as those embodied in the 1930s in the Spanish Civil War, and the diminution everywhere of moral authority. Many political parties--for example, the Socialists in Italy, France and Germany, the Anti-Revolutionary

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Party in the Netherlands, the Republicans and Monarchists in Italy, the Communists in most places--no longer are issue-oriented or responsive to the needs of the constituencies they purport to represent. A younger generation finds government bureaucracy--especially in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands--antiquated, cumbersome, and in the hands of a generation that came to power twenty-five years ago and remains committed more to preserving its authority than to utilizing political power to renovate society.

French students bitterly criticize De Gaulle's "arbitrariness," his fascination with nuclear armaments at the expense of badly needed public works, his disregard of public opinion, and the manner in which he stages periodic elections to legitimize his "mandate" and perpetuate what they consider to be one-man rule. And they are no more attracted to De Gaulle's pretensions to national glory, as witness Daniel Cohn-Bendit's rejection in March 1968 of "national flags and frontiers."

Few single issues can impel large numbers of students to demonstrate, although the role of the United States in world affairs, particularly US involvement in Vietnam, is most evocative. It is especially so in the United States where students who are critical of American policy and who regard Selective Service as a means for quashing dissent are



ANTI-U.S. DEMONSTRATION IN PARIS, 7 APRIL 1967

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distressed by the prospect of being coerced into supporting physically a course of action to which they object on moral grounds.

Abroad, local US involvement and the alleged role of the Central Intelligence Agency provide a backdrop against which to mount a protest over the Vietnam war--the first major conflict in the lifetime of the dissenters. Opposition to American involvement in Southeast Asia and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is fueled in Germany, for example, by the Kiesinger government's advocacy of the so-called Emergency Laws and the distrust which many students have of government by coalition. Egyptian students, hypersensitive to the appeals of Arab nationalism, see American participation in a "Zionist conspiracy" aimed at establishing Israeli hegemony in the Middle East and blame the rout of Arab troops by the Israelis in June 1967 on US aid. In Argentina and Brazil students take to the streets against unpopular military regimes which they are convinced are maintained in power through US support. In Panama and Mexico they do so out of resentment over malfeasance or corruption of one-party rule--but always against a backdrop of US involvement.

In Communist countries, anti-American demonstrations can be deceptive; they are hardly a valid manifestation of student dissidence. Anomie nevertheless exists. Russian students resent the heavy-handed attempts of party leaders to bolster a myopic view of history. Dismayed by the revelation of Stalin's perfidy and the fall of Khrushchev, they have been quick to ask whether the Soviet system is at fault. They have turned back in upon themselves, according to most accounts, searching for a new value system grounded in individual worth. Polish and Yugoslav students, far from seeking to overturn the Communist state, hope to nudge it into fulfilling its avowed goals and have rioted against the obstructive tactics of party bureaucrats who bar the advance of a younger and better educated generation.

The children of a generally affluent generation--West or East--are less concerned with matters of economic livelihood or the challenge of building a revolutionary state on the ruins of autocratic rule than were their fathers and some, at least, are deeply engrossed in matters of life-style.

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The Student Explosion

As a general observation, student activism has emerged in times of political flux, when social values have been subject to challenge. The mid-1960s are such a time. The concern with which present-day activism is viewed by many is traceable, of course, to the violence which sometimes accompanies it. It also is due to puzzlement over the ultimate objectives of the protesters, who arise out of student bodies drawn from a far wider social base than before, and apprehension over the number of people who might become involved if protest truly is symptomatic of a deeply rooted malaise. There also is a vague feeling that the dissidents are likely to prove more effective with time and the opportunities afforded them by expanding communications.

Next to defense, education is the biggest business of the modern state--and the greatest need of the underdeveloped countries. University populations have more than doubled world-wide in ten years. There are 600,000 students in France and 350,000 in the United Kingdom. The Federal Republic, which has 370,000 in its universities, anticipates 500,000 by 1970. The USSR has 1,900,000 full-time university students. Japan, which like the United States has committed itself to the goal of mass education, has more than one million. There are more than six million Americans enrolled in colleges and universities.

This implosion has strained facilities in all but a few countries; the construction of buildings and the expansion of faculty have not kept pace. Neither has pedagogy made adequate use of modern invention. The situation is especially critical in the great metropolitan universities abroad, e.g., in Paris, Rome, Buenos Aires, Rio, where scores of thousands of students live for long periods of time in hostels and tenements under conditions approaching genuine hardship. At the Sorbonne, for example, more than 100,000 students live in congested quarters and study in obsolescent buildings designed for far fewer than half that number.

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More important than antiquated buildings and crowded living conditions, however, has been the failure of university authorities and faculties to modernize administrative techniques, reform curricula to meet the needs of an increasingly technological society, or improve teaching methods. Many courses have little if any relevance to contemporary life. Degree requirements dating back a hundred years force a student to commit to memory great bodies of irrelevant data.

.... Many of the new generation of European and Latin American and Asian students are from lower- or lower-middle-class families; they have first-hand knowledge of the socioeconomic ills of the day. They arrive at the university with high expectations and an acute appreciation of the type of course content which is likely to prove functional in their lives. All too often the reality does not live up to expectation.

There is an unmistakable correlation between academic discipline and propensity to protest. While it is somewhat misleading to generalize, students enrolled in professional schools, such as Law, Medicine, or Engineering, seldom are found among campus demonstrators. Where there are exceptions, as in parts of Latin America where medicine is regarded as a "liberal" undertaking, the explanation usually can be traced to the effects of emigration on a university faculty or to a significant event in the development of the particular school.

Professional and preprofessional students are vocationally oriented; they are obliged to master a clearly defined body of data and to submit to regular examinations designed to test their progressive skill in applying that data.

The protesters come from what are described as the Liberal Arts--precisely the faculties which have had to absorb the brunt of increasing enrollments and which are hard pressed to maintain any semblance of high standards.

Except in the United States, there is too little information to shed any light on the character, academic

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standing, etc., of most of the prominent student dissidents. Men like Rudi Dutschke or Karl Dietrich Wolff of West Berlin's Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund and Daniel Cohn-Bendit of Paris' 22 March Movement are reputed to be better than average students, with considerably more than average oratorical skills. Dutschke, for example, survived the taxing routine of undergraduate study in Germany and was admitted to advanced studies at the Free University.

There are ample data to support the view that some of the best of the students in US universities are involved in protest--and that they often are found at schools judged among the finest in the country. Kenneth Keniston, whose books The Uncommitted and The Young Radicals provide valuable insights into the student psyche, maintains that socially-directed protest requires a special cultural climate, that is, certain distinctive values and views about the effectiveness and the meaning of demonstration and about the wider society. Finally, some historical situations are especially conducive to protest. Keniston believes that there may exist what he terms a "protest-prone personality."

Summarizing a large number of academic studies published since 1965, Keniston notes that almost all student protesters in the United States are outstanding performers in the classroom; the higher the student's grade average, the more likely it is that he will become involved in any given political demonstration. Similarly, students come from families with liberal political values; a disproportionate number report that their parents hold views which are essentially similar to their own and accept or support their activities.

More than 1800 of the 2100 colleges and universities in the United States have reported no significant dissidence. The most serious outbreaks in the United States have occurred in a handful of universities--mostly in the so-called multiversities, which have reputations for arbitrary management, restive faculties, high drop out rates, etc., or in smaller schools where Negro students have sought to improve their lot.

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Open communications between administrators and students are critical to the maintenance of the kind of climate which operates against dissidence; so, too, are close student-faculty ties. A restive junior faculty proves an irritant and frequently provides protest with its initial impetus--especially when more senior faculty members abdicate teaching responsibilities.

In much of the world, the real executive authority is vested not in the university but in a government ministry; day-to-day control is entrusted to a political appointee. In Mexico, for example, university rectorship often seems a steppingstone to the governorship of a state. Given the prospect of election to high office in a one-party state at the close of a brief university career, no rector will prove too tolerant of dissident students. Elsewhere, in much of Europe, administrators have little sway over autonomous faculties; rectors are elected for brief terms from among senior faculty and are unlikely to oppose for long their past and future colleagues.

The tenured faculty long have been the autocrats of the academic world. Thanks to government-sponsored research and consultant contracts, private practice in medicine or law, political careers, and a plethora of other outside interests, they have become absentee autocrats. At the University of Rome, for example, a few senior professors appear in class only once or twice a term. None of the law faculty at Lille lives in Lille. Faculty members at Nanterre, outside Paris, commute from homes in the capital and seldom can be found anywhere outside the classroom. When present, many European faculty are unapproachable; they are mandarins. First- and second-year students in the Netherlands are prohibited by custom from addressing professors. The problem is further complicated when, as in the Federal Republic, senior professors because of economic interests or professional jealousy conspire to keep down the number of postgraduate students admitted to teaching positions, and candidates whose progress thus is stymied further swell already large enrollments.

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In the United States the compulsion to publish has stimulated increasingly narrow academic specialization and less and less meaningful classroom instruction. Actual teaching all too often is left to graduate assistants or is designed to further some line of esoteric research being pursued by a professor. As David Reisman and Christopher Jencks observe in the recently published The Academic Revolution, the inquisitive or sensitive students who hope to find a "visible relationship between knowledge and action, between the questions asked in the classroom and the lives they lead outside it" receive, instead, "pedantry and alienated erudition."

In the Middle East, Japan, Latin America, and even Europe violence has been a hallmark of student dissidence. Protest has grown more militant in the United States because those who speak for it are convinced that docility does not succeed, that over the past several years only violence or the threat of violence has won a respectful hearing. In short, they believe that society is structured in such a way that it can ignore or blunt peaceful protest, but that it abhors interruption and will pay attention to the noisy picket line or raucous demonstration that closes down a vital institution.

Student demonstrations are expressive, rather than directed; they are calculated to dramatize an issue and attract public notice. The demonstration itself becomes the focal point of the action.

This view of the efficacy of confrontation is rooted in the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, where a few hundred activists employed sit-ins and other means to expose to public view regional customs which became an intolerable embarrassment to be remedied under the pressure generated by an aroused public opinion. It has been buttressed by the urban riots of recent years.

Rightly or not, the dissidents sense that latent support for their cause exists and can be galvanized by direct action, that their critical view of society is shared by a far larger number of their age group.

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
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In the US, the dissidents have looked without success to the residents of the ghetto; in France with momentary success they found the support of the young workers in the industrial complexes which ring Paris.

It is moot whether television or newsreel coverage of a demonstration or a riot can spark similar outbreaks elsewhere, although several commentators have remarked on the likelihood that a disturbance at Columbia, for example, may embolden dissident students at other schools and cause them to press for relief of their own grievances. French officials found no evidence of significant foreign involvement in the recent Paris riots--but they do cite what they describe as the "grapevine effect" which television coverage of earlier riots in New York and Berlin and other cities had on the mood of the students at Nanterre. It seems likely that the media, by their emphasis on violence, police intervention, etc., add to the intensity and duration of a disturbance. They also tend to evoke sympathy at least on the part of like-minded students elsewhere--sympathy which confirms the belief of the protesters in the probity of their cause.

A student in the US, France, Brazil, or Japan probably does identify with his peers in other countries and is more likely to share their values and feel that their problems are his. Because of the accessibility of foreign-language books and newspapers



UNIVERSITY PROTEST IN PARIS, 9 NOVEMBER 1967

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and the type of avant-garde art and films which are so popular in most university communities, there are few, if any, cultural impediments to this kind of identification. Moreover, today's students are highly mobile; they travel within their own countries and abroad, frequently enrolling for study at foreign universities. Many universities have a cosmopolitan character. In the academic year 1967-68, for example, there were 90,000 foreign students registered in American schools and 80,000 Americans studying abroad. In 1966, the last year for which cumulative totals are available, there were more than 100,000 students from the lesser developed countries enrolled in European or US universities. An estimated 10,000 were in the USSR in December 1967.

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Theory, Practice and Inspiration

The 1950s, during which many observers were perplexed by the indifference of American university students to political and social issues, witnessed in Europe and then in the United States a rebirth of interest in Marxist social criticism. A conscious effort to construct what since has come to be called "a new politics," this neo-Marxist current was a reaction to political developments of the day--on the international level, to the nuclear arms race, Suez and the Hungarian Revolution, Khrushchev's Secret Speech and the Algerian conflict; and, nationally, to a host of causes. It first found voice in England in The Universities and Left Review in 1956, and then in the United States in 1959 with the University of Wisconsin's Studies on the Left and Chicago University's New University Thought, in 1960.

Whether in England, France, Japan, West Germany, or the United States, like-minded young people--mostly university-centered--grouped together independently of one another. To date, they have eschewed one creed or one approach. Loosely dubbed the New Left, they have little in common except for their indebtedness to several prominent writers, such as American sociologist C. Wright Mills, Hegelian philosopher Herbert Marcuse, and the late Negro psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, and a few contemporary revolutionary heroes like Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara. (The term New Left, itself, has little meaning--except as a device to distinguish between today's young radicals and the Communist-Socialist factions of the interwar period. It is taken to mean an amalgam of disparate, amorphous local groups of uncertain or changing leadership and eclectic programs.) The consequence was an amalgam of anarchism, utopian socialism, and an overriding dedication to social involvement.

This intellectual response to the international and domestic crises of the 1950s coincided in time with the emergence of student activism in the United

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States, i.e., with the first stirring of the Civil Rights Movement. The experience of the Civil Rights Movement electrified the American university community. Nor did its lessons go unnoticed abroad.

In a few countries nearly moribund student organizations were revitalized; in others, where existing organizations clearly were pawns of old-line political parties, new alignments emerged.

Since then, the two currents, neo-Marxist social criticism and student activism, have co-existed in a mutual search for a meaningful program, a lever for overturning social structures. It is easy to belittle their efforts; more difficult to ignore the thrust behind them. Lacking any useful prescriptive advice from the few intellectual mentors whose writings they value, the dissidents have sought to define a political role for students and young intellectuals. The 100,000-member Union Nationale des Etudiants de France, for example, decided that students are "intellectual workers" and entitled as such to recognition by the state. Carl Davidson, an American radical theorist, has argued that students "share many of the social relations and conditions of production with many of the skilled workers of large-scale industry," and are becoming the new working class. Hence, for him, student revolt is "an important historical



GUEVARA IN WEST BERLIN, OCTOBER 1967

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phenomenon," the "rising of the trainees of the new working class against the alienated and oppressive conditions of production and consumption within corporate capitalism."

Much of the writing of the New Left has an unmistakable improvisational quality about it. The publication recently in France, Italy, and the United States of collections of personal mementos and mimeographed press handouts issued in the course of demonstrations at the Sorbonne, Rome and Columbia make clear that many of the dissidents are concerned most passionately with limited issues of local consequence and have little conception of what they seek once the conflict is broadened.

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### Exchange of Ideas

Most of the activities of the dissidents, whether in the Communist or Free Worlds, take place not within but against the framework of established student organizations. Such organizational activity and coordination as exists among and between dissident groups is conducted out of view of most student organizations and out of operational control of their leaders. The mass of dissident students, whether or not affiliated with existing organizations, does appear to have--like the more radical students in the US--an amorphous and frequently changing, de facto leadership, functioning effectively outside an institutional framework. Such de facto leaders make frequent use of personal contact and may assist one another financially.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit traveled to Amsterdam, Frankfurt, and Berlin--all centers of student radicalism--during the recent French crisis. The now disabled Rudi Dutschke and other West German students have visited Prague. The West Berlin unit of the Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund reportedly provided what the French have described as a "modest" financial assistance, and German students in Paris served in some kind of liaison capacity between the two organizations during the riots.

These contacts result in little more than an exchange of mutual experience--largely between individuals who may or may not represent the organizations to which they belong. They are brief, frequently public, and held too irregularly to accomplish much. Nevertheless, they do constitute the nucleus of what could become a source of direction.

There may already be some sentiment for formalizing these contacts. In an interview published in the August 1968 issue of Evergreen Review, Columbia University's Mark Rudd answered a question about whether there would be "any attempt made to unify all the various national student movements:"

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We're planning a conference for August or September of the revolutionary student movements from France, Germany, and the U.S., possibly Belgium, Japan, Cuba, Vietnam and the others. We want them to come here (which has never happened before) to meet us and see that there is a revolutionary movement here, and more important, so that the U.S. student movement can begin to identify with the international student movement--that's one point we've been very weak on.

The division between the de jure and de facto student leaderships exists even within Soviet-orbit countries. In Poland, for example, the Polish Students Union (ZSP), a member of the Soviet controlled International Union of Students, is under the leadership of Communist zealots--some of whom hold office in the IUS. Rank-and-file ZSP members have been in the core of "anti-establishment" dissent among Polish youth for years. Various clandestine discussion groups long have existed under a ZSP umbrella; from them have emerged a number of leaders and groups around whom members of different political persuasion have clustered.

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### The Communists and the Students

There is no convincing evidence of control, manipulation, sponsorship, or significant financial support of student dissidents by any international Communist authority. In fact, the Russians and Chinese have received precious little for the time and money they have spent on cultivating Free World youth. The most vocal of the dissidents have been wary of being caught up in any of the international youth organizations controlled by Moscow. Self-styled Marxists and admirers of Ho Chi Minh, the dissidents are contemptuous of the neanderthal leaderships entrenched in most national Communist parties, including the CP/USA.

The Bloc parties have reacted to student dissidence by harshly suppressing riots in Eastern Europe and expressions of anxiety and dismay at their eruption in the Free World. Underlying these reactions is the unmistakable concern of the ruling Communist parties over the "anarchist" thrust of the students and the lip service they pay to "Maoist" and "extreme leftist" slogans. (There also is a healthy measure of respect for the dialectical skills displayed by the dissidents in debate with party functionaries in the West.) On 30 May, Pravda's Yuri Zhukov denounced Western student rebels as "werewolves" determined to split progressive movements and denounced French student radical Daniél Cohn-Bendit as a "provocateur."

In Western Europe, student dissidents have shaken governments in which national Communist parties have had a stake. Nowhere has this been demonstrably in the interests of over-all Communist policy. Relations between the dissidents and the Communist parties of Western Europe have grown grotesque. In West Berlin students deride the Communists as Stalinists on the one hand and revisionists on the other. Both the illegal German party and the French Communists have been aghast at the antics of the leftist students. The indecisiveness of the French Communist Party during the early stages of the Paris riots and Daniél Cohn-Bendit's antiparty strictures once the Communist-controlled labor unions had reined in their stalwarts

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and abandoned the students to face the riot police illustrate the dilemma. Cohn-Bendit's impassioned denunciations of the French "Stalinists" were listened to attentively by student dissidents everywhere. The message was clear: threatened by anarchy, bureaucrats of all stripes embrace.

Neither is there evidence that the romantic appeal of Mao Tse Tung has led to significant Chinese influence. The Chinese have from time to time covertly funded sympathetic factions within Communist sponsored youth groups in a number of countries--exploiting them to embarrass local party leadership and counter pro-Russian propaganda. A few French students under Chinese influence were active in the early days of the disturbances at Nanterre; they soon lost influence, however, and never played a directing role.

The Cubans maintained no such contacts in France or elsewhere in Europe before the outbreak of disturbances, and Cuban personnel abroad shunned participants in the French riots once trouble began. Castro does find favor among the dissidents, who apparently regard him as the embodiment of the student revolutionary. The Cuban leader is determined to counter Russian influence wherever he finds it and welcomes activists anxious to visit Cuba. As a counter to the recent Ninth World Youth Festival in Sofia, the Cubans organized a "Vietnam summer" to attract young European radicals this summer. There is marginal evidence that the Cubans have supplied limited funds to Black Separatists in the United States; there is nothing to corroborate speculation that these monies have found their way to white student activists.

Local Communist parties have gained control of national student organizations in all of South America except Chile, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Honduras. Nominally accountable to local direction, the leaders of these organizations are likely to prove amenable to Cuban overtures. It remains to be seen, however, whether they will be able to mobilize a following in pursuit of objectives which are in Castro's interest alone and not in the best interest of their memberships.

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For years the Russians have funded two instrumentalities for influencing world youth movements, the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS). Neither organization seems disposed at present to exert control over student dissidents in the Free World and both may prove vulnerable to infection from without. A hard core of the IUS remains responsive to Moscow; nevertheless, the twists and turns of the Cold War and the increasing degree of ideological diversity within Bloc and Free World parties have vitiated the effectiveness of Soviet influence and divested IUS of most of the sway it held over member national organizations in non-Communist countries.

Those who see the IUS from its organizational and operational viewpoint stress the maintenance of Soviet control and point to sporadic efforts by dissidents associated with the IUS to impose some measure of structure within the diffuse mass of students in the non-Communist world. The opposite view is that the IUS is all but dead, that it is split among internal factions and cannot advance the interests of anyone. The truth appears to be that although it is not completely impotent, neither is Russian control over its leadership nor efforts to reinvigorate and expand its efforts relevant to channeling "student power" in support of Moscow's interests.

The leadership of the IUS has attempted without noticeable success to enhance the attractiveness of its propaganda and to attract broader participation in its seminars and meetings. It also has supported the demands of many western students for academic reform.

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The foremost example of efforts by the IUS to maintain a channel to the dissidents has been its recent attempts to woo the Syndicalist movement of Western Europe. The idea of the French students in the mid-'50s, was that "young intellectual workers" should participate fully in the political process and enjoy living allowances, free tuition and other amenities commensurate with their position. This had little to do with the revolutionary syndicalism of fin de siècle Europe, and even less to do with latter-day corporativism. If anything it had a Trotskyite tinge. The notion found favor elsewhere in Europe in the early 1960s and gave rise to the European Syndicalist Student Organization (CESE). CESE has an international secretariat in Amsterdam for the purpose of coordinating the activities of its national affiliates and exchanging information on mutual problems. It has affiliates in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, England, The Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, as well as exile groups purporting to represent Portugal and Spain.

The IUS shunned CESE with its Trotskyite-idealist bent until 1967, when there evidently was a decision by the IUS or in Moscow to attempt to gauge the nature and extent of student unrest in the West by infiltrating CESE's rather loose organizational structure and, perhaps, to seek some voice in CESE's national affiliates.

There is evidence to suggest that at least part of whatever coordination and/or liaison there has been among European dissidents has been channeled in some way through CESE. On 17-18 February 1968 CESE sponsored a two-day meeting on Vietnam in Berlin.

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Radical Students in America

There are approximately 6.3 million students enrolled in US colleges and universities. The overwhelming majority are politically apathetic. Many others are pursuing professional or preprofessional training and are loath to take time to participate in activities not directly related to the classroom.

Of those who are politically active, some 250,000 are affiliated with the Young Democrats and Young Republicans--just as in most Western countries, where far more students belong to youth adjuncts of major political parties than to radical groups. On balance, they contribute only marginally to the political dialogue. It is doubtful that they could be mobilized effectively to provide much counterforce to the radicals, even if one of the major parties were to field the kind of candidates who would excite a significant campus following.

There are conflicting estimates of how many American students are involved in protest. The figure 300,000 frequently is cited both in official reports and newspaper articles. It apparently is an extrapolation from total university enrollment based on an arbitrary estimate made five years ago by Columbia University professor Amitai Etzioni, who estimated that no more than five percent of all students were involved. Etzioni had little data from which to calculate; he worked principally with statistics gleaned from the early period of the Civil Rights Movement--material which has little relevance today.

A more plausible figure would be 120,000--and that would include a good many students who can be activated only in behalf of local causes which have little or no political ramification, as well as members of the Negro Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and other Black Power groups which seem less and less disposed to participate in protests not aimed at relief of their specific complaints. If we eliminate

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the Black Power advocates, the one-time protesters seeking less stringent campus curfews and visitors' rules, and such organizations as the California-based League for Sexual Freedom, we are left with a hard core of between 30,000 and 35,000. This includes the 2,000 or so members of the CP/USA's DuBois Clubs, the several hundred members of the Progressive Labor Party, the Young Socialist League, etc.

By far the largest and most vocal group included in the 30,000-35,000 figure is Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). SDS is not a typical radical organization, but none other approaches its visibility or range of activities. A study of SDS may be useful because the organization has achieved considerable success and is more and more a magnet for student dissidents and because its organizational framework could serve as a model for radical students in industrialized, urban societies abroad.

#### The Founders

SDS' evolution dates from 1959, when a group of students belonging to the Michigan University chapter of the socialist-minded League for Industrial Democracy founded a separate organization to support the kind of civil rights activity which the Congress of Racial Equality and others were launching in the South. The following year, in June 1960, thirty students with similar ideas met in New York to expand the Michigan organization nationally.

A so-called National Executive Committee of SDS met at Ann Arbor in December 1961; most of the participants had spent the preceding several months in voter-registration drives in southern states. Tom Hayden, a student at the University of Michigan, was charged with drafting a statement of purpose, which was adopted the following year at Port Huron.

"We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit. The first effort, then, should be to state a vision: what is the perimeter of human possibility in this epoch? The second effort, if we are to

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be politically responsible, is to evaluate the prospects for obtaining at least a substantial part of that vision in our epoch: what are the social forces that exist, or that must exist, if we are to be successful? And what role have we ourselves to play as a social force?

The Port Huron Statement rehearsed the complaints of alienated, politically powerless students in an industrialized society. It was not remarkably radical by today's standards (recent SDS tracts describe it as "quaint") and drew heavily on the ideas of the late sociologist C. Wright Mills.

Like SDS statements to follow, it also was indebted to social critic Herbert Marcuse. It expressed despair of genuine reform in a political system in which both major parties allegedly had become spokesmen for a gigantic technocracy, and saw little reason to look to a middle class bound to its material possessions.

It was equally critical of the Communists, adding that their nostrums offered no great promise for man's future--but renounced what it termed professional anti-Communism, which, it said, served only to inhibit dissent.

Relations between SDS and its parent organization, the League for Industrial Democracy, had been strained from the beginning. Fearful of losing its tax-exempt status, the League censured and then cut the students adrift.

SDS undertook to organize the urban poor in the north and midwest, with much the same objective as voter-registration drives in the south--redressing the balance of effective political power. To this end, it launched its Economic Research and Action Program (ERAP) with nine projects, such as the Newark Community Union Project that Tom Hayden started with an initial \$5,000 grant from United Auto Worker's President Walter Reuther. Most foundered.

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In the meantime, in 1964, the Berkeley Free Speech Movement saw the successful use in the north of sit-in tactics, and adaptation of that technique began. A group of students at Ann Arbor, many of them SDS stalwarts, devised the first of the academic teach-ins to oppose the escalation of the American effort in Vietnam. Though much publicized, the wave of teach-ins which followed across the country was not wholly successful and petered out after several months. Many of those who participated turned away from direct opposition to the war out of a conviction their efforts had failed to impress the policymakers; they no longer sought to stimulate a dialogue which had proved largely one-sided.

For their part, Students for a Democratic Society began to oppose actively anything connected with the Vietnam conflict. They forged alliances with disparate groups, many ad hoc or letterhead organizations. They participated in the formation of the National Vietnam Day Committee (VDC), which led two days of protests at Berkeley in May 1965, and supported the more extreme efforts of the VDC to publish tracts designed to subvert members of the Armed Forces and to stage sit-ins on railroad tracks over which troop trains were to travel.

Four hundred SDS members met at Ann Arbor late in 1965 to formulate a more cohesive program than that which had been set forth at Port Huron. Splits developed between those, like Tom Hayden, who favored a maximum effort in the city slums, others who wished to activate nonradical college students, and a third group that seemed to favor the formation of a more selective and intellectually disciplined core of social critics. Factional disagreements, however, were papered over out of common resentment at the deepening US involvement in Vietnam. The Port Huron statement was amended to drop the ban on Communist membership in SDS and the meeting voted to seek alliances with any group opposed to the Vietnam conflict.

Journalists and academicians who had been favorably disposed toward SDS began to express

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dismay over the organization's increasingly tolerant views of institutional Communism and the kind of myopia that caused it to castigate the United States for its involvement in Vietnam without expressing even the mildest criticism of the North Vietnamese or their Viet Cong allies.

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Quest for an Outlook

Some members of SDS tried during their 1965 convention to redefine the organization's relationship toward society. They failed to attract much support, however, because anti-Vietnam sentiment dominated all of the discussions.

A year later, 1966, the SDS National Council founded the Radical Education Project (REP) as "an independent education, research, and publication organization" to be "devoted to the cause of democratic radicalism" and "the creation of a new left in America." REP quickly solicited the assistance of "all people who identify with the forces of radical democracy in America and abroad."

With a growing list of sponsors (Philip Berri-gan, Julian Bond, Hal Draper, Jules Feiffer, Andrew Kopkind, William Kuntzler, Staughton Lynd, Herbert Marcuse, Barrington Moore, Linus Pauling, James A. Pike, and others) it set about to subsidize the creation of a new body of critical literature.

To aid in this effort, it stipulated certain "convictions" as a basis for research:

- the promise of American abundance has been perverted and thwarted by contemporary capitalism,
- class division, privilege and exploitation are unnecessary for abundance,
- the possibility of greater wealth for Americans does not justify exploitation of other countries.
- democracy must be judged in practice and by the accountability of officeholders to the voters who are affected by their decisions.

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- present-day US Government does not allow for democratically arrived at decisions which affect social development or the quality of individual life.
- America is held in moral and political stalemate by economic and political forces and by a 'deadening' belief in national chauvinism, i.e., "the American way of life."
- anti-Communism is central to the ideological manipulation of the people and provides a cover for "the most brutal application of military and economic power."
- violent revolution, though deplorable, may be necessary where the oppressed lack political leverage to attain economic and political freedom.
- issues such as "Vietnam and the oppression of the American underclass" cry out for action. The work of long-term research, education, organization, and theory does not relieve the obligation for immediate passionate protest.

REP asked for concrete proposals necessary for effective political action--action of the kind which would broaden the interests and commitment of students drawn to SDS by "single issues" or "gut reaction" and serve to extend SDS' appeal to a constituency broader than the students or urban poor. It pledged cooperation with the University Christian Movement, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in founding a Latin American Institute "to coordinate research, monitor information and maintain contacts between radical student, church and academic groups in this hemisphere."

The Radical Education Project has become the focal point of much of the controversy surrounding SDS. Several of its members have been active in Communist-front groups, such as the Dubois Clubs,

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the Tri-Continental Information Center, and the American Institute for Marxist Studies. Others belong to the Socialist Workers' Party.

REP publishes "scenarios" designed to enable students to introduce "relevant" material into classroom discussion. In its latest circular notice, REP advertises close to one hundred diverse publications, ranging from a 5-cent pamphlet on "Wildcat": Anatomy of a Work Stoppage" by Steven Fox, through a 20-cent edition of Regis Debray's "The Long March: Guerrilla Movements, Theory and Practice," to a \$4.75 hardbound edition of Containment and Revolution, edited by David Horowitz.

#### Leadership and Organization

SDS is an amorphous, polycentric organization—really little more than a collection of local chapters, not all of which respond readily to any leadership.

Its adherents often mirror the community in which they live. In New York they have a pragmatic, liberal concern for the problems of the underprivileged and an acute appreciation of urban and state political dynamics. In the south they have a quasi-religious cast. In Berkeley, California, they have a decidedly literary-existentialist cast. (Student activists are not societal drop-outs, i.e., "hippies," and they bitterly resent being mislabelled. Activist Sherman Chickering admits that both activists and hippies are true believers in what he calls "Youth Culture," but insists that the two differ in origin. "The activist is most likely to be the child of liberal Democratic parents; the hippie is most likely to be the child of a conservative Republican. The one considers his father a New Deal sellout, but adopts his father's Constitutional ideas; the other considers his father irrelevant and rejects the prevailing culture entirely.")

SDS members boast of their lack of leadership and hierarchy. Their top policy-making body is the annual convention. Between conventions, a National Council meets at fairly regular intervals. There is a national staff of approximately fifteen

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full-time, poorly paid employees and an annual budget of upwards of \$80,000--much of it evidently raised through public appeals.

Record-keeping, like finances, is haphazard. Headquartered at present in Chicago, SDS counts some 6,000 national members in more than 225 local chapters. There are said to be as many as five local chapter members for every national member. As of a year ago, national members paid dues of 50 cents a month; local chapter members contribute nothing to the national office, and not all chapters--no charter from the national body is required--remit funds to Chicago, either.

SDS meetings have been described as chaotic. There have even been attempts in the past to abolish the post of National Secretary and to adopt the Quaker method of consensus as a decision-making technique. In some chapters no member is ever denied the right to speak--however irrelevant his remarks.

SDS has opted for the "Politics of Controntation," has grown steadily more militant--partly in response to the pressures brought to bear upon it by better organized leftist groups which seek to restructure it as a typical party-line mass organization and partly, one suspects, because of the constraints felt by several changes of national leadership to keep ahead of their followers. The most determined of the SDS members are convinced that passive demonstration is ineffective and are out to challenge what they deem the "Rotten Society" with "Institutional Resistance."

This element, which one-time SDS member Paul Goodman has termed "the neo-Leninist wing of the New Left" regard strikes, picket lines and sit-ins as ineffective and disparage what they call "that old mass-mobilization thing." In the space of six months, between the spring and fall of last year, this group nudged SDS away from demonstrations, of which the Pentagon protest seems likely to prove the last, toward smaller, more violent protests--of which Columbia is the best example.

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SDS militants travel continually at home and abroad--to Cuba, Europe and the Far East. They pay their own expenses wherever possible and probably count on financial assistance and lodging from parents, relatives, and friends. While abroad, they presumably receive similar help from local student organizations or, in Cuba, from the Castro government.

SDS and the Armed Forces

SDS seeks allies wherever they are to be found--in the city slums, among young university faculty members and poorly paid secondary school teachers, and more and more determinedly among younger servicemen bound for Vietnam. It is SDS' conviction that the Vietnam conflict is unpopular among all young people, and particularly repugnant to those being trained for combat in Southeast Asia. The organization's leaders may also believe that the influx into the military of recruits with at least some college experience ensures a sympathetic if not completely receptive audience.

During the Algerian conflict, the French students learned that the military were not a profitable target for infiltration and subversion. On the basis of that experience, a number of them later advised militants elsewhere to concentrate their efforts against men subject to induction so that potential inductees could be won over to the cause before they were removed from the campuses or cities and subjected to military discipline.

Except for occasional picketing of Army and Navy depots or ports of embarkation, for the most part, the American student radicals followed this advice for several years. In December 1966, however, the SDS National Council set out to organize a "draft resistance program." New Left Notes (SDS' weekly publication) on 27 March 1967 called for a three-part campaign aimed at providing assistance to men seeking to avoid the draft, broader support of the Anti-Draft Union, and the transformation of anti-draft sentiment into a general protest against

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US involvement in Vietnam. New Left Notes listed the names of nine regional "coordinators" of this program and added a catalogue of non-SDS-campus and local antidraft organizations. A correspondent for the paper reviewed step by step the tactics he had employed to obstruct his induction in Fort Wayne, Indiana, in the spring of 1966. Occasionally, beginning in mid-1967, SDS began to employ servicemen they had won over while still in civilian life or lower ranking enlisted men, who had sought out anti-war groups in various localities, to smuggle anti-Vietnam tracts into military reservations. They also collected funds for or lent moral support to a small number of Army men courtmartialled for refusal to go to Vietnam.

The defection of four US Navy enlisted men in Japan in November and the role played in their subsequent travel to the USSR by the rabidly anti-American Japanese peace group Beheiren seem to have caused the SDS to adopt a more aggressive stance toward the military here in the United States. In collaboration with the Nationalization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, SDS agreed sometime early in 1968 to stage a "Summer of Support" to demonstrate to servicemen that the peace movement is genuinely interested in their welfare and to solicit "grievances" from young or disgruntled GIs. SDS undertook to operate "coffee houses" adjacent to such major installations as Fort Leonard Wood, Fort Hood, Fort Ord, Fort Lewis, and Fort Polk. Others are planned for Fort Sheridan and Fort Dix. In Washington, D.C., one is scheduled for the Greyhound Bus Terminal.

In recent weeks, the coffee houses at Fort Hood and Fort Jackson have become popular gathering places for young enlisted men and officers. A new series of underground papers designed for GI consumption--Vietnam GI, The Ally, The Bond--have been found in the barracks at both installations. These mimeographed or offset throwaways also have shown up in South Vietnam. In shifting the focus of their attention to the young GI, the student radicals have left behind many of the privileges and immunities--and many of the advantages--which are theirs within the university structure. They are more vulnerable to sanction

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from federal, state and local authority. They know this; there is little doubt that they are conducting their newest venture with considerable circumspection. Eventually local authorities may find some pretext for stepping in--if only to deny whatever licenses are required for establishments which cater to the public.

Too blatant interference with attendance at the coffee houses might prove counterproductive, especially as increasing numbers of college students and recent university graduates are inducted and turn to them for relief from the tedium of military life.

The Summer of Support could become a major undertaking for the duration of the Vietnam conflict. It affords the dissidents an opportunity to propagandize under conditions they deem almost ideal and... simultaneously enables them to strike out against as pivotal a structure of government as the Army.

Over the next few months, however, the young American radicals are more likely to shape their activities with an eye to the November election.

If the psychologists are correct in contending that many of the radicals' demands for a voice in administering the universities cloak their lack of authority over their personal lives, then the opportunity to help elect the nation's Chief Executive should prove a powerful magnet. However, it is unlikely that any candidate for national office will succeed in establishing a meaningful dialogue with the radicals--any more than any recent office-holder could for long have sustained a dialogue with young people who have few live heroes. To them, this year's campaign is an opportunity to propagandize, to exploit the "issues," to disrupt political rallies by the use of ridicule--just as they have belittled speakers on a number of campuses.

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### Prospects

Organizations like the SDS in the United States, the 22 March Movement in France and the Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund in Germany have received considerable notoriety as a consequence of their activities. For a good many students, that notoriety probably is directly translatable as effectiveness. For the short run, it would appear that they are the only vehicles open to the student radical and the less militant young person who is impelled for personal reasons to move from mere indignation to protest.

Many of today's students--far more than are directly involved in protest--share the activists' disillusionment with the political process. Because of the diverse and changing issues which fuel dissent, an end to the Vietnam conflict would not automatically signal the close of student protest. Other issues quickly would come to the fore.

The social and political malaise that underlies much of the present-day dissidence will not be speedily cured; there are, in fact, striking parallels between the situation today and the conditions of cynicism, despair, and disposition toward violence which existed after World War I and which later helped produce Fascism and National Socialism on the Continent. In Scandinavia, where the Vietnam issue has been central to dissent, an end to the conflict in Southeast Asia might well diminish the level of protest. Elsewhere in Europe, the prospects are less encouraging. In Italy, France, West Germany, Spain, and Portugal, the democratic base ranges from fragile to non-existent and could well be threatened should the dissidents provoke frightened governments into repressive measures of the kind that would broaden the nature of the dissent.

Several Latin American governments are observing closely the efforts of the Onganía regime in Argentina to depoliticize the universities and to end the abuses of fifty years. Meanwhile, an increasing number of them are disposed to quash student

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dissent with military force, as witness the case of Mexico. In Brazil, student agitation may well induce a reactionary military clique to pressure a reluctant but harried government into adopting far more harsh domestic policies. Meanwhile, local Communist parties have made inroads into student organizations, in some cases enhancing the chances of violence.

If an education is everywhere necessary for "success" by today's standards, it is doubly or triply so in Africa and other underdeveloped areas. For the educated African, then, political activity and government service become the most promising path to money, status, and power. The professions are limited, industry still is largely under European control and management, and military service holds little attraction. Until these conditions alter, student dissidence will be fed locally and will pose a threat to the stability of a number of governments.

It is debatable whether an end to the Vietnam conflict would defuse student dissent; some other pretext would serve equally as well. In the United States, where the question of university reform is real but not as pressing or as explosive as in Europe, peace in Vietnam probably would cause dissidence to subside--but not disappear. The chances are that some of those who lend support to SDS would lose interest and that SDS would turn with renewed vigor to the political problems of the slum dwellers. Given the discouraging record of past student forays into slum areas, it is moot whether any momentum could be sustained--especially if imaginative Federal, State and private redevelopment efforts were under way at the same time. Other radical groups would retain little more than nuisance value; most are too compromised by their association with Communist party organizations and too restricted by hidebound, unimaginative leadership to prove very effective once cut off from SDS or denied the Vietnam issue.

International Communism has not been able to employ its student/youth mechanisms to channel dissent in support of its objectives; nevertheless, Moscow benefits from whatever notoriety attaches to Free World institutions as a consequence of activism.

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The national Communist parties, particularly in Europe, have been unable to cope with the dissidents and view with alarm the possibility that their malleable youth organizations will be drawn toward the radicals.

A word of caution is indicated. Many sociologists and psychologists believe that industrial societies are disjunctive, that they tend to aggravate conflict between generations. If this is so, there is a likelihood that dissidence will worsen and that its base will broaden--unless the youthful energy which makes it so potent a force can be rechanneled to more constructive purposes.

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~~No Foreign Dissem~~**ARGENTINA**Summary

Recent student disturbances--the first since the Onganía government came to power in 1966--point up the problems that Argentina is encountering from its sizable student population. They also reflect the similarity between student problems in Argentina and those in France, West Germany, and even the United States.

To meet its student challenge, the Onganía administration has emphasized conservatism and tradition. It has been quick to suppress antigovernment demonstrations and has shown little sympathy for student demands.

Background

As in most of Latin America, the university system in Argentina in the nineteenth century was modeled after the Spanish. Students were required to memorize large amounts of unrelated material in rote style. The curriculum was concentrated on classical themes, such as Greek philosophy, ancient literature, medicine, and law; sciences and the humanities were not included. Also adopted from the Spanish was the "faculty system." Students entered a faculty which was self-contained. All courses were held there, whether or not related to their field of specialty. Thus a student in the Faculty of Medicine had all his history, language, and other non-medical courses within that faculty.

Not only the Spanish influenced the Argentine university system in the nineteenth century. The Positivist philosophy through its emphasis on the development of scholars and experts who would manage the affairs of the nation, established university graduates as an elite group. In addition, the immigrant wave from Europe which markedly altered the ethnic make-up of Argentina introduced a more enlightened university background from non-Spanish Europe, and some modern ideas began to penetrate the Argentine system. The role of the Roman Catholic

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Church in Argentine education was, in the meantime, declining, and by the early 20th century political reforms had ended the Church's sway.

It was not until 1918, after a student campaign against the university system at the city of Cordoba, that a reform program was achieved. Under "the Cordoba reform," students were given a voice in university administration, including the right to vote on course content, professors, and rectors for their schools. Tuition was eliminated, and drastic revisions were made in entrance requirements. The reform was basically a middle-class phenomenon. The universities--previously citadels for the sons of the upper-land-owning classes--were now opened to the middle classes. The working classes, however, were still largely excluded by tuition and fees. With the opening of the universities to the middle classes and the inclusion of students in university government came the involvement of students in national politics--a role they have been reluctant to relinquish.

Peron, when he assumed power in 1945, took control of the universities at all levels. He opened them to the lower classes by eliminating tuition fees, he ended the use of part-time teachers, and he established a "Workers University." Although political activities were banned by Peron, student organizations became even more politically oriented and shifted leftward in their ideology.

The fall of Peron signaled a return to the system that had prevailed under the Radicals. Student political groups ran the gamut from Communist to Far Right, but the most important were the Reformists, who had originally sparked the Cordoba reform, and the Humanists, who were oriented toward Catholicism. Although student political groups were independent of national party affiliations, the Reformists were later dominated by the Communists and the Humanists leaned toward Argentina's poorly organized Christian Democrats.

Dr. Arturo Illia was made president of Argentina in 1963 at the insistence of General Ongania, commander in chief of the Argentine Army. By 1965, the military were beginning to lose patience with the

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kindly old doctor from Cordoba--and so were Argentina's activist university students. Demands for improvements in the universities, including increased budgets, were mixed with student complaints about many of Illia's policies. In 1966, the leftist-oriented and Communist-run Argentine University Federation, to which most important student groups belonged, mounted increasingly violent demonstrations. These disorders were one of the factors which led to the 1966 coup and Ongania's assumptions of the presidency.

The Ongania government took over the national universities in September 1966. It claimed that its aim was to end student involvement in politics and to improve the educational system, but the exercise of undue force against students at the University of Buenos Aires drew world-wide condemnation. When the government demanded that university rectors take an oath of loyalty, many resigned; teachers at all levels, some fearing repressive measures, followed suit. New university regulations in 1967 placed the universities under the control of the Secretariat for Education of the Minister of the Interior. University administration was now to be handled by faculty and the Secretariat. Students could have no vote in the governing council, though they were permitted one elected representative, and all students were required to pass at least one course a year to maintain university status.

#### Universities Today

Argentina probably now has the best system of higher education in Latin America. Between 35 and 40 percent of Latin America's university students and several thousand students from outside the hemisphere are enrolled in Argentine schools. Enrollment in the nine national universities and 13 private institutions totals more than 250,000. State-owned university education is tuition-free, although private schools are permitted to charge tuition.

In 1966, Argentina's primary school system had 3,118,000 enrolled students--about 90-percent of the school-age population--and its secondary schools 755,000. Well over 90 percent of primary school

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teachers have teaching degrees, and the ratio of teachers to students is the lowest in Latin America. About 3.8 percent of the national budget each year goes to education--close to the 4 percent figure recommended by UNESCO.

There is another side of the Argentine educational picture, however. Only 50 percent of primary school students complete the total program. About 43 percent of those who enter secondary school go on to graduate, and only 25 percent of students who enter the universities eventually receive degrees.

The system also wastes resources because of its distorted pattern of degree specialization. About 25 percent of the university students study medicine. (Argentina has more doctors-per 10,000 population than the United States.) Another 20 percent study law. Despite the fact that Argentina has serious shortages in the natural and social sciences and in many technical fields, few students enter these disciplines.

Argentina's school system, like most in the world, suffers also from regional imbalance. Schools are concentrated in the major cities; the rural areas are largely neglected. The universities--both public and private--are scattered through downtown buildings of major cities. Students find private accommodations, at home or in rented rooms, and social facilities are for the most part nonexistent.

Private universities, which are relatively new in Argentina, must meet stringent academic and financial standards and submit to government supervision. All but three of the 13 schools are affiliated with the Catholic Church. Only about 15,000 students--six percent of the total university enrollment, attend private institutions.

When students attempted to hold demonstrations to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Cordoba reform in 1968, the Ongania regime proved that it was determined to bring order to the national universities. Police, both within the schools and on the streets, dealt quickly with the demonstrators.

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No available figures indicate the total number of professors in Argentine universities. It is known, however, that about 11,000 teachers at various levels were employed at the University of Buenos Aires prior to the 1966 take-over and that the staffs of other national universities are smaller. The limited number of full-time professors is the most striking feature of the universities. At the School of Economics at the University of Buenos Aires, for example, there are only 12 full-time professors for 15,000 students. Most classes, especially at Buenos Aires, are held in the evenings to allow both students and teachers to hold other jobs. Professors devote little time to research or writing, and many textbooks are collections of earlier printed works, rehashed and padded.

Many professors are politically to the left, ranging from mild Socialists to Maoist Communists. Although several former deans of the University of Buenos Aires have held far-leftist views, none are thought to have been Party members. The faculties of Philosophy and Letters of the same university have been strongly Communist, but their following has been limited. In 1965, however, they did prevent Presidential Assistant Walt Rostow from speaking at the Faculty of Economics.

The Communist activist professors were cautioned by the Communist Party not to resign after the 1966 take-over. Many who did leave their posts no doubt feared reprisals, either for their political views or for their Jewish origin. This year, however, most faculties are operating normally, with shortages mainly in the natural sciences, psychology and sociology.

#### The University Students

The large majority of students in Argentina's universities come from the middle and upper classes, with a small minority from the lower working classes. For the most part, they live in the same large cities where the universities are situated. In racial and ethnic background, they match the national profile--a mixture of Spanish and Italian, with other European strains and a few mestizo (mixed Indian

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and white). Unlike other Latin countries, the upper classes in Argentina are not exclusively of Spanish derivation. They also have Italian, German, and British heritages. Argentines tend to be highly discriminatory, however, especially toward dark-skinned people of any race. Although some conservatives still hold anti-Semitic beliefs, Jews have not been excluded from the universities. The upper classes who resent the middle classes, distrust the lower class, which make up a large part of the activist or radical university student groups.

Students from the upper classes can afford to attend schools in the US or Europe, and many do. They are, therefore, not as involved with university activities in Argentina as are other groups. Middle-class students attend the universities to cement or expand their standing in society. Most recognize that they must attend graduate schools abroad for a complete professional education. Lower-class students go to the universities to escape the ranks of the working class; many of them become the politically oriented activists and professional students.

Eighty percent of university students avoid demonstrations. They do not want to jeopardize their standing at the university or their future entry into Argentine society. Moreover, student protest or "rebellion" in Argentina is usually directed more toward revision of the existing system than to its complete overthrow. A number of student organizations, however, provide centers for student opinions and actions; many of them are leftist.

The Argentine University Federation, until the Ongania regime the principal student confederation, now operates with much reduced membership. Orthodox Communist youth, Communist dissidents, and other left-wing groups are all still involved in the organization, but the government keeps a close eye on their activities, and the organization has been able to do little within the country. The Humanists, like the FUA, oppose the Ongania reform, although they are apparently more circumspect about the prospects of a confrontation with the government. As an organized force, they now

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appear to be semimoribund. The Integralists are a pro-Catholic and somewhat leftist group, limited largely to the University at Cordoba. Although they were a major force in the 1966 riots against the Ongania take-over, they did not participate in the 1968 demonstrations, citing as a reason the Communist domination of the FUA. The Communist Youth Federation and the relatively new Communist Youth National Committee for Revolutionary Recovery vie for the membership of Communist youth.

Despite the diversity of orientation among the student groups, some common attitudes seem to prevail. Generally, organized students--Communist and non-Communist alike--oppose the restrictions imposed by the Ongania reform. They want the tripartite system of administration returned so that they can have a voice in the running of the schools. They oppose the rule requiring a student to pass one course per year and any requirements for payment of tuition or penalties.

The students mourn the loss of student politics--formerly their major diversion. They oppose the Ongania government because it is a dictatorship, and they disagree with its rightist policies, both foreign and domestic. Since many activist students come from lower-class origins, it is understandable that they favor Peronism and more benefits for labor. Although the activists bitterly opposed Illia when he was president, they now support the ousted Radicals as one means of opposing the present administration.

There is no evidence of serious contacts with activists in other countries, such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit in France or Mark Rudd in the US, although the FUA, through contacts in Communist front groups, probably is in indirect touch with student leaders in other countries.

#### Students and Organized Labor

Not since the Peron era has there been so much dialogue between student leaders and labor. Recent splits in the 2.5 million-man General Confederation of Labor have led to the formation of the so-called

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"rebel" CGT. Avowedly more leftist than the mainstream and more of an orthodox Peronist stripe than the main group, it actively opposes the government and has, therefore, attracted support from the FUA.

The fragile alliance between the "rebel" CGT and the FUA has offered little threat to the government. Nevertheless, an alliance between the majority of students and a strengthened "rebel" CGT could create a major problem for the government.

The non-student who is the same age as his university counterpart probably resents the privileges the university student has while in school and his opportunities after graduation. This resentment probably is tempered somewhat by the sentiments of the 75 percent of university students who fail to graduate.

#### Prospects

In some respects, Argentina's university students are today faced with a situation similar to that existing in 1918 before the university reform. They are virtually excluded from any control over the administration of the universities, and requirements of academic performance mean that the schools are no longer open to all. It seems likely, therefore, that the pressures that motivated the students in 1918 will do so again.

There are, however, significant differences. The Onganía government is quick to suppress antigovernment demonstrations and has not the sympathy for the students demands, which the Radicals had in 1918. Moreover, the failure of student participation to improve university administration or the educational system was demonstrated over a period of many years and student involvement in generally unstable politics after the reform was not generally well received.

The outlook for the universities is probably one of order but little progress in the next decade. There are few funds to direct toward university improvement in the present austerity campaign, which may last at least two to three more years. And there is less sympathy for innovation or change among Argentina's traditionalist leaders. Innovations either good or bad, can come only with a progressive government in Argentina. The prospects for this are not bright.

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## BRAZIL

Brazilian students have a long tradition of protest. Their grievances are legitimate, and pose a long-range threat to the maintenance of stability.

A cycle of student provocation and police repression tends to feed off itself. Recurring demonstrations are likely to continue at least until the government makes some moves to implement badly needed educational reforms. Until then, politically conscious students remain easy prey for any agitator.

Concurrently, pressure for firmer action to halt agitation builds up in the military--which is the key to the stability of the Costa e Silva government. The President's reluctance to act under pressure has virtually precluded his doing anything to satisfy either the students or the military. His continued inaction is likely to increase, rather than alleviate, the problem.

### Government Attitudes and Actions

Until the April 1964 revolution that ousted leftist President Joao Goulart, the dominant student organization was the National Students' Union (UNE) and its state level affiliates. The UNE was supported by the government and controlled by a united front of Communists and members of the radical student group, Popular Action (AP).

The revolution weakened but did not completely destroy the effectiveness of these groups. In late 1964 the Castello Branco government realized that the tradition of left-wing student organizations would not die easily, and that there would be little control over student activities in the absence of administration action. In November 1964 Congress passed the so-called Suplicy Law, establishing a new student representation system, headed by a National Students' Directorate. Disenchantment with this statute--which set controls on student activities as a requirement for continued financial support--undercut its effectiveness.

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In early 1967, the government amended the Suplicy Law and abolished student organizations at national and state levels, permitting only groups within individual universities and faculties. The 1967 law also banned student strikes and political activity, and further declared illegal all secondary school organizations--except athletic, civic, cultural, and social groups. It has been no more successful than the earlier version, and in effect has created a vacuum in which left-wing and radical groups have thrived in the absence of recognized student organizations.

The government has moved only desultorily to fill this void. One student group, Decision, has received government backing, but as yet it has failed to produce anything approaching a national organization. A government-sponsored civic action program, Project Rondon, designed to involve students in helping the poor, especially in rural areas, has yet to have any major impact either.

Neither the Costa e Silva nor the Castello Branco administration has been able--or willing--to establish rapport with the students. Both have viewed student political activity as subversive, and treated it as a police problem. This attitude merely has facilitated a trend toward the Left in student politics.

The Education Ministry is a morass of bureaucratic inefficiency, and Minister Tarso Dutra, is widely regarded as the least effective member of the cabinet. Despite heavy pressure, Costa e Silva has refused to replace him. The President's Special Commission on Higher Education--chaired by General Meira Mattos, a widely respected military man much distrusted by students--recently pointed to numerous faults in the educational system and recommended that the "whole structure undergo a complete reform." The government, however, continues to "study" the problem.

#### "The System"

The government--while admitting that some student grievances are legitimate--has maintained

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that it cannot undo overnight inequities created through decades. In point of fact, however, although the funds allotted to education since 1964 have increased, the educational system's share of the national budget has decreased during the same period from more than 11 percent to little better than 7 percent.

Secondary education depends largely on private schools which have been a bottleneck for the education of children from lower income families. Higher education brings together part-time students and professors in part-time, overcrowded universities with outmoded curricula and ill-qualified instructors who are so poorly paid that they must hold more than one job. The catedratico system, whereby professors hold life-tenure in university chairs, results in a powerful force opposed to reform. Further, university facilities are usually widely scattered.

Students take courses only within their own faculty. Many study law, preparatory to careers in politics or business, rather than the more demanding technical courses required for the understaffed fields of engineering, agriculture, or medicine. There is little emphasis placed on regular class attendance; students often remain for years without graduating, thus creating a professional student class that is particularly inclined toward politics and agitation.

#### The Role of the Student.

Brazilian students traditionally have exerted an influence out of proportion to their numbers. This derives in large part from the prestige which Brazilian society accords to intellectual attainment and from the elite nature of the educational system. Participation in university politics long has been a first step toward a successful political career.

Although the majority of Brazilian students are apathetic and apolitical--only 10 to 20 percent ever participate in student politics--they share many

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attitudes in common with the activists. One of these is an inordinate faith in Brazil's destiny and a deep disappointment over present day reality--poverty and illiteracy, undeveloped natural resources, and lack of opportunity. Few, however, are prepared to do more than protest.

Students generally place part of the blame for Brazil's difficulties on widespread corruption and on inefficient and mismanaged government institutions. Some few may blame the inflexibility of Brazilian society, while others accuse Communists and other radicals of vitiating development. For the majority, however, the most obvious scapegoat is foreign imperialism, which they believe siphons off the country's wealth and conspires to prevent Brazil's accession as a "Great Power."

Clearly the US is the most visible foreign power on the Brazilian scene, and as such the target of student, as well as popular, wrath. Even "democratic" Brazilian students state confidently that the US government is dominated by economic groups that control international politics and prevent the development of the "third world"; that the US initiated the planting of coffee in Africa in order to maintain Brazil in a colonial status; that US involvement in Vietnam is aggression and doomed to fail.

#### Student Organizations and Leaders

There are no effective national student organizations except those which operate clandestinely. The legal central student directorates and faculty-level academic directorates most often are controlled by leftists, many of whom simultaneously hold office in the clandestine organization and are members of a radical political movement.

A bewildering variety of splinter organizations come to prominence and then fade out, depending primarily on the ability of their key leaders. Students--like the majority of Brazilians--tend to support charismatic leaders, rather than ideas, which accounts in part for the disparities in student

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organizations from state to state and even from city to city. For example, leaders and organizations prominent in Rio de Janeiro may well be almost unknown in Curitiba or Recife.

The illegal UNE remains the dominant organization and probably commands at least the tacit support of most students. However, UNE recently has suffered from disagreement among key leaders over tactics and policy. The struggle at the national level appears to be between the militant Popular Action (AP) group, headed by Luis Travassos, which won control of UNE at its last national congress and a less radical group headed by Edson Soares and composed, at least in part, of people sympathetic to Communism. The basic difference between the two groups appears more a matter of degree than substance. AP militants are pushing to broaden protests to include national and international issues as well as legitimate educational complaints. Further, they want to reject outright any government offers to talk things over. The more moderate line prefers to restrict agitation to student problems and wants to accept the government's challenge--but only to "unmask" the administration's duplicity and the fact that it does not really intend to enact reforms. The Thirtieth UNE Congress, scheduled to be held clandestinely in the near future, may end in the establishment of two rival organizations. It is also possible that one side or the other will bow to whichever group has the greatest student following. At the present it appears that the AP radicals will give way.

This same split between radicals and extreme radicals exists in at least some of UNE's subordinate state organizations. The Sao Paulo group has been split for months. There are two presidents and two separate state organizations that manage to cooperate on certain issues, but waste much time and energy fighting each other instead of the government.

In addition to the legal and illegal student organizations, there are also political movements or parties which have student wings. In the case of the AP, students make up the great majority of

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the total membership, and they also constitute substantial parts of two smaller groups, the Revolutionary Organization of Marxist Political Workers (POLOP) and the Revolutionary Workers' Party/Trotskyite (PORT).

The AP is one of the most radical and certainly the most controversial of the student-oriented political groups. It was created in the early 1960's when some activists in the Catholic University Youth and the Catholic Student Youth groups broke away to participate in political and social reform movements. Young Catholic activists had been gradually moving further left since the mid-1950's, and their views consistently came into conflict with the conservative-moderate views of the church hierarchy. Although the AP's views were originally fairly typical of Catholic action groups, its clandestinity and cell-type organization led to a growing radicalization.

From its formation until the 1964 revolution, the AP controlled the UNE through a united front coalition with the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) and grew rapidly. Despite government efforts to destroy it, the AP has retained its hold on UNE, and until the recent schism appeared to be thriving. Now there is evidence to suggest, that the AP may be beginning to disintegrate in some states. Dissension and defections have occurred in Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo, and in Guanabara the AP has been virtually moribund since the police swooped up most of its state leaders in 1967.

Not a great deal is known about the AP. It is headed by a national command of four conscientiously obscure figures. There are ten regional commands, some of which are divided into zones. Internally, the AP is organized into cells of three to five members, base nuclei of three to five cells, and base assemblies made up of all nuclei members. This pyramidal arrangement continues through sections and section assemblies to the zone level. Certainly such sophistication has not developed in many states.

AP may number as many as 2,000. Finances are murky; at least some funds come from within the

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Church--particularly from the Dominican Order which has long had a special relationship with the AP. Other funds also come from Christian Democrats abroad, especially in Western Europe. Probably the majority of the money comes from the AP's own members and sympathizers.

Even if the AP's influence is waning, student militancy is growing. Marxism in its many shades and hues traditionally has appealed to Brazilian intellectuals. Many educators and students are influenced by its tenets and are easily led into supporting Communist causes. It is not likely that many students actually join the party, but many are willing to follow the Communist ideological lead and will end by giving at least tacit support to one or another of the Communist factions.

The PCB has long made a special effort to attract students. Despite the recent splits which have racked the party, it has continued these efforts and reportedly its leaders are much encouraged by their success in attracting new members as a result of student demonstrations. The Party has reactivated the Communist Youth Union that was abolished in 1958, not only to attract younger members but also to forestall the creation of dissatisfied young militants who until now have been taken directly into the party without any apprenticeship.

Working through regular student organizations, the Communists though few in numbers have been able to dominate policy through parliamentary maneuver, militancy and superior organizations, and because most Brazilian students are inclined toward Marxism and disillusioned with democracy as they see it practiced.

The PCB sends students to the Soviet Union and to Eastern European countries for academic and political training. There are probably about 200 Brazilian students studying in the bloc--perhaps 90 in the USSR and the others in groups no larger than 20 in other Eastern European countries. Few of them appear to be Communists; rather, they are mostly persons willing to take advantage of an opportunity for a higher education which few could have obtained at home.

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Several Communist-oriented splinter parties have developed as a result of splits within the PCB. In 1962 a group of young militants who favored Chinese-type violent revolution formed the Communist Party of Brazil (CPB). This group has had little success in recruiting, but some of its members may be active among radical students.

Late in 1967 another, larger group of dissidents led by Sao Paulo PCB Secretary General Carlos Marighella broke away because of the party's insistence on non-violent methods. It is not clear how many party members and sympathizers went with Marighella, but the PCB has had trouble reorganizing in such key states as Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. Marighella has opposed adopting any formal name for his group and strongly prefers that no organizational structure or bureaucracy be formed. He reportedly hopes to organize rural guerrilla groups and does not appear to give priority to student cadres.

The Marighella group itself did not remain united for long. One sector, probably led by Mario Alves de Souza Vieira and Jacob Gorener, has formed a movement known as the Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party (PCBR) which reportedly has had some success in attracting former AP members in Guanabara who admire its emphasis on the primacy of the working class and its advocacy of violent methods. The PCBR seems likely to attract some of the more militant students. It may be responsible for some of the recent incidents of urban terrorism.

Yet another dissident Communist group is the Communist Workers' Party (POC), reportedly made up of radical leftist students. It has at least some contact with Marighella. Another splinter group, active in Rio de Janeiro, is the United Front of Calabouco Students, which takes its name from the Calabouco restaurant closed by the government in late March. Students who had gathered to protest the planned closing were broken up by police who shot and killed student Edson Souto, setting off the wave of violent demonstrations that lasted more than a week and that have recurred spasmodically ever since. The front has produced at least one important student leader, Elinor Mendes de Brito, and is continuing its efforts to broaden its support.

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Backing for the Students

Confronted with this amorphous array, security forces have had little success in monitoring, let alone curtailing student activities. Officials are frustrated by their inability to apprehend key student leaders, who usually operate with protecting goon squads. Only rarely have police successfully rolled up portions of student organizations. Police forces, who must inevitably feel as though they are nailing custard to the wall, arrest any student or bystander upon whom they can lay hands.

Such repression has led to charges of brutality and has been responsible for a general increase in public support for the students' legitimate demands. The spontaneous demonstrations of early April have given way to well-organized antigovernment protest. Radicals realize that the student body can be galvanized into a potent force. They can maneuver, if not completely control, students and are able to turn a protest against police excesses into a demonstration against the "dictatorship" of foreign capital. Undisciplined secondary students add to the confusion, particularly since they appear to operate outside of the effective control of any organization.

Vitally important support has been forthcoming from the clergy--some of whom, with the consent of the hierarchy, have participated in demonstrations. Such diverse leaders as the controversial archbishop of Olinda and Recife, Dom Helder Camara, and the moderate Cardinal of Rio de Janeiro, Dom Hamme de Barros Camara, both have given their blessings to the students. Dom Helder has been particularly clear in stating his belief that students necessarily will be part of social reform in Brazil, and therefore the Church must build ties to them. While more moderate churchmen have refrained from clear-cut encouragement for the students--and even Dom Helder has tried to discourage radicals--all but the most conservative have at least tacitly approved their cause.

The Church's new-found enthusiasm for social and educational reform has, however, deepened the

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suspicion with which it is viewed by many "hardline" military men, some of whom regard the clergy as the most active force for subversion in Brazil. The growing coincidence of student-Church interests seems likely to add to the already simmering tension between the Church and the Costa e Silva government.

Student leaders have also sought to attract support from labor. Several unions have issued manifestos of support and some workers have participated in student demonstrations. In general, however, workers have shied away from too close an association—partly because of a traditional suspicion of "rich men's sons" who merely wish to exploit the workers' grievances for their own ends, and also from fear of government repression and a belief that association with radical students will lessen the effectiveness of worker protests. Such considerations militate against a meaningful worker-student alliance. Should they be overcome, the government would face serious trouble.

Opposition politicians have also been quick to try to capitalize on student demands. So far none has gained the support of the students, who regard such men as former President Juscelino Kubitschek and the outspoken Carlos Lacerda either as outmoded or opportunistic.

#### Prospects

Popular support for the students would not have crystallized had the government moved to implement needed reforms. The President's failure to understand the forces at work is clear from his repeated attribution of the disorders to professional agitators and to profiteers, opposition politicians, and persons whose rights were canceled after the 1964 revolution. He has frequently expressed his belief that there is a "vast, subversive plot," but fails to attribute any of the problems to his administration's

Student demonstrations, no matter how well-organized and widespread, will not bring down the government. They may, however, cause divisions within

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the military over the handling of the continuing turmoil. Military dissatisfaction with the performance of President Costa e Silva and some of his key ministers is likely to increase in proportion to the disturbances.

Costa e Silva apparently is undecided as to what course to follow. He has been reluctant to impose a state of siege, fearing that it would force him to take one authoritarian step after another, but his room for maneuver is increasingly limited.

Mounting student and military frustration with government inaction, however, does not bode well for even short-range stability in Brazil.

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## CHINA

Summary

Although many "new left" student leaders, from Rudi Dutschke to Mark Rudd, have acknowledged some sort of debt to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung," their borrowings from him have been eclectic rather than programmatic, romantic rather than practical. Mao addresses himself primarily to the problems of a peasant revolution--problems of a very different order from those connected with the urban, post-industrialized milieu that has spawned student unrest in Europe and the United States.

Nevertheless, many "new left" leaders undoubtedly see similarities between their "movements" and that of the Red Guards who have for the past two years been the spearhead of China's Great Proletarian Revolution. Some parallels are superficially quite striking. The Red Guards have appeared to attack the increasingly irrelevant and worn-out remnants of a used-up cultural tradition. They are fanatic and not open to appeals for compromise and reasoned adjustment. Their cry that "there can be no construction without prior destruction," while taken from Mao, has roots in an anarchic tradition that parallels but long predates similar currents in the West. Their attack on the self-satisfied Communist bureaucracy that had grown up since 1949 has appeared to reflect a deep-seated hatred of the twin evils of hypocrisy and inertia. Above all, the Red Guards felt that they were about to inherit the earth. And initially many militant Red Guard groups directed their ire specifically at the administrative apparatus of an educational system that did not appear capable of preparing them for the future that regime propaganda had assured them was to be theirs.

The Red Guards

In actual fact, the Red Guard phenomenon differs sharply from the kinds of student unrest evident in Europe and the United States. It was brought into existence and has been protected by the highest levels of the Chinese regime which closed schools in

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the summer of 1966--precisely so that the students could "make revolution." Except for a brief period in February 1967, Mao and the radical clique around him have persisted in keeping Red Guard organizations alive--often by artificial respiration--despite the damage these groups have caused to the Chinese economy and the orderly administration of the state. Moreover, the major targets of Red Guard attack--all those of real political importance--have been chosen by the regime. The radical Red Guard leaders have been close to extremist leaders of the regime in Peking and have taken their orders directly from them.

In addition, Peking has set up an elaborate logistic network to support the Red Guard movement. The more important Red Guard groups, with "liaison stations" and like-minded allies all over China, could not exist in their present form without such support. In this sense the Red Guard movement is an artificial--and in many ways highly structured--growth quite different from the student protest movements in the West.

The kindling was close at hand when Mao lit the fires of the Cultural Revolution. If he exploited and manipulated discontent within Chinese society, the discontent was real enough. Some of



RED GUARDS CHANTING REVOLUTIONARY SONGS

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the most obvious existed among the young and in the area of education and studies.

Population Pressures and Education

China faces the problem of a population that is at once expanding and growing younger. Both the population and the problem are much greater in China than elsewhere. There probably are 800 million people in mainland China today. Of these, almost exactly half--equal to 90 percent of the combined populations of the United States and the Soviet Union--are under 21.

China's educational facilities have expanded greatly since 1949, but they have not kept pace either with the burgeoning population or with the increasing expectations of the young--expectations that have been fostered by the regime itself. Competition for places in institutions of higher education has been particularly keen.

Even those who do manage to acquire a higher education frequently are stymied. Meaningful jobs commensurate with their educational level and skills often have not been available, and when openings have occurred they frequently have involved transfer from the comparative comfort of the great cities of east and central China to remote and backward outposts in the hinterland. Moreover, the Communist leadership that took power 20 years ago (in early middle age) at the end of the civil war has not relinquished its stranglehold on virtually all middle- and upper-echelon jobs of any consequence. The waiting line for these jobs has grown longer as the waiting period has grown more frustrating.

Within the schools themselves, tensions also have been high. Some of these tensions have been a direct result of regime goals that in practice have been conflicting rather than mutually reinforcing--an attempt to modernize the country on the one hand, and an attempt ideologically to remold Chinese society on the other. Mao has shown an awareness of these tensions, but his attempts to solve the problem prior to the Cultural Revolution exacerbated rather than relieved the situation.

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To build a modern country takes modern skills. To turn out large numbers of technically trained and oriented youths requires an emphasis on purely scholastic achievement. But those who perform best in an academic environment are those who can adjust most easily to the academic grind--that is those from a middle-class or bourgeois background. A peasant child in China normally would bear the same relationship to a more advantaged child from a bourgeois background that a disadvantaged child from an urban slum bears to a middle-class white child in this country.

Moreover, in China, as elsewhere, education is the key to advancement--however long deferred. Many of those who were best qualified intellectually for higher education were interested merely in material rewards and perquisites that a modernizing society must pay to the relatively small group that has attained technical proficiency. "Careerism," cynical or otherwise, became increasingly prevalent as the first flush of revolutionary enthusiasm wore off. At the same time, however, the regime was strongly emphasizing that China's youth would soon inherit both the country and the Chinese Communist revolutionary tradition. Mao in particular was anxious that tradition would not be diluted by an indifferently motivated youth bent on pursuit of successful careers. He insisted that peasant and



STUDENTS WAVING MAO'S WORKS--AUGUST 1966

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worker-class background must be the prime consideration in selection for places at institutions of higher learning.

Red Guard diatribes, even when discounted for polemical exaggeration, make it clear, however, that purely academic qualifications continued to play a part in the selection process. Thus, peasant and poor worker children, told that they were China's "revolutionary successors" and uniquely qualified for this role by virtue of their class background, found that the "class enemy" still was accorded significant preferment in the educational system. The hatred thus engendered boiled over in the early phases of the Cultural Revolution, when opposing student Red Guard groups broke down along class lines--particularly at the more prestigious universities, where bourgeois students were to be found.

These problems--(1) a population expanding more rapidly than the educational system can absorb the young but producing graduates more rapidly than a backward economy can use them, and (2) an educational system that tends to perpetuate a gulf between the advantaged and the disadvantaged--are by no means unique to China. But superimposed on them are still others growing out of China's historical and cultural experience.

#### The Weight of Tradition

The Chinese cultural system always has accorded a special place to the scholar. The imperial mandarin was an administrative system peopled by a scholar-elite. The way to advancement was through study and examination--and the rewards frequently were very great. Beyond material advantage, the educated man traditionally was accorded a position of honor in society. The pace of success was very slow. Rewards and honor went to the old and aging. The young were subordinate. "Scholarship" was devoted to quasi-Confucian ends bearing little relationship to the needs of the modern world.

The famous "May 4th" movement (1919) that followed the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty stood all this on its head: the youthful students who were the spearhead of the movement were exalted over their

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hidebound and repressive elders; traditional concerns and attitudes were denounced in the name of the liberating influence of modern techniques and Western intellectual currents. "May 4th" was the fountain-head of both the Communist movement and the Chinese nationalist movement in its modern form, as well as the source-point for most Chinese intellectual trends of this century.

The implications of this movement, however, really were not clear-cut as they once seemed. Elderly scholars were denounced and derided--but by younger scholars. Modern Western intellectual fashions, including Marxism, flowed into China--but the Maoist version of Marxism, which in time became the new orthodoxy, contained a heavy infusion of notions derived from a romantic view of the traditional, peasant-based uprisings that had punctuated Chinese history. Above all, although Confucianism as an administrative and philosophic system was discarded, the ethical and cultural assumptions on which it rested in large degree survived. The specific gravity of a culture that had remained virtually intact for some three thousand years proved very high, and the consequences of this fact still are working themselves out.

One immediate result of the "May 4th" movement was to fuse the connection between students and politics. Students not only played a major part in mobilizing public opinion against "imperialism" in the early 1920s, but also were prominent in the growth of the nationalist movement later in the decade. Student disenchantment with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang was an important factor in the long duel between the Communists and the Chinese Nationalists. The idealistic fervor of these "children's crusades" was important in the fluid politics of the 1920s, 30s, and 40s. It was much less so after the Communist take-over.

The diminished importance of the students as a political force, despite lip service from the regime, contributed to the disillusionment built into a situation that obtains when the "outs" who have been inveighing against "things as they are" must grapple with the intractable reality of attempting to run and modernize a country as vast and backward as China. In short, the Communists in power have

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proved as unsatisfying from the idealistic point of view as the nationalists before them.

These circumstances, frustrations, currents, and countercurrents were an explosive mixture, but it took a deliberate act on the part of the regime to set that mixture off. The secondary explosions continue, but in some respects a chain reaction only partly under control appears to be operating.

#### The Current Phase

Peking could at any time cow, control, or shut down Red Guard activity through the unlimited use of force. Unless it does, Red Guard chaos, feeding on itself, will continue indefinitely.

Mao and his radical friends are manipulating the students as a means of striking down or intimidating those officials they consider unreliable. But Mao is also unquestionably concerned about the state of the Chinese revolution--about the inevitable loss of revolutionary elan that has overtaken his movement after nearly 20 years in power. To crack down hard on the students would entail a further disillusioning and alienation of the nation's youth, which is--as he keeps saying--China's future.

Short of a drastic crack-down, the Red Guard movement seems destined to run on and on in its anarchical, disorderly way. The regime, particularly in the early days of the Cultural Revolution, portrayed the Red Guards as the repository of all virtue, a claim that the students could quite easily believe. But there are Red Guards and Red Guards: some formed in the name of Mao but actually manipulated by "local power holders" for immediate political ends; others, offshoots of authentic "revolutionary" groups; still more opposed to one another on obscure local issues. All are intractable and compromise, a betrayal of principles, is virtually impossible.

To conciliate one group is to alienate the others. Even partially to satisfy one group's demands is to increase that group's appetite for further gains. In the process, original grievances

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are long forgotten and the theme of "beggar thy neighbor" is dominant. Bloody sectarian battles breed new resentment. Whatever the intentions of the political manipulators in Peking, at the level of the average member of a Red Guard group, a kind of nihilism--battle for its own sake--becomes the ruling passion.

A further problem in controlling and channeling Red Guard excesses lies in the nature of the goals of the Red Guards. At best these are ill defined, but even as generalities they are shot through with contradictions. Some organizations, manipulated by local officials, have tended to defend given individual officeholders, but the true "revolutionaries" have agitated to "bring down" local, provincial, and national "power-holders" whom they regard as symbols of a frustrating status quo. This "program," if it can be called that, is essentially negative.

Insofar as Red Guard groups of any persuasion have a positive program, it is to acquire "power"--that is, to replace disgraced former officials. This ambition, probably is confined to the leaders of the various guard groups, but at all levels there is an amorphous hope that the log-jam blocking the way to relatively rapid advancement can be broken. In fact, however, there is little likelihood that Red Guards will secure an appreciable number of important official positions. Movement in this direction in December-January 1966-67 led to utter chaos and quickly had to be repudiated.

Implicit in Red Guard attacks on "power holders" is the larger, less well-defined aim of purifying the system. Starting from the Maoist premise of the corrupting influence of "revisionism" the Red Guards have tended to lay their collective frustrations to the ideological mistakes of the "power-holders." Their attacks on bureaucracy, routinization, specialization, and pragmatic devotion to efficiency in production at the expense of ideology, however, point up the ambiguous heritage of the "May 4th" movement, as well as the paradoxes inherent in the Maoist version of Marxism. The attacks on the old culture and on established ways of doing things that the Red Guards emphasized particularly

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in the early days of the Cultural Revolution are in the "May 4th" tradition. But routinization, specialization, and concern with pragmatic problems rather than ideological principles--an aspect of "things as they are" that has come under strong attack--are all inevitable manifestations of the modernization process. The demand for purity is in effect a call for a romantic, primitive Communism, at once utopian and nostalgic. It is an attempt to return to the heady days on Ching Kang Mountain, where Mao held out with a small band of true believers after the insurrectionary debacle of 1927.

These romantic and idealistic strands in the Red Guard program, because they are unrealizable, already have bred a counterreaction. Cynicism and "careerism," those objects of Red Guard scorn, have in the past year tended to grow, rather than diminish, among Chinese students. As inconclusive battles between rival Red Guard factions have dragged on, there has been a steady increase in individuals who have "opted out" of the struggle entirely and are uncommitted to any side. Many have become drifters, living from hand to mouth--the "flower children" of China. Others have gravitated toward criminal and semilegal activities.

In Red Guard ranks the general hope for advancement has tended to degenerate into a cynical "what's in it for me" attitude. Implicit in many of the fights over the apportionment of the positions and perquisites of "former power holders" is the idea that to the victors belong the spoils. Moreover, many Red Guard leaders, elevated to posts of responsibility, have evidently tended to lord it over their fellows in the manner of the "corrupt" officials they have just replaced.

These tendencies at present still coexist with the more idealistic strands of the Red Guard program. But as the Cultural Revolution drags on inconclusively and as the inevitable compromises with reality occur, the present trend would suggest that much of the fervor and idealism of the movement is petering out in the sands of frustration and perhaps despair.

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## CONGO (KINSHASA)

Summary

Student strikes are not new in the Congo, although during the past year they have been more frequent, wider in scope, and more militant. In all strikes--or threats of strikes--the university authorities, backed by the government, dealt harshly with the students. Student resentment has built up over the past several years and may partially account for the present increased student militancy.

Higher Education

The Congo has three universities with a total enrollment of about 3,000. Lovanium University in Kinshasa is the largest (about 2,000 students in 1966) and the oldest. It began operation in 1954 as a government-subsidized branch of the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium. The Congo Government currently underwrites about 40% of its budget. The Official University of the Congo at Lubumbashi (OUC) is a much smaller, government sponsored school with a 1966 enrollment of about 800. The third, the Free University of the Congo at Kisangani, had a 1966 enrollment of just over 200.

In addition, there are at least eight special public schools at a post-secondary, but nonuniversity, level to provide training in specific fields such as mining, teaching and medical training. In 1964 these schools had a total enrollment of about 1,400.

According to 1964 estimates, the universities and special schools had a combined faculty of nearly 450. Of these, approximately 415 were non-Congolese. A few had administrative duties in addition to teaching responsibilities. About 80% of the university students are Congolese nationals. Other Africans make up an additional 10%, and non-Africans another 10%. About 1,000 Congolese are studying abroad--the majority in Belgium.

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Because so much emphasis was placed on the Congo's shortage of college-educated young men at independence, most university students today regard themselves as a unique group and share what has been dubbed the "future leader" complex. They see themselves as an intellectual elite deserving of a government job in Kinshasa, and totally reject the idea of returning to the bush where their new found skills could be profitably employed. There have been at least two attempts to found a type of domestic peace corps, but both times the university students sent their regrets.

The students range from left of center to radical in their political thinking. Most espouse some sort of socialism or vague Marxism and generally reject capitalism. Unable to identify with any Congo regime since independence, they are dissatisfied with the present government and are among the few with the courage to say so.

The politically-significant students are the 2,000 at the Lovanium. Lovanium is the best university and the one with most prestige; moreover, it is located in Kinshasa where most meaningful political activity takes place. Student activity at Lovanium is controlled and directed by the General Association of Lovanium Students (AGEL). Recently, however, the General Union of Congolese Students (UGEC), an international organization which includes Congolese students throughout the world, has made inroads into the student political structure at Lovanium.

Information on the size of these two groups and the proportion of their membership to the entire student body is unavailable. They probably represent only a small minority.

Feelings of student solidarity do exist, however. Following the arrest and rather harsh treatment of several AGEL leaders in early 1968, for example, most students not sympathetic with the leaders or their leftist concepts were nevertheless bitter about the government's repressive tactics. Many felt that the government had exaggerated an "alleged subversive plot" as justification for further repression.

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Those students several years out of the universities who have joined the government usually have tempered their views. They become more conservative--in keeping with the present regime--and more middle class orientated. Graduates who are unable to "compromise" their principles find jobs with private business in the Kinshasa area.

#### Recent Strikes

Congolese students have been striking periodically since independence. Generally, such strikes have been minor, of short duration, and aimed at securing better food or living conditions. In early 1967 there was a major strike for "Congolization" of the university. Since early 1968, there have been strikes, threatened walk-outs, or demonstrations at all three universities and at several of the special schools. In June 1968, even secondary school students took to the streets to protest the handling of their final exams. Lovanium students went on strike for better living conditions and better academic instruction in March 1964. There were no demonstrations; professors and college employees circulated freely on campus. The students demanded and received removal of army units from the campus as a pre-condition for negotiations. Within a week, government officials, university administrative personnel, and students formed a committee to consider student complaints, and classes resumed. The joint study committee came to naught several weeks later, but the strike did not resume because the students were preparing for final exams. With the beginning of the new academic year in October 1964, there was talk of renewing the strike, but nothing came of it. Few student demands had been met.

A student strike in February 1967 closed the Lovanium for nearly two weeks, following the suspension of four students for assaulting several university employees. The strikers demanded a role in the administration of the university, such privileges as free treatment at health clinics and cut-rate meals at restaurants, as well as freedom from government interference in academic affairs. The university rector ordered several of the strike leaders off the campus on two hours notice and refused to meet with some government officials who sought to intercede on the grounds that the problem was solely a university matter. President Mobutu personally mediated between the students

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and university officials. He reaffirmed to the students his support of the university authorities, although he did agree to consider student demands for a greater voice in policy making. For two weeks the university was garrisoned by army units; this and Mobutu's firm stand dampened student enthusiasm.

Students at the Official University of the Congo at Lubumbashi (OUC) demonstrated for two weeks in late January 1968, protesting administrative handling of student rights--e.g., housing scholarships for married students and transportation. Radicals among them took advantage of the situation to circulate inflammatory Marxist tracts and introduce a revolutionary tone. Several university employees were assaulted. The central government's Minister of Education went to Lubumbashi and pointedly reminded the strikers that they were receiving education as a gift of the state. The presence of armed security forces surrounding the Minister sufficiently underscored his message and cowed the students.

Students have become increasingly vocal so far this year. Lovanium students held a small scale, off-campus, anti-Vietnam demonstration during Vice President Humphrey's visit to Kinshasa in January 1968. In March, two special schools in Kinshasa were strikebound--one for five days. An April demonstration at the Free University of the Congo at Kisangani was headed off by the dispatch of troops, as was a strike planned for the following month at Lubumbashi. OUC students rioted for two days late in May.

In all cases, the government has dealt harshly with demonstrators, usually calling troops to restore order and guard campus property. Lip service has been paid to student complaints, but little action has been taken. The legitimate grievances of Lovanium students, fairly peacefully presented in 1964, have yet to be resolved. In the process, the students have become sullen and resentful of the paternalistic treatment they receive from university and government officials.

#### Outside Influences

Soviet-bloc financing for student leaders has been often rumored or assumed, but it is difficult to prove. Student leaders more likely act on their own.

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in accordance with their political philosophies. Some reportedly maintain contacts with members of the Belgian Communist Party which prepared several of the more inflammatory tracts circulated by the students in recent demonstrations.

The mass media are government controlled, and have not supported the students. Following the February 1967 Lovanium strike, the Kinshasa press commented favorably on some student grievances, perhaps reflecting a divergence of views within the regime.

The Mobutu government has tried, so far unsuccessfully, to win over the university students. The youth wing of the single political party (JMNR) has been singularly unable to attract students--many of whom may consider themselves above its level of politics.

Anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism have seldom been a real issue, although many students are critical of Kinshasa's open support of the United States and would prefer to see the Congo join the nonaligned bloc. So far, little blatantly antiregime sentiment has surfaced in the strikes and demonstrations. But the government's harsh treatment of student demonstrators has produced discontent which will probably continue to smolder and could lead to more serious trouble in coming years.

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## ETHIOPIA

### Introduction

The Ethiopian students basically are the same as students in most developing countries. They suffer from the same anti-establishment views including a deep-seated suspicion of the developed world, which sometimes approaches paranoia. However, the Ethiopian has the additional burden of an autocratic traditionalist government which he views as unprogressive, corrupt, and unwilling to accord the newly educated class responsibility.

The student - young elite dissent actually seems more on the order of a generation gap within the Amhara-Tigre family from which most of them come. Their dissent does not mean, however, that the dominant ruling Amhara-Tigre minority, roughly 40% of the population, is likely to relinquish its long-held power over the other ethnic groups of the Empire, or bring them more actively into national life.

### The Students

The students have no clearly defined goals. They talk of replacing the conservative establishment, including Haile Selassie, with progressives--preferably themselves--so that Ethiopia can catch up with other emerging countries. However, they do not seem to envision destruction of the Imperial system, or any dramatic break with Ethiopian tradition. Most seem to favor a constitutional monarchy, with the Crown Prince replacing Haile Selassie, and some degree of open political activity. While virtually all students share the same frustrations regarding the regime and feel that as educated Ethiopians they have a responsibility to promote actions on national problems, the large majority still is relatively conservative. They are leery of tactics which might jeopardize their own education--they are almost wholly subsidized by the government--and skeptical of the Marxist radicals. This radical minority has openly stated that political action against the regime is the proper goal.

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of student life. Thus there have been repeated clashes between student organizations and the university administration over the degree of permissible political activity, with the administration awkwardly caught between students and the government.

The hard core dissidents are a relatively small group, generally described as Marxists, centered on the Addis Ababa campus of Haile Selassie University. A recent embassy estimate places them at around 50-100. They are well organized and have been effective in propagandizing and exploiting other students. The government security apparatus has the ringleaders pretty much identified and watched.

The radicals first came into the picture in December 1966 with the formation of an Addis campus political group called the University Students Union of Addis Ababa (USUAA). The radicals soon gained control of their organization. The National Union of Ethiopian University Students (NUEUS) is also dominated by the radicals. More important than these open organizations is an informal, clandestine student group called the "Crocodile Society," composed of some of the influential members of the other two groups. There are an estimated 70 "Crocodiles." Since the USUAA has become active and the "Crocodiles" more aggressive, their propaganda has become more hostile to the regime and more anti-US, using the vitriolic language learned from Communist countries.

#### Anti-US Overtones

While the April '68 riots were the latest of what is threatening to become an annual spring rite, this year saw an anti-US bias which, while it has existed among the students for a long time, had not been as openly expressed before.

The American presence in Ethiopia is large and obvious in the economic assistance field, through our extensive military assistance program,

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and (more obvious to the students) at Haile Selassie University. The US is regarded as the principal external prop of the regime and thus is resented. The Ethiopian is proud, often to the point of xenophobia, of his country's long independence and tradition, and suspicion of foreigners or outside meddling in internal affairs is ingrained in the Ethiopian personality.

#### The University

Haile Selassie University, the center of student life in Ethiopia, contains six components. The principal and oldest is the University College of Addis Ababa. The others are the College of Agriculture, College of Engineering, Institute of Building Technology, the Public Health College and the Theological College. Not all of these are located in Addis Ababa, but the capital is the focus of student discontent. Total student enrollment at the university in 1965/66 was 2,256. The faculty in Addis totals approximately 479, of which a large number are foreign nationals. Americans comprise the largest number of foreign faculty members.

The university is run by a board of governors consisting of Imperial appointees and elected members. Administrative authority is vested in a president (Ethiopian) and two vice presidents, one of whom is an American. All three are appointed by the Emperor. Final authority in academic matters resides with a Faculty council.

Most of the day to day administration rests with the American vice president, who somehow keeps the campus functioning in a businesslike manner. Because of his exposed position he was the focus of much student criticism during the April 1968 riots. The president, while well thought of, tends, like most Ethiopian bureaucrats, to avoid responsibility for unpopular decisions and has depended on his American deputy to act for him. The government does not intervene directly, except to quell student disorders and discipline recalcitrant students. The success of any university effort to discipline the student body depends in the last analysis on the backing given it by the government. The government

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sometimes will prove conciliatory if that course is tactically convenient, but generally responds to student activism with various forms of repression. The police have been particularly brutal in repressing students in the past.

Faculty support of any sympathy for student protests has depended on the issues involved. In the demonstration in early 1967 the faculty, both foreign and Ethiopian, united in support of the students, while in April 1968 the foreign faculty reacted adversely. Ethiopian faculty members generally were sympathetic, primarily because they shared the students' antiregime sentiments.

The 1968 riots began on the pretext that a campus fashion show was "invading and corrupting our national culture." It was basically an anti-government and anti-Western protest, and quickly degenerated into a looting spree joined by secondary students, street urchins, and some of the unemployed of Addis. Several days of police action were required to restore order. Imperial Bodyguard troops were also used to guard installations and relieve the police. The USIS building was considerably damaged.

#### Political Connections

There are no political parties in Ethiopia. Therefore, the traditional European links between students and established parties are not possible. Student activists maintain intense contact and interchange ideas with politically minded members of the young elite in the university faculty, the civil service and private sector. Some sympathetic government officers may even from time to time give limited cover to the students, as happened this spring. Student links to younger army officers are less direct or intense, but some sympathy for student views does exist in the officer corps.

Embassies, including our own, cultivate students, with the East Europeans concentrating on the radicals. The extent of foreign Communist involvement with the radicals in Addis is not clear. When the police raided student headquarters in April of

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this year, they found considerable propaganda material and even an espionage training film. The students also maintain contact with both pro-West and Communist-front international student groups. Perhaps the most important outside tie of the activists is with organizations of Ethiopian students in Europe and North America, all of which are violently antiregime, anti-US, and Marxist-oriented.

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## FRANCE

Summary

Student unrest is due primarily to the failure of the university system to adapt itself to the Twentieth Century. Unlike a majority of students, whose grievances could be met by a far-reaching modernization of the university system, the determined and articulate minority which is the New Left, opposes the French society itself, on the grounds that it is dehumanized and corrupt. Their goal is a permanent cultural revolution aimed at "exploding" the country's emergent post-industrial society. Far from shaping and controlling events, Communist leaders reacted haltingly to student protest under pressure from young workers who were in the forefront of labor sit-ins.

The government seems determined to use strong countermeasures, police force if necessary, to keep students in line.

Underlying Causes

There has been an enormous increase in the university population over the last decade. Prior to the Fifth Republic, higher education generally was reserved to a select group, but in an enlightened attempt to provide more graduates for places in an increasingly technological society, Gaullist politicians accelerated the post-World War II policy of educational "democratization" by reducing the entrance standards for universities. When De Gaulle came to power in 1958, there were roughly 170,000 university students; today more than 600,000 are enrolled.

Inevitably, other national priorities prevented the government from providing the funds necessary to keep pace with the needs of the students. For example, plans to expand the 700-year-old Sorbonne in Paris never were implemented. The Faculty of Sciences has facilities for 24,000 students and an enrollment of 31,000. Libraries and lecture halls are outdated and overcrowded, and students are excluded from using

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the Bibliothèque Nationale (France's Library of Congress) until after they have received their degrees. A number of new campuses have been erected near Paris and in the provinces, but their modernistic facades mask grave deficiencies. Outside Paris at Nanterre, the first university to erupt in demonstrations, the swimming pool has been completed, but there is no library.

Students are graded by a rigid testing system developed by Napoleon. It places excessive emphasis on rote memorization. As a result of this and inadequate preparation, between one fourth and one third of all students fail first year examinations. As the proportion of repeaters increases--and in many faculties their number is rising more rapidly than the influx of new students--university facilities are further choked.

There is little vocational orientation. The "Grandes Ecoles"--those elite institutions which prepare students for positions in the government and business--are highly selective and operate on a quota system. Four out of every five applicants fail to gain acceptance to the "Grandes Ecoles" and must enter the other university faculties. Only 28 percent of this larger group pursue any scientific curriculum. Of the small percentage of French students who finally graduate, only about 25 percent find employment in their field of preparation.

University professors are required by law to spend only three hours a week in a classroom; many appear only for lectures and then return to their research or to other positions. Professors at the suburban and provincial universities prefer to live in the more congenial atmosphere of Paris and commute once a week to their place of employment. None of the law professors at the University of Lille, for example, live nearby.

University rectors preside over a maze of almost autonomous faculties and lack authority to make changes on their own initiative. They must clear even insignificant personnel changes with the Ministry of Education in Paris, and faculty appointments must be authorized by the Minister of Education.

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Students, also, face an elaborate bureaucratic labyrinth when they approach graduation.

Grievances borne out of such conditions created a climate in which a minority of New Left student leaders were able to initiate the first of a series of demonstrations which resulted in widespread rioting in May--riots which spiraled into the most severe domestic crisis of the Fifth Republic.

Student Organizations, the New Left, and the May Crisis

On the eve of the crisis the largest of the student unions, the socialist-oriented Union Nationale des Etudiants de France (UNEF), and the smaller and Communist-dominated Union des Etudiants Communistes (UEC), were attempting to stem what appeared to them to be the increasing apathy, i.e., what they deemed the "depolitization" of the student community. At the same time, however, these established student organizations were being outflanked on the left by a number of New Left groups--the Federation des Etudiants Revolutionnaires (FER), the Jeunesse Communiste Revolutionnaire (JCR), and the pro-Chinese Union des Jeunesse Communiste Marxiste-Leniniste (UJML). Unwisely most observers dismissed the newer radicals as an insignificant minority, incapable of mobilizing the apathetic majority of students. Typical of these was a reporter for the respected Swiss journal Neue Zurcher Zeitung, who, after investigating the student scene in early March 1968 concluded: "In comparison with the student unrest which has broken out from Berkeley to Berlin and from Warsaw to Cairo, the situation in France is actually peaceful."

But the situation already had deteriorated at Nanterre. In January 1968, during the inauguration of a new sports center, Daniel Cohn-Bendit publicly insulted Minister of Sports Francois Missoff. Exploits such as this soon earned the fiery young German the moral leadership of most student radicals. On 22 March, following the arrest in Paris of Vietnam war protesters, students led by Cohn-Bendit occupied faculty offices at Nanterre. Soon after there were formed two new coalitions--the Movement of 22 March and the Comite de Liaison des Etudiants

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


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Revolutionnaires (CLER). Both played a major role in the May explosion.

Tension increased still more at Nanterre because of the activities of the Occident Movement, an extreme rightist student group whose members described themselves variously as neo-fascists, O.A.S. sympathizers, or French Nazis. Organized into seven-man cells, they trained for street fighting, engaged in brawls, and set out to disrupt meetings of the Movement of 22 March, CLER, and other leftist student groups. At the Sorbonne, also, Occident attacked all left-leaning student groups, including the UNEF. The fighting became so bitter that university authorities at Nanterre suspended classes between 27 March and 1 April--a move which led only to increased disorder throughout April. Occident's actions served to engender student sympathy for the New Left; they also forced the UNEF to become more militant.

The Nanterre protest movement spilled over to the Sorbonne, where on 3 May the government attempt to disperse demonstration of less than 1,000 resulted in 576 arrests and the sentencing to prison of five students. This gave protest leaders a concrete issue and prompted moderate students to unite behind the radicals. After three days of clashes between students and police throughout the Latin Quarter of Paris, the UNEF as well as the usually conservative teachers union--the SNESUP--called for a general student strike. They



The Black Flag of Anarchism

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received an enthusiastic response. The student revolt spread to every provincial campus, and sparked a nationwide general strike. By 13 May the students had gained widespread sympathy from the country, and the government had been forced to admit the need for a major university reform and granted an amnesty for all those who had been arrested. Police were withdrawn from the Sorbonne area.

The Majority and the New Left

The majority of students who followed the lead of the New Left did so in hope of winning a reform of the university system--adequate facilities, an education relevant to their future lives, contacts with professors and a voice in determining what is taught, and a decentralization of the bureaucratic university system. In short, they want an education better adapted to the type of post-industrial society emerging in France and elsewhere in Western Europe.

These goals--goals which are likely to become those of the Gaullist government--are not shared by leaders of the New Left. These determined and articulate few oppose any pragmatic reform aimed at renovating the university to permit it to take its place in a society which they believe a priori is dehumanized and corrupted. They would have the university become the staging ground for a permanent cultural revolution designed to "explode" bourgeois society, something they call an "anti-university," a "counter-university," or a "critical university."

The French New Left did not plan in May and does not now seek a political revolution in the sense of a forcible seizure of power by an organized party. They contend "who rules" in a modern society is "less a question of the party in power than of the organization of labor, the distribution of technological authority, and the control of information and publicity." Thus, their strategy is to further

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"A real cultural revolution working through a new dynamic educational system led by "critical universities" in ferment, a freed television, new experiments in other communications media, including literature and the theater, could lead to a rapid evolution in mass consciousness of the social situation, to the point where the gap between the "real" country and the "governmental" country becomes too wide, the lack of representivity of present structures and leaders too patent, new solutions and new leaders appear on the left, and the explosion, either peaceful or violent, follows."

Given these views, the New Left's rejection of traditional electoral politics is not surprising. After De Gaulle dissolved the National Assembly and called for a plebiscite on 30 May, the radicals described the elections as "treason" and printed ballots which read "I have already voted at the barricades."

The Gaullist parliamentary victory in June which wrote an end to the crisis of May further increased their dissatisfaction with all forms of peaceful political change, and it is unlikely that the radicals will be brought to accept--in the foreseeable future--democratic methods of attaining their goals.

#### Outside Influences

there are indications that the Deutscher Sozialistische Studentenbund, the West German radical student group, played a minor role. Cohn-Bendit has contacts in this organization, members of it traveled to France to take part in the demonstrations (apparently on their personal initiative), and the organization made at least token financial contributions.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Role of the French Communists

The French Communists played no role in the first phase of crisis in early May, and at the outset were openly critical of the students. The French Communist Party (PCF) condemned the student demonstrations on the grounds that they were led by "false revolutionaries" ignorant of the dialectics of the class struggle. Communist labor leaders criticized the movement because it was dominated by "sons of bourgeoisie," rather than workers.

There is a long history of open hostility between the PCF and French students, especially New Left revolutionaries and the Communist-led UEC. Many one-time UEC leaders had been expelled from the party because of their demands for a more liberal party policy or because they favored a pro-Chinese line. Because of the PCF's reluctance to take student demands into consideration, many Communist youth defected to the New Left. Student revolutionaries in turn condemned the PCF as an archaic, reformist remnant of the establishment labelled party leaders as "Stalinist creeps."

The PCF and the Communist-led General Confederation of Labor (CGT) nonetheless did a quick about-face after the first week of student-police confrontations resulted in a ground-swell of public support for the students. The CGT joined non-Communist unions in calling for a general strike on 13 May. On the same day Communist politicians and labor leaders marched in Paris with students and representatives of the non-Communist left in a massive "people's parade" of over 300,000.

In return, student leaders complained that the Communists had not been at the barricades during the first days of violence and struggle, and that their late entrance into the movement was an attempt to exploit the student protest for the party's ends.

This assessment has validity. In fact during the May crisis there were two movements--one controlled by students, the other by young workers. French Communists always have placed the interests of the workers among whom they have many followers

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above those of the politically ineffectual students. They are by and large a force of moderation and are opposed to the revolutionary goals of the New Left.

Students' and professors' unions declared jointly on 17 May that the participation of the workers had altered the odds in their favor, but both the PCF and the CGT remained unenthusiastic and opposed all subsequent attempts to forge a worker-student alliance. Most workers--Communist and non-Communists--agree with their leaders in this regard. Few working class sons are presently in French universities, and there is a saying among workers to the effect that "Today's college student is tomorrow's police official." Only an undetermined number of the younger rank and file sympathize with the student-dominated New Left.

The PCF and the CGT prefer to present themselves to the "responsible opposition." Despite the party's crushing defeat in the June elections this is not likely to change. Divisions within the PCF will probably become more evident, however, and it is possible that there will be defections--especially from the ranks of the intellectuals.

#### Prospects

The Gaullist government has announced its intention to reform the university system. When specific reform measures are announced, it is likely that they will aim at gearing the educational establishment to the broader needs of the country's society and economy. If they are successful, much of the discontent which gave depth and breadth to the May disorders is likely to diminish over the years.

In the short run, however, further disorder seems inevitable. Pressures for faster change, and disagreement over the course of such change, will provide ample issues for demonstrations and counter-demonstrations. Even minimal reform is certain to meet resistance on the part of the bureaucratic Ministry of Education as well as in the conservative academic community.

The New Left is almost certain to oppose any reform which runs counter to its radical idea of a university. If so, its student groups may lose their

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appeal among more moderate students, but the New Left still will constitute an articulate minority in certain situations. Meanwhile, the exploits of May will be romanticized and lend an auro of mystique to a movement which is essentially a "romantic revolt."

Many Gaullist leaders are extremely pessimistic.

government leaders argue that the only effective answer to the "nihilists" is force--"police force." Given the present mood of that large segment of French society badly frightened the disorders of May, this is likely to be the Gaullist government's response to university disorder.

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## THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### Summary

The West German student radicals, whose demonstrations erupted into violence in early spring, have used much of the same language of protest as students in other countries, including an emphasis on their alienation from the established order. Though a small minority even in the universities, they have aroused widespread sympathy among their contemporaries.

There is an impatience with established forms of political expression--in particular, the present Bonn coalition--and an idealization of romantic, violent revolt on the Che Guevara pattern.

### The Radicals

As in other countries, the actively protesting students are only a small minority of the total university population, which now is approximately 300,000. They have been found at all important universities, with strong contingents at Frankfurt, Munich and Cologne. Their largest and most determined concentration, however, is at the Free University of West Berlin, which has become a kind of magnet for student radicals because--among other reasons--the military conscription laws of the Federal Republic are not applicable in West Berlin. Few as the radicals are in numbers, they are not a group entirely apart, scorned and ridiculed--as once they would have been--by their contemporaries; they represent merely one end of a spectrum which includes many other dissenters who on occasion join in demonstrations.

Because of the freedom of movement now enjoyed by most West Europeans they also have some ties with radical students in other countries. For example, French student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit is not alone in France in having acquaintances in German student circles, and some German students

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have as individuals taken part in French riots. German texts relative to agitation have been translated in Paris for French student use. In both countries, the radical students form a loose conglomeration, with anarchist, Trotskyite, Maoist, and Castroite ideologies all represented.

The most important of the German radical student organizations is the German Socialist Student League or *Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund* (SDS) once affiliated with and supported by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), but an independent organization since 1961 and thus able to appeal to those who believe that socialist opposition elements have had no spokesman since the SPD became part of the Bonn government in December 1966. Probably the main reason for the party's disavowal of the SDS in 1961 was the use by the SDS of material from East German archives to expose former Nazis serving as judges in West Germany. The membership of the SDS was given as only 1,600 in a report made by the West German Minister of Interior earlier this year. At the Free University of West Berlin, with an enrollment of over 15,000, SDS members number an estimated 400-500.



ANTIWAR DEMONSTRATORS, WEST BERLIN, OCTOBER 1967

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The Humanistic Union, which includes both students and others, is another group which has been active in organizing demonstrations in Berlin.

### The Moderates

Other student political organizations are approximate counterparts of the major political parties. Present affiliations include the Liberal Student League of Germany (LSD) with the Free Democrats; Circle of Christian Democratic Students (RCDS) with the Christian Democrats; and the Social Democratic University League (SHB) with the Social Democrats. A roof organization, the Circle of Political Youth, is supposed to unite these groups, but is relatively inactive. Both the LSD and SHB stand to the left of their parent parties, and there are signs that ties between the SHB and the SPD may be severed, as happened with the SDS. The RCDS has been less active than the others. In several universities, leftist students have gained added influence through their control of the official student government organizations (ASTA).

### The Generation Gap

The alienation of one generation from the other is particularly marked in West Germany where the elder generation is more discredited than perhaps in any other country. Most over 40 are more or less tarnished by their association with Nazism, whose ugly history is increasingly well-known to German youth. Those in their thirties are still likely to be dismissed as mere hedonists, wallowers in the "economic miracle." Germany's recent history, which is probably more thoroughly known



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than is the case in other countries, serves as a lesson in what to reject. Aside from the resistance conspirators against Hitler, there are almost no heroes.

The generation gap is further evidenced by West Germany's version of the "hippies"--the *Gammler* or vagabonds, who invade Munich's *Englischer Garten* by thousands in summer. They are probably of little or no political significance, but they shock the more staid citizens of the Federal Republic by their refusal to work or to wash, and citizen hostility aroused by the vagabonds rubs off on student radicals. Some of the university students are also in effect *Gammler*, such as the members of *Kommune I* in West Berlin, a Maoist student colony which was far out enough to be excluded even from the SDS.

#### Low Level of National Pride

For some years past, West German youth has shown a distaste for the traditional manifestations of nationalistic feeling. In the '50s the prospect of military service evoked the slogan "Ohne mich" (Count me out).

In a country-wide poll in 1967, 78 percent of all the respondents stated that in a referendum they would vote to create a United States of Europe; those voting "yes" included 94 percent of the respondents with a university education, and 82 percent of those between 16 and 44. Nevertheless, a plurality did not expect to see a United States of Europe in their lifetime, so that one has the impression that the sense of loyalty among Germans may really be lying idle, awaiting a claimant.

Faith in European Federation has been shaken to a degree by the policies of President De Gaulle. Concern for German reunification has found no practical expression, and the feeling which once ran strongly against the East German regime has ebbed. While students once helped dig tunnels under the Berlin Wall, this activity has been terminated at the instance of the West Berlin authorities.

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Leftist intellectuals who formerly maintained ties with the Social Democratic Party now are alienated by the party's participation in the Grand Coalition and have wide influence among the thinking youth. Generally, the old orientations have come into question, and the students now find substitutes outside the traditional framework.

#### Dissatisfaction With the Educational System

Another important cause of unrest is probably frustration with the limitations of the educational system and career prospects. Education is still a privilege, and the school system is highly selective. Even now, only six percent of the *Gymnasium* graduates and five percent of the university students come from working class (blue collar) families. In 1965, 165,355 students were admitted to the *Gymnasium*, the secondary school, but that same year only 48,528 graduated and received the *Abitur*, which is a license for admission to the university.

University students are enrolled for longer periods than in most countries: an average of 6 to 8 semesters is required for a *Diplom*, equivalent to a masters degree, and 8 to 14 semesters for a doctorate. For the student in the humanities or social sciences, however, the big problems are whether he will finish his studies with any *Diplom* or degree, and what will happen thereafter. Since the demand for historians, philologists, sociologists, and political scientists is slight, the normal opening for a graduate, if he is to make use of his studies, is a teaching position in the secondary schools or universities.

While secondary teachers have much more status than in the United States, a university position is the logical goal for the student of the social sciences and humanities. Between 1928 and 1960, the total number of university students roughly doubled, but the number of professors remained practically constant. With the decentralized, largely autonomous organization of German higher education, the professors have been successful in

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applying the brakes to expansion in the humanities and social sciences. Cynics point out that faculty members have a material interest in keeping their classes large, and the number of colleagues small since each student pays lecture and examination fees to his professor.

West German universities encourage students to stay on, instead of weeding out the least promising. In Germany, the young Abitur-holder thinks that all doors are wide open. Only after years of study and expense does he begin to discover that he may never obtain his degree or a prestigious position. Efforts to force old students to leave aroused widespread student protest in Berlin in June 1966, enabling the SDS to conduct its first large-scale demonstration. Prospective failure and radicalization seem to form part of a syndrome.

In the natural sciences, the students' opportunities generally are much greater--which is one reason for the lack of interest of most such students in radical activity. When the students leave the university, there are plenty of employment opportunities, as shown by the advertisements in the daily press. Even so, many scientists have chosen to emigrate; more than 200 scientists are estimated to have left Germany for the United States between 1957 and 1961.

#### Influence of Marxism

Though no Marxist-oriented political party has had much success in influencing the students, unorthodox varieties of Marxism have become attractive to some. Marxist ways of thinking do not seem foreign to a German. The idea of bitter class hostility, the belief that one is either master or servant, the conviction that general concepts have a sort of reality and force of their own--these are all part of the German tradition, too. Probably the discrediting of other traditions makes German youth more susceptible than it might otherwise be to Marxist-Leninist arguments.

The susceptibility of university students to Marxist thinking is probably somewhat

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further increased by the nature of their secondary education. The West German periodical Spiegel has suggested that the influence of Rudi Dutschke is due in large part to the fluency in the vocabulary of Marxism which he acquired in East Germany. In any event, there are many varieties of Marxism to be found among the West German students--orthodox East German Communism being far from the most popular.

#### Society's New Accent on Youth

The enhanced status given to youth seems to have lent the West German students somewhat greater confidence when it comes to challenging the old order. In West German advertising, as in American, young faces have replaced old. Young people have grown less patient about waiting to enjoy independence, consumer goods, or a share in political power. The students have shown much interest in political leaders--ranging from President Kennedy to Fidel Castro--who achieve power young, and the Bonn government looks to them like a system of old men. Foreign Minister Brandt's sons join in the student protests.

#### What the SDS Wants

The SDS is generally recognized as the most important of the radical student organizations. It is highly decentralized. The strongest chapters are in Frankfurt, where the influence of the metal-worker's union is reflected in a fairly disciplined organization, and in Berlin, where the word "ferment" is hardly adequate. In Cologne, the SDS is orthodox Marxist-Leninist, with ties to workers in the Ruhr.

Most SDS activists seem to look on agitation as a process for making people more aware of the senselessness of old rules, of freeing them from indifference and the "manipulation" of the mass media--which means, concretely, from the influence of publisher Axel Springer.

Die Zeit summarizes SDS views as follows:

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Our late-capitalistic society, or to be more precise, the established rulers, suppress the drives and potentials for development of the individual ("Repression"). The individual, however, does not realize this, since he is part of the system ("Integration")--and this is indeed skillfully accomplished by the direction of his consciousness with the help of the mass media ("Manipulation"). Thus the existing conditions cannot develop further in a progressive way ("Progression"), but rather society leads to the static continuation of what already exists ("Reproduction"). The task of the student minority, gifted with "critical rationality," should be to break through this system and enable others to see through it. People should become "conscious."

This outlook owes much to an exile Marxist-Hegelian, Herbert Marcuse; it does not trouble much with concrete positive proposals.



RUDI DEUTSCHE AT VIETNAM CONFERENCE-17 FEBRUARY 1968

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~~No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem~~Rudi Dutschke

Rudi Dutschke was the most important SDS leader until he was severely wounded by a young rightist on 11 April 1968. It may be many months--if ever--before he can return to active politics. Dutschke is married to an American girl from a Chicago suburb, also a student at the Free University. He is 28, having grown up and received his first Abitur in East Germany. He was an athlete and a member of both the Communist and the evangelical youth organizations in Luckenwalde. According to Spiegel's report, probably stemming from Dutschke's own statements, he declined to join the East German army (at that time a "voluntary" matter), and largely for that reason was unable to go to an East German university. He began to commute to West Berlin and eventually got a second, Western Abitur, which permitted him to enter the Free University in November 1961. After studying the works of Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin he entered a radical group in West Berlin in 1963. His field is sociology and his professors say that he is highly gifted.

Dutschke emerged in 1966 as a skillful agitator. His chief weapon was provocation: the idea that the more he and his followers demonstrated and challenged the system, the more the governing elements in society would "unmask" their true character by resorting to naked force.

Dutschke made provocation a standard procedure for the SDS, using two demonstrations on 10 December 1966 to make the police resort to force.]

Ties With Other Groups

The SDS's chief lack has been a program capable of attracting the support of nonstudents. The SDS is,

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however, making some effort to gain contact with workers,

Two leaders of the left wing of the Berlin SPD, Harry Ristock and Erwin Beck, took part in a Vietnam rally in February, largely organized by the SDS. After the Dutschke shooting, the Berlin SDS became the major element in a coalition of the Berlin far left called the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO).

An organization of secondary school students, the Action Center of Independent and Socialist Pupils, forms a sort of junior auxiliary. Peter Brandt, son of the Foreign Minister, has been a member of another school group affiliated with the SDS: the Independent Pupils' Union.

Contacts With East Germany

Major SDS leaders are probably not controlled by the ruling East German Socialist Unity Party (SED), and the radical students can be expected to plan their own action programs, regardless of Ulbricht's wishes.

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West Berlin and West German students generally are not sympathetic toward the ultraorthodox SED. It should be noted, however, that, aside from its support of the West German Communist Party, the SED has for years been conducting a widespread infiltration and subversion effort aimed at West German parties and mass organizations; this program,

aims at students. |

also

East German Communist Youth (FDJ) representatives attended the SDS convention in Frankfurt in September 1967, and East German literature was freely distributed. |

West German students, including the less radical, are inclined to think that such contacts serve to promote German unity, and that they can elude SED influence and indeed weaken the hold of the SED on its own youth. They are not in every case mistaken. But the SED apparently hopes to develop a network of intermediate-level controlled contacts in student (as in other) organizations, and then to use these contacts to manipulate the organizations. Where the students are largely anarchist or Maoist, as in Berlin, the SED will have difficulty in gaining influence.

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In some other cases, however, as in the orthodox Marxist chapter at the University of Cologne, infiltration may be easier. The SED does not expect to achieve mass conversions overnight; at least some of the West German contact-makers are likely to come under SED influence. The chairman of the West Berlin Branch of the SED claims that this branch has gained 1,200 new young members since the beginning of 1967, bringing its membership to 8,000.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**INDIA****Summary**

Student disturbances during the past two years have been the most widespread and disruptive since independence. As in other countries, their intensity caught officials by surprise. The agitation spread from university to university and was often destructive.

Strikes, involving destruction of property and the intimidation of university officials, were frequent in the mid-1950's. They were usually spontaneous but occurred with disturbing frequency. Often centering on minor grievances, the strikes did not seem to warrant the intensity of the agitation or the resultant destruction of property.

"Student unrest" for many years merited inclusion in the agenda at most Indian educational meetings. It was often cited as the university system's foremost problem. The periodic disturbances prior to 1966, however, were incidental and attracted little attention, except among educators.

**The Educational System**

Wide educational opportunity, from the primary level to the university, was an important tenet of the nationalists during the struggle for independence. Mass education is one of the country's most impressive accomplishments. India has more than 70 universities and some 2,700 individual colleges imparting post-secondary education to almost 2 million students. This is an eight-fold increase in students since independence. Current projections are for close to four million students by sometime in the 1980's.

The availability of qualified academic personnel, classroom facilities, libraries, student housing, and other amenities, however, have failed to keep pace with the student population. Overcrowding is a serious problem. Academic standards have declined precipitously.

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Perhaps five percent of India's students now receive decent training by recognized world standards. Except for a few quality technical schools, university education appears to consist largely of desultory lectures by poorly paid instructors (who are often instructors because better jobs are not available) and cramming for the annual examinations from lecture notes and college outline books.

The problems of poor instruction and inadequate facilities are accentuated by a haphazard curriculum, especially in liberal arts, poised somewhere between the requirements of British India and those of today. As much attention is still given to the English poets, European wars, and European philosophy as is given to their Indian counterparts. Hegel, for example, is still a required subject while Gandhi is optional.

Many Indian students may be oblivious to the academic inadequacy of the universities, since the shift to mass primary and secondary education has also lowered the standard of education available at those levels. But the absence of challenging teaching and other facilities which might interest students in the academic side of the university experience are complemented by extraordinary pressure to succeed academically, i.e., to do well in examinations. A good undergraduate degree, permitting a student to go on to a M.A., is indispensable for reasonably prestigious and secure employment. Good jobs, especially for liberal arts graduates, are far fewer than the number of graduates turned out each year. The pressure on the Indian student, it has been said, results not only from the desire for security but the more unique need to obtain employment commensurate with one's caste status.

Government positions, with their status and their pensions, are avidly sought. Job security is also important: traditionally no one is fired from the civil service. One writer has suggested that the pressure for secure employment in a society where such opportunity remains scarce results in Indian students being oriented to becoming part of the system rather than to struggling against it.

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Student objectives during the 1966-67 disturbances, as well as in the unrest in years preceding, were largely matters related to postgraduation employment. The effort to change requirements for entering the bar, to lower the passing standard on examinations, the protests against unfair examinations and also the concern over national language policy are in this category. The language used in the university and in government has a direct bearing on a student's competitive position in entering government service.

#### The Riots of 1966 and 1967

The disturbances of 1966 and 1967 affected most of India's states--1,000 student strikes occurred during the period. Destruction of university and government property was common. At least ten student deaths resulted from clashes with the police. Prestigious universities were forced to close, in some cases for weeks.

By mid-September 1966, disturbances were front page news. A local student union would decide to strike over a minor grievance and local authorities would ban demonstrations and be defied by the students. Arrests would follow amidst sometimes brutal baton charges by the police, who sometimes opened fire. Such police intervention--perhaps necessary in Uttar Pradesh where there was danger of unrest spreading to other parts of the population--added to student grievances and "police brutality" became an issue.

The government pleaded for calm, acknowledged the seriousness of the problems and hoped the tempest would pass. With its persistent communal problems and other periodic unrests, India perhaps has developed a capacity to tolerate rampant disturbances.

#### The Organisation of the Disturbances

The initial unrest in 1966 was at Jodhpur University in Rajasthan and resulted from a student strike designed to lower the passing grade on examinations. Shortly after, in Lucknow, students struck to support government employees who were agitating for increased allowances. In Delhi, law students, supported

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by those in other faculties, demonstrated for a change in a Parliamentary Act which complicated and delayed their admission to the bar. Grievances elsewhere included inadequate libraries and laboratories, hostel mismanagement and overbearing university administrative personnel. In Andhra Pradesh, the government's efforts to force the retirement of a popular vice-chancellor provoked agitation and students on the Andhra coast took to the streets to protest an apparent central government effort to bypass the state in selecting the site for a public sector steel plant.

The central government's attempt to establish Hindi as the national language was at issue in most of the 1967 disturbances. Students across populous northern India, egged on by enterprising politicians, launched violent pro-Hindi demonstrations. When the government subsequently modified the thrust of its draft legislation, south Indian students--especially in Madras, but also in Mysore and Andhra Pradesh--spearheaded anti-Hindi and antinorth demonstrations.

All of this was coincidental with student disturbances elsewhere in the world. The Indian students tactics were perhaps influenced by students in other countries--for example, in the defiance of bans on demonstrations--but there is a legacy of such tactics in the Indian independence movement, as well. Ideological motivation has played no important role. Despite India's great internal problems, there was no attack on the democratic system. Pressure was for change of policy or priorities within the system. Interesting also, none of the agitation led to anticapitalist, anti-imperialist or anti-American sloganeering.

#### Political Party Involvement

Congress leaders, as well as vice-chancellors (who tend to be loyal Congress members), have attributed unrest to the machinations of minority party student groups operating under the influence or direction of opposition parties. Congressmen saw the persistent 1966 agitation as an effort to embarrass Congress on the eve of the 1967 election campaign and saw 1967 disturbances as an extension of the more broad-based campaigns of the nationalist and separatist political parties on the language issue.

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Student sections of the political parties, including Congress, have existed at most of the major universities since before independence, when Student Congress played an important role in gaining support for the "Quit India" movement. In recent years, however, these student sections have had a modest importance. None of them, certainly, has captured the student movement on a national basis. Only the Jan Sangh, the Communists (Left and Right) and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagan (DMK) seem to have sections with coherent programs in even a few universities, and these student sections, like their parent parties, have mainly regional appeal--the Jan Sangh on the Gangetic plain, the Communists in West Bengal and Kerala, the DMK in Madras. Congress has made halting efforts in recent years to revive Student Congress but with little success.

Minority political parties tried to exploit student unrest in 1966, but they do not appear to have provided leadership either through involvement or through the student sections. Their main contribution--this primarily from the agitation-minded Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) and Communist Party (Left) in Uttar Pradesh--was in associating their local "mass" organizations with student demonstrations, in the process perhaps exacerbating disturbances.

Political parties may have been more intimately involved in 1967--especially the Jan Sangh and SSP in the north and the DMK in Madras--since the student concern--the language issue--coincided so closely with the policies of the parties. It is doubtful, however, that they or their student sections precipitated or controlled the agitation once it was in progress.

There is a tradition that local university student unions should be independent of political parties. Antipathy to political party involvement in student politics appears to be a clear strain. This may accrue from the proliferation of squabbles among political party student sections in the 1950's which were part of the student unrest of that era. The National Council of University Students, a loosely constructed federation of local student unions, was formed in the 1950's as an apolitical body in reaction to such political factionalization. This attitude was clearly manifested in 1966 disturbances

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when a proposed national student march on Delhi to protest student arrests and police brutality collapsed when it was learned that the SSP and the Communists were involved.

### Conclusion

Little can be done in the immediate future to reform the universities academically or improve their facilities. Available resources will permit only slow improvement which may not keep up with increasing enrollment pressures. Moreover, the political priority given mass education inhibits any scheme to tighten admissions policies or provide a few quality universities. A recent proposal to establish five or six excellent schools, which would turn out quality professional graduates, has been quietly shelved by the government. At the same time, the employment prospects are tied to economic development and the rate of social change where progress is slow.

Recent student unrest is probably also a symptom of the general national uncertainty which set in after Prime Minister Nehru's death. The lack of clear national leadership, already apparent by 1966, tended to be accentuated by the 1967 elections which showed the Congress hold on the country to be slipping. The period since has seemed even more disorganized. Across the north, minority party coalitions, necessary due to the 1967 election results, have been unable to govern effectively in the states. Communal rioting again appears on the increase. Various new groups have emerged, representing special interests among India's welter of centrifugal forces. This adds to the tone of uncertainty.

Student unrest, although not necessarily at the pitch of 1966 and 1967, is likely to remain with India for some time, organized by local student unions. Political parties are not sufficiently entrenched at the universities to play more than a marginal role. There is no force, including the loosely structured national union of students, capable of welding the unrest into a coherent national movement.

## INDONESIA

*"There are 400 ways to topple a government, among them the employment of children to block streets and roads."*

*--Sukarno, in conversation*

### Summary

Indonesia's youth and students traditionally have been active in times of political crisis. The incipient independence movement of the 1920's, the revolutionary period following World War II, and the post-coup period of the 1960's have all provided clearly defined goals and methods.

Indonesian youth today are quiescent, waiting to judge a newly-installed and popular cabinet. In the meantime, the students are both the army's strongest ally and staunchest critic. They sit in Parliament, operate their own press and radio, and organize educational programs.

### Recent Past

The attempted coup of 1965 heralded the appearance of youth and students as an independent political force which helped bring down a 20-year-old regime. Prior to this, Indonesia's youth had not shown themselves particularly independent or inquisitive. They were closely channeled by their adult political parties.

There were exceptions, of course. ANSOR, the youth affiliate of the Moslem Scholar's Party (NU), took a strong anti-Communist, anti-Chinese position far more forthright than its parent organization, which has a long record of opportunism. Christian students, many educated under missionary auspices often managed to escape the stultifying ideological indoctrination that permeated the state schools.

Such exceptions were often obscured by the clamorous leftist mobilization of students and youth against foreign powers "threatening" the Republic of Indonesia.

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By late 1965, however, non-Communist students were exhibiting a remarkable ability for organization and independent action, often encouraged and supported by the army. Their actions were now primarily directed internally against a discredited political machine, President Sukarno, the PKI, and rising prices.

Long-standing animosities aroused by Communist influence broke out in the wake of a Communist-inspired attempt to seize the government. Communist China's alleged involvement surfaced resentment of Chinese economic "domination." Sukarno's early attempts to shield the PKI nurtured suspicion of his involvement and tarnished the state philosophy so closely identified with him.

The students who took to the streets were not all anti-Sukarno, of course. Some supported the embattled leader. Sukarno had early recognized the need to mobilize his own youthful legions and leftist student activists took a lead in forming mass pro-Sukarno federations. Eventually, however, these were proscribed by the military government on the basis that they were being used by Communist elements.

#### Traditional Roles

The Indonesian educational system has undergone an extraordinary expansion since independence, but the concurrent population increase and a rising demand for education have outstripped available facilities. In 1968, 35% of Indonesia's 112 million population were of school age; less than half attended class. Enrollment in higher education has increased at a faster rate than in primary and secondary schools. The current enrollment of Indonesia's 40 state and 150 private universities is estimated at 278,000 with about 8,000 graduating annually. With 42% of the population under 15 years of age in 1961 and a current growth rate of 2.3%, severe pressures are certain to continue.

The major universities are government financed and located in urban areas of Java. They are composed of individual faculties which are

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geographically scattered and separatistic. The shortage of teachers and materials is acute. Salaries are low and most professors have other jobs, reducing their effectiveness in overcrowded classes. An official 1967 survey of 24 state universities conducted reported a ratio of 1 faculty member to every 728 students. Textbooks are not available or are prohibitively expensive, while libraries and laboratories are totally inadequate.

Universities usually do not have residence facilities and students must rent rooms or live with relatives. Most come from the families of government officials, army officers, pensioners, and teachers, and are two to three years older than their Western counterparts when they enter college. Many attend part time, working to defray expenses. Because of this situation, the lack of a standardized curriculum and an arbitrary examination system, it is difficult to complete a degree in the scheduled time of 5 to 7 years, and attrition is high.

A university education traditionally has been the passport to a secure position in government and a means of ensuring social prestige. Students, therefore, tend to study law and the social sciences. While a medical degree is highly respected, most aspirants lack preparation to complete the difficult course of study.

Limited academic interests and the value placed on a degree rather than educational training, have produced graduates who have little inclination to change the bureaucratic system. This has meant a bloated, largely underemployed, over-extended civil service.

The first Indonesian student associations, formed in the early Twentieth century, quickly evolved into nationalist pressure groups. Sometimes they provided the genesis of political parties; members of the Bandung Study Club, under the chairmanship of Sukarno founded the Indonesian National Party (PNI) in 1927. As the Dutch became aware of the political nature of these associations,


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student activities were curtailed and many leaders were exiled. The student associations were dormant throughout the 1930's until the arrival of the Japanese who sought to gain support for the war effort by creating numerous youth and student organizations which emphasized Asian nationalism and Indonesian culture. At the same time, anti-Japanese university students, while effectively penetrating the Japanese-sponsored organizations began overtly and clandestinely to advocate independence. At the end of the war opinion was heavily against any association with the Dutch, and Indonesian students enthusiastically fought in the revolution.

Independence and the departure of the Europeans left many vacancies to be filled by Indonesians in the universities and the government. The first students--a handful compared with today's enrollment--to enter the universities after independence were highly motivated by job prospects, the social value of a university degree previously reserved for an elite few, and personal identification with the spirit and goals of the revolution. Most students from 1949 to 1957 had full government scholarships and living costs were relatively low.



STUDENTS OUTSIDE SUKARNO'S PALACE

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As this revolutionary generation graduated, however, it was replaced by another whose prospects were not as favorable. The rapidly growing student population increased the demand for government jobs, and political connections, always helpful, became even more important in obtaining civil service appointments.

In addition, as the revolution faded and living costs rose more than wages university students became frustrated and more opportunistic.

#### Under Sukarno

While the Communist student and youth organizations have often loudly touted membership figures other organizations have been reluctant to do so.

Membership requirements are often ambiguous. The term "student" is rather loosely defined and Indonesia, too, has its share of students without universities. Both youth and student organizations have included members from 14 to 40 years of age, while student organizations count not only enrolled students, but also recent graduates or people who contribute time or money. Because of social taboos and the early marriage of girls, female participation has been minimal and usually confined to auxiliary groups.

Most of the student and youth groups are affiliates of adult parties and reflect the major orientations that are found in political life--religion, nationalism, and socialism, which included Marxism until 1966.

Prior to October 1965, the major Indonesian parties were the Moslem Scholars Party (NU), the Indonesian National Party (PNI), and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), all of which had student adjuncts. Sukarno's gradual move toward the left facilitated the growth of Communist and leftist national groups, while moderate political and religious groups were increasingly on the defensive. In 1963 the leftward thrust greatly intensified, and by mid-1965 only the army offered even minimal resistance to the nation's move into a Sukarnoized version of Communism.

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Communist Youth and Student Movements

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) courted youth and students to counter the traditional values and behavior that often deadened adult political life.

As with other Indonesian political organizations, the PKI differentiated its youth groups by age, sex, and education. Its most successful mass organization and the only one with which the party maintained open ties was its peasant-based youth organization, The Peoples Youth (PR). Less successful were the PKI's high school and university student front organizations, the League of Indonesian High School Students (IPPI), and the Concentration of Indonesian University Students Movements (CGMI).

In the early 1950's Communists gained covert control of IPPI, a student organization that had grown out of a wartime fusion of nationalist high school and university students. This resulted in a split which, by 1957, had resulted in two rival IPPI's--neither of which was effective.

Local university associations were begun by the PKI in 1950 in Bandung, Bogor, and Jogjakarta. In November 1956, these were brought together to form the Concentration of University Students Movements (CGMI), with about 1,200 members. Growth was moderate and in early 1960 the CGMI claimed 7,000 members, although the actual figure probably was closer to 4,000. By 1963, CGMI was claiming 17,000 members but this figure was padded by "students" from the Peoples University and other PKI-established academies.

The CGMI never acknowledged its tie with the PKI, and only a small percentage ever realized it was a PKI front organization. Many members who discovered its true affiliation withdrew.

CGMI exerted considerable influence during the early 1960's thanks largely to a convergence of national policy and PKI sentiment, which made it easier for the Communists to manipulate the organization.

CGMI was the only national student organization open to students with no political affiliation or strong religious feelings. Most others joined organizations affiliated with the national political parties such as the PNI or the Masjumi. CGMI served to recruit and season young Communists. The organization was banned early in 1966 and many of its members slipped into leftist national groups where they would not be so readily noticed.

Much more successful was the general youth arm of the PKI, the Peoples Youth (PR), which had its base in the Socialist Youth of Indonesia and had been sponsored by the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party split in 1948 and many of its members formed a new Indonesian Socialist Party. The Socialist Youth of Indonesia, however, remained with the old Socialist Party and many of its leaders and members were involved with the ill-fated Communist-led Madiun rebellion of 1948.

Its name was changed in 1950 to Peoples Youth because of the Madiun affair. PR claimed 30,000 members in 149 branches throughout the country and embarked on an extensive membership drive.

By 1955 the PR claimed a total membership of 616,605--of whom 80% were peasants, 15% workers and clerks, and 5% high school and university students. Only 5% were female. By 1961 the organization claimed 1,250,000 members, of which 7% were girls. Claimed membership had reached 1.5 million by early 1963 and at its peak prior to the 1965 coup attempt, PR claimed 3 million members, although this figure probably was inflated.

It is difficult to estimate the number of full-time cadre active in the PR. Many doubled as cadre for the PKI or for one or more of the party's other mass organizations. Indications are, however, that the PR had more full-time activists than any other youth organization. As the PR grew, it placed increasing emphasis on travel to the Soviet Bloc, both for education and as incentive.

What attracted members to the PR was not so much its political activity as what its then Secretary General called the fight for youth's "everyday interests" and the appeal to "the everyday needs of

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every section of youth, in workshops, factories, offices, harbors, urban quarters, villages, estates, schools, etc." Political activity meant little to the ordinary peasant or worker.

The comprehensiveness of the PR's program was exemplified by demands raised during its Fifth Congress in 1956. On behalf of young workers, for example, the PR demanded improvement on wages, social security and working conditions, abolition of wage differences because of sex or age, low-priced distribution of essential commodities, and scholarships from employers and government for technical education.

The PR also set up mutual aid groups to assist members in time of need and organized local "civic action" teams to repair roads and irrigation ditches. Through sports and social events, the PR provided activities in villages usually beset by boredom as soon as the sun went down.

All of this did not divert the PR from its political function. It sought to raise the "progressive" awareness of many Indonesian youth and students and passed on members to the PKI and its mass fronts.

The PR, along with SOBSI, the PKI's labor front, took the lead in mobilizing the September 1963 sackings of the British and Malayan embassies and the subsequent takeover of British enterprises in Indonesia.

Because of its long known affiliation with the PKI, and its direct involvement in the coup attempt, the PR was hit heavily in the anti-Communist purges after 1965. It was banned in March 1966 along with the PKI and other front organizations.

The PKI's youth program has not yet recovered from the 1965 purges. The party has attempted to establish a covert recruiting program, operating through its Central Committee Youth Department--mainly on East and Central Java. Leftist sentiment remains strong in these areas and there are latent animosities stemming from the purges.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Indonesian Students Abroad

During the early 1960s an increasing number of Indonesian students went abroad to study, predominantly in Communist countries.

At the time of the attempted coup there were approximately 1,500 overseas. About 1,000 were in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Some 60 were in Communist China. There were about 800 graduate students in the United States. Japan and Australia accounted for the remainder.

Communist governments attempted to influence the students' political development and sought to dominate the local Indonesian Students' Association. Where an association's leadership might not be sympathetic, the host government would set up a rival rump leadership which could often count on substantial support from among the members.

The group most seriously infiltrated was that in Communist China, most of whose members refused to return home after 1965. They remain in Peking, shrilly demanding armed revolution in Indonesia guided, naturally, by the thoughts of Chairman Mao.

Of the 400-500 Indonesian students in the Soviet Union, about 100 remained loyal to the Suharto government and returned home. The remainder, staunchly leftist (either PKI or left-wing National Party sympathizers), had their passports revoked and either remained in the Soviet Union or drifted away to Peking and even to Albania. The Indonesian Government has reported the existence of 700 fugitives undergoing guerrilla training near Peking, although not all are former students.

It is difficult to tell, owing to Djakarta's inadequate screening techniques, how many anti-government students returned and are active against the Suharto government. There is very little opportunity for "underground" elements in Indonesia to employ propaganda tactics on anything but a limited, regional scale.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Post-Coup

Little attention has been paid to the genesis of the post-coup student movement and the establishment of anti-leftist student federations known as "action commands." Catholic and Moslem student leaders appear to have taken the initiative late in 1965. Their university student groups came together to form KAMI, the University Students Action Command, one of the most important coalitions of this period. While KAMI drew its strength mainly from religious student organizations, it regarded itself as nationally rather than religiously motivated.

KAMI may have been largely the brainchild of its first secretary general, Kosmos Batabura, who was at that time also chairman of the Catholic University Students Association. It has now been generally accepted that KAMI had the early support and protection of the army.

A government assessment in February 1966, when KAMI's activities hit a high point, placed its hard-core membership at 7,500. However, the group was highly effective in rallying thousands of students and gaining the support of many labor and professional groups.

Not unnaturally, student groups proved most effective in Djakarta. In many areas beyond the capital they often collapsed in the face of opposition from leftist, pro-Sukarno students and elements of the military, especially the leftist-oriented Marines.

The post-coup youth campaign was a fluctuating thing, often reacting more to the mood of the time than to any preconceived plan. Student hostility focused on Communists, then on Sukarno's ministers and close associates, economic deterioration and finally on the Chinese.

Insinuations that the CPR may have inspired the coup became more and more widespread. On 21 October 1965, 50,000 demonstrators protested China's "intervention" in Indonesia's domestic affairs. Foreign Minister Subandrio was charged with being

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a "Peking Dog" and if he did not run to Mao's bidding, it was enough that he occasionally had sat in his lap.

The students' tactics during this period were those so familiar to the West. Beginning with street demonstrations, mass meetings, and roll-calls the students turned to more direct action.

In early January 1966, students had initiated the boycott tactic. All university activities were struck until the government retracted price boosts in gasoline, kerosene, postal rates and train fares. Sukarno's installation of a new cabinet in late February 1966 was protested by thousands of students jammed into the streets of Djakarta, overturning vehicles and blocking the streets to keep the newly appointed ministers from attending installation ceremonies at the palace. Traffic was brought to a standstill and Sukarno was forced to bring in his new ministers by helicopter. Pamphleteering, radio, newspapers, graffiti, rock-throwing, the "liberation" of official buildings, and student arrests of government officials became regular occurrences. Fights with rival student groups alternated with demonstrations either supporting or condemning the "old order."

Student efforts at organizing often took a military tone, with the formation of brigades, regiments, and squads usually named after compatriots wounded or even killed during confrontations with pro-Sukarno troops or youth groups. While all this points to a certain amount of guidance from the Army, an anonymous student leader has said:



"TRY SUKARNO"

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"We learned how to organize and demonstrate from the Communists. We have watched and studied their methods for ten years. Unfortunately, we are a nation trained in Marxism...We have also learned a lot from the Japanese Zengakuren movement."

Sukarno angrily demanded that the students, especially KAMI, be disbanded, but his demand went unheeded. KAMI increased its coordination with KAPPI, its high school counterpart, and guided thousands of students in demonstrations. With the army's support, the leftist nationalists and other pro-Sukarno forces were largely neutralized. The Communists earlier had been destroyed as an overt political force.

The transfer of executive authority to General Suharto in March 1966 was preceded by three days of violence and demands that diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists be broken: from 9-11 March, students invaded the offices of NCNA, the Chinese Consul General, and the Chinese Trade Office. Foreign Minister Subandrio's offices were also sacked. In May the students finally breached the walls of the Chinese Embassy.

A feeling that they, perhaps, were the new protectors of the public welfare, had taken hold.

Sukarno's fall and General Suharto's subsequent appointment as President relieved the students of their major thrust. They are now largely concerned with matters of economic stability, corruption, and a rediscovery of the world of which they are a part.

The search has led them to parliamentary participation. In early 1967 they were given a total of 18 seats in a revised parliament, divided among students and working youth. How many they currently hold is obscured in the confusion of nomenclature, reconstituted parliaments, and obtuse statistics.

More important than numbers, however, is the influence they exercise. Through approximately 140 "amateur" radio stations they bombard the government and populace with anti-corruption and economic stability campaigns and dated western

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music. Their major newspaper, Harian KAMI, enjoys a paid circulation estimated at 9,000 and it is no doubt read by many more people. It is regarded as a highly professional effort and offers some of the best editorial comment of any Indonesian newspaper.

The Role of Chinese Students

The attitudes, activities, and organizations of the Indonesian Chinese, both citizens and aliens, have been influenced by specifically ethnic interests. The majority have remained largely apathetic and passive, focused largely on day-to-day concerns. However, during the pro-Chinese and pro-Communist Sukarno era the Chinese became important as a political sub-group.

While alien Chinese were prohibited by law from engaging in political activities, Indonesian Chinese became involved with such "integrationist" organizations as *Partindo* and *Baperki*. The latter ostensibly was established to investigate ways of assimilating Indonesia's Chinese. While these organizations were essentially Indonesian and Indonesian Chinese, alien Chinese--especially the staunchly pro-Peking among them--found ways to infiltrate them. The national and provincial leaderships of *Baperki* came to be dominated by Chinese Communist agents and sympathizers.

The leftward course of Indonesian politics in the early 1960s was felt most by the young Chinese who were prone to identify with Communist China and more anxious to engage in political expression. Sukarno's concept of a "Djakarta-Peking Axis" made the policies of Djakarta and Peking increasingly indistinguishable and political commitment to one became commitment to the other. This virtually eclipsed the moderate or pro-Nationalist Chinese.

Many of the Chinese youth in the *Baperki* affiliates also joined the PKI's student front organizations. In early 1965 a *Baperki* official claimed that 5,000 members of the organization's youth affiliate had joined the PKI's high school students'


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front, IPPI. By mid-1965 it had become unpatriotic for Chinese youth and students not to engage in pro-Peking and pro-Communist activities. The attack on the USIS cultural center in Djakarta in February 1965 was largely carried out by students from Chinese high schools, both Indonesian and alien.

The reaction to the attempted coup of 1965 largely undermined the position of the Chinese and while they took to the streets with other pro-Sukarno elements, they were often placed on the defensive by charges of Chinese involvement in the coup and Chinese economic domination.

The Chinese will remain a problem for years to come. While several thousand were expatriated to mainland China following the coup and many more remain in detention camps, the Chinese population is still engaged in the day-to-day struggle of making a living. This has been made all the more difficult by increased government restrictions on their economic and social activities.

Nationalist China has cast covetous glances their way but its desire to influence this large group of overseas Chinese, estimated at approximately 3 million all told, has been thwarted by Djakarta's desire not to get involved with Nationalist China and risk losing what few strands of a "non-aligned" foreign policy remain.



ANTI-COMMUNIST DEMONSTRATORS BURN CHINESE-  
SPONSORED UNIVERSITY, OCTOBER 1965

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Indonesian Chinese students are subject to all the uncertainties of a period in which the Indonesian government is trying to assimilate the Chinese community into the national fabric. For this reason, Chinese political attitudes seem to have entered a period of suspended animation, a retreat into ethnic non-involvement in the face of continuing apprehension.

#### The Future

The Indonesian student movement shows signs of strain from Moslem-Christian frictions. Moslem and nationalist political parties are waiting anxious to advance their interests. Leftist nationalist youth and student organizations hunger after political respectability. While they are still in limbo, and their rehabilitation will depend in large part on the discretion of their parent organizations, they nevertheless provide a locus of unrest.

Indonesia now finds itself with a strong president, a somewhat weak parliament, a large student population heady from the overthrow of Sukarno, and an army that holds the key to stability. The Suharto government has placed a partial moratorium on political activity; national elections have been put off until 1971.

It is unlikely that student activity will erupt in such force as to paralyze the country, as has happened in France. Youth and students in Indonesia are largely accustomed to prescribed roles and operate within the security and discipline of the extended family and a highly personalized society. Even their often violent protests following the attempted coup were subject to these conditions.

One side effect of this is a tendency toward divided loyalties--especially on the part of Moslem student organizations, who feel the pull between religion and government.

In the long run, much depends on the Suharto government's ability to convince the populace that

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it is working toward economic development. Failure to do so could lead to serious disaffection among the nation's elite, especially the youth and students.

Such disaffection would, of course, make it more difficult for the government to obtain popular cooperation and could produce a spiralling coercion-disaffection interaction that would intensify antagonism and open a breach between the student front and the army, its main ally up to now. The resultant loss of army support would leave a vacuum in the student movement which could be exploited by political parties.

Much of the same can be said about working youth, although they are not as politically active as the students. The Communists, who had the most success in organizing youth, are destroyed as an overt political force and many of the leftist nationalist youth organizations which belonged to the Sukarno-inspired Youth Front are mending political fences. It would appear that youth organizations active at the present time, sometimes in conjunction with the students, are somewhat more closely connected to political parties and labor unions. In the meantime, the student front, KAMI in particular, continues to provide a platform for a new generation of political leaders.

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## IRAN

### Introduction

There has been an upsurge in student unrest during the past year. Recent demonstrations appear to have been aimed primarily at redressing localized educational grievances and police reaction to student activities, and to have had no broader political overtones.

### Background

Political activism among University of Tehran students has, until recent years, been endemic; there were few years between the early 1950s and 1963 not marked by rioting and often bloody demonstrations. Traditionally, the activists have been nationalists, supporters of former Prime Minister Mossadeq, of his National Front or one of the offshoots of the National Front. The Tudeh (Communist) Party has also been heavily involved; Tudeh Party cells were active on the campus for 15 years. A few of the early Tudeh Party leaders were university professors, who retain a shadowy party-in-exile in Eastern Europe.

Earlier student demonstrations were almost all antigovernment. The Shah provided a natural target and the demonstrations were for the most part unabashedly political, with little attempt to use genuine student grievances as a pretext. The Shah's increasing confidence in the rightness of his domestic and foreign policies was accompanied--and perhaps made possible--by a strict suppression of political dissidence, including that at the university. Student leaders who promoted demonstrations were jailed, and officials of the National Security office were openly ensconced on campus. Such measures, together with a more optimistic feeling generally in the country, have operated to produce a less openly militant student body.

### Present Student Attitudes

Many young Iranians apparently feel no sense of identification with the regime and its development

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efforts which are decided at the highest levels of government. Antiestablishment sentiment is probably intensified by the lack of an effective political opposition either in the universities or in the society at large. No political organizations are permitted on campus and the security organizations and their informers keep a close watch for potential troublemakers.. Outspoken opponents of the regime have been expelled and drafted.

A university education is probably the most important requirement for success in Iran. Despite their dissatisfaction with the political system, therefore, most students are unwilling to jeopardize future job security by any confrontation with the police over political ideology. In the past, many university graduates were unable to find jobs, and therefore had less to lose. Now, however, many of the brightest graduates are absorbed into a burgeoning bureaucracy as participants in the reform program, and the problem of an unemployed, disgruntled educated class is beginning to fade.

#### Current Unrest

Recent student unrest and demonstrations, therefore, have been aimed primarily at complaints about the educational system and defects within Iran's universities. Approximately 30,000 students are enrolled in nine institutions of higher learning. All but one of these institutions have experienced student demonstrations during the past year. In May and June of 1967 and again in January and February of 1968 incidents resulted in arrests at the universities of Tabriz, Pahlavi, and Tehran. Pahlavi was closed for several weeks in February. The students demanded, among other things, abolition of newly instituted tuition fees, and upgrading of degrees, higher university budgets, and better facilities.

The demonstrations had a number of proximate causes. Tabriz University, one of the first to erupt, was subjected to a complete administrative overhaul and reform following local disturbances--probably leading many students elsewhere to feel demonstrations could produce results. The demonstrations also had a snowballing effect; for example, students in Tehran

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struck in protest against alleged police brutality at Tabriz in June 1967, and again in sympathy with the Teachers Training College strike early this year. Students from Tehran University reportedly visited Isfahan University and encouraged demonstrations in February.

Some government and security officials contended that Chinese Communist sympathizers were behind the activities, but this has not been confirmed. A few Tudeh Party cells do continue to exist at the University of Tehran but there is no overt manifestation of their presence, and their covert activities are directed mostly at staying alive.

Iran's universities are in transition, changing from a system of memorization and learning by rote to a more flexible, creative approach. Conservative, religious-oriented students find this modernization threatening,--Pahlavi University's demonstration centered around dissatisfaction with "foreign" teachers, and "insults to Islam," for example. Others undoubtedly believe that modernization is not coming fast enough, and that their training still is not relevant in the modern world.

In addition, the universities have had difficulty in attracting competent and dynamic faculties, despite government efforts to recruit better qualified teachers. At Tabriz, for example, until this year's reorganization, the university was dominated by conservative, long-entrenched native Azerbaijanis with questionable qualifications.

Although the apparent student/faculty ratios at Iranian universities are not too bad these figures are deceptive. At Tehran University, for example, where the ratio was 28 to 1 in 1966, faculty members have been only part-time teachers--medical professors with private practices, economics professors with their own businesses, etc. Some top professors reportedly have not shown up for classes in years. There has been virtually no faculty/student relationship. Professors traditionally deliver lectures and depart with little or no exchange with their students. The government now has banned part-time teaching, but it is not known to what extent its ruling has been enforced.

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University chancellors generally have won their positions on the basis of their ability to maintain order. Many are poor administrators, with little ability to communicate with the younger generation. Students are well aware of the attempts to keep them quiet; rumors at Tehran University that the chancellor was about to create a university-controlled student organization resulted in a pamphlet declaring that "we boycott any imposed trade union."

#### Outside Influences

There is little evidence of off-campus influence on student activism. Security officials, and in some instances university officials, charged that Communists were active in recent demonstrations; 20 of the 100 students arrested in the Tehran area in February 1968 were alleged to be pro-Chinese Communist. This has not been confirmed. There is some Communist activity, consisting primarily of the circulation of a limited amount of Soviet and Chinese propaganda. Some students may be receptive to this propaganda, but generally its effectiveness has been undercut by rapid economic and social development. Many students turned out in February to mourn the death of a famous wrestler associated with Mossadeq's National Front, but the front itself has been effectively silenced by the Shah's reforms and by security measures.

The US Embassy believes that in universities such as Pahlavi, which are located in less urban areas, Muslim religious leaders still have an influence over youth. On charges of fomenting the strikes about 50 religiously conservative Shirazi citizens were arrested following disturbances at Pahlavi in February.

There is no evidence that student revolts in the US, France, etc., have influenced the Iranian students, or that Iranian dissidents abroad have had an impact on the local scene.

#### Government Approach to Student Problems

Iranian officials, from the Shah on down, are aware that the regime has not been accepted by many intellectuals. They are anxious to keep youth satisfied and to encourage students to support and participate in the regime. There is no visible effort to

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train youth for political responsibility; in fact, the government attempts to keep students from engaging in political activity altogether.

The government is trying to improve and modernize Iranian universities through increased enrollment and expansion of facilities, improved and enlarged faculties, establishment of technical institutions, and of a more creative and relevant method of instruction. Further improvement is slated under the new five-year plan, but progress is slow--particularly when change threatens the university status quo and is fought by elements both in faculties and student bodies.

The regime-sponsored Youth Organization has established a Youth Palace in Tehran elaborately equipped with sports facilities, a snack bar, and occasional entertainment. There are plans for similar facilities in other Iranian cities and for other centers open to nonuniversity youth, as well.

Political and social pull--or being a descendant of one of Iran's "1,000 families" is still important in the rise to success, but less so than before. More middle-class youth are attending universities, and with the government's increasing emphasis on skill and technical competence, more of them are now able to get jobs without political connections. Of greatest impact, however, has been the increasing availability of government jobs. Both high school and university graduates are employed in large numbers in the Literacy, Health, and Development Corps.

#### Iranian Students Abroad

Iranian officials estimate that some 25,000 to 37,000 Iranians are studying abroad, including 5,000 to 12,000 in the United States. Surveys have shown that many of the best do not return home because of better opportunities abroad, but that average students are likely to come back. Most of the sizable number of dropouts and failures (only 50 percent of the Iranian "students" in the US are thought to be actually enrolled in schools) get nonprofessional jobs with good pay abroad and do not return to Iran.

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A degree from a US or European university is considered far more prestigious than one from an Iranian university, and many youths go to fantastic lengths to study abroad. For example, private enterprises in Iran sell admissions to small, often unaccredited universities in the US to students who are unable to gain admission to better US schools. Poorer students often seek education abroad because they are unable to gain entrance to Iran's limited capacity universities.

A small but vocal segment of Iranian students abroad (an estimated 500 are in the US) engage in active anti-Shah activities. They hold meetings, issue sporadic publications, and make grandiose plans, but their major activity is to harass the Shah when he travels. Anti-Shah demonstrations, joined by radical students in the US, Germany, Austria, and England, among other places, have been a major irritant to the Shah, have strained relations with host governments, and have often led to supersecurity and extremely tight security during his journeys.

The largest organizations of Iranian students abroad--the Iranian Students Association in the US and the Confederation of Iranian Students in Europe--appear to be a conglomeration of Communist sympathizers, National Front - oriented leftists, middle-of-the-roaders, and religiously oriented rightists. They have no ideological cohesiveness; only opposition to the Shah and the present regime unites them. Because leftists tend to be more active, they almost inevitably assume control but do not necessarily reflect the attitudes of the majority. Most of the funds apparently come from membership dues. Of course, those who are in the forefront of anti-Shah activities are well known to Iranian authorities and most of them find it impossible to return to Iran.

The government is also concerned by the so-called "brain drain" problem. During the past year, it has initiated a number of steps calculated to lure overseas residents back. These include draft exemptions, the promise of good jobs in government and private industry, and active recruiting for teaching jobs at Iranian universities. The regime may also be making it more difficult for Iranians to go abroad in the first place.

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~~No Foreign Dissem~~The Long View

There will likely be no dramatic changes in student attitudes over the next ten years, assuming that the Shah's economic development programs continue to provide challenging employment to increasing numbers of university graduates. It is also unlikely that many Iranian students will risk political activism while economic and social advancement appears possible. Nevertheless, as long as political activity is proscribed (and it is likely to be for as long as the Shah is in power), the regime will probably not win whole-hearted student support, and resentment of its authoritarianism, however benevolent, will pervade university life.

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~~No Foreign Dissem~~**ITALY****Summary**

Student agitation during the 1967-68 academic year has extended throughout Italy. Although directed primarily at educational reform, it has attracted the support of extremists and has aroused concern in political circles.

Student violence is not new. There was violence at several universities in 1962-64, 24-hour strikes in a number of universities in 1965, and disturbances involving both right and left extremists in 1966. The year just completed was the first, however, in which student unrest has been so widespread or has spread the length of the peninsula.

The first disorders of 1967-68 occurred at the Catholic University in Milan on 18 November. The last university sit-in of the year ended at the lay University Bocconi in Milan on 14 July 1968.

The most violent demonstrations took place in Rome. On 1 March 1968, there were serious disorders and clashes with the police near Rome's School of Architecture. Both police and private vehicles were destroyed by demonstrators. On 27 April 1968, some 2,000 university and secondary school students demonstrated in a central plaza against the arrest of several School of Architecture students. In clashes with the police the students used iron bars, chains, Molotov cocktails and stones as weapons. Several hundred individuals have been wounded in the clashes. Serious student demonstrations have also taken place during the past year in Turin, Florence, Padua, Venice, Naples, and Bologna.

**Percentage of Participation**

An average of some 10 percent of the students in the 34 Italian universities have been involved in the demonstrations. Thirty percent took part at Palermo, 20 percent in Florence, 15 percent at Sassari, and 10 percent at Turin, Rome, Genoa, Venice, and Chieti. In other university centers, the percentages were lower.

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Fewer than one percent were involved at Pescara, Ancona, Bari, and Pesaro.

The vast majority of Italian students have sympathized with the activists, or have been silent about their opposition to the unrest. Press and public opinion generally have been sympathetic to the student agitators, largely because of the obvious inadequacies of the university system.

### The Objectives

Student agitation is directed primarily toward educational reform but there is some evidence of a broader dissatisfaction with the "system." Possibly in line with modern anarchist thought, young Italians often seem uncertain of the alternatives they seek, divided or disorganized as to objectives, and without over-all leadership. Their specific demands are an admixture of local complaints--which provide a spark for trouble, and deep-seated, often long-discussed grievances over the antiquated character of the curriculum, the inadequacy of buildings, and the crippling lack of facilities for scientific and technical training. With these complaints go demands for far greater participation by the students in the actual running of the university and criticism of the government's inflexibility.

### Causes of Student Agitation

A basic cause of agitation in Italy is the rise in the number of university students. While in elementary school the increase in students is only slightly in excess of the general population growth even in 1965-66, 20 percent more enrolled for the first year of study for university degrees between 1965 and 1966 alone. The relatively static number of professors and an outdated curriculum have led to frustration. At Rome, for example, many students believe that it is absurd for them to be forced to achieve competence in the Latin of ancient Rome, but the requirement cannot be abolished except by act of parliament. In a smaller school such a requirement could be evaded by faculty-student collusion, but at Rome with 60,000 students such evasion is impossible.

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A general mood of restlessness also has proved infectious. Disaffected youth, known locally as "capelloni" (the long-haired ones), imitating foreign beatniks were noticeable in mid-1965. Some 200 from all over the country demonstrated at Carrara on 2 June 1967, with the support of the Federation of Italian Anarchist Youth.

The extremists with their rejection of all political order, their exasperated search for "direct democracy," and the weight they attach to the social and political criticism of Herbert Marcuse, have gone beyond the limits of homegrown Communism.

#### Outside Agitation

There is no evidence of foreign instigation or guidance during the seemingly spontaneous demonstrations of 1967-68. Television coverage of demonstrations elsewhere contributed to some degree, as did the exchange of literature and "experience" with foreign students and between Italian student groups. The extremist leaders of two university demonstrations in northern Italy during the last week in May had just returned from France.

In Italy, as in France, the orthodox Communist Party was surprised by the student outbreak and proved unprepared to endorse the aims or methods of the student agitators. The Italian party, with a membership of over one and a half million has been in the forefront of those free world Communist parties that have struggled to minimize their subservience to Moscow. It has sought the role of a more or less regular political party. The Italian Communists reacted ambiguously to the recent student disturbances, trying to capitalize on the move of events while refraining from taking an official position on the violence. While leaders of the party left argued for a more militant stand to enable the Communists to foment and take advantage of disorder, rather than backing away as they believe the French Communists did, the party, particularly its right wing, has been afraid that involvement in demonstrations such as those staged by the students would disrupt its long-term goal of winning a governmental role by peaceful means. The party also fears that the disorders, coupled with

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the restiveness evident in the Communist youth organization, could loosen its hold over party members in the universities. Communist youth increasingly are of the opinion that parliamentary reform is too slow a process and that the "Italian road to socialism," leads inevitably to social democracy.

Consequently, extremist political parties played a key role only in the lesser student demonstrations. No political party played any significant role in the demonstrations in Rome, Milan, Florence, Bologna, Naples, Trent, Bari, Perugia, Palermo, Venice, and Cagliari. Similar demonstrations at Padua, Pisa, Turin, and Sienna began spontaneously but were later influenced to some degree by the Communist and Proletarian Socialist parties. The extremists seem to have had the greatest influence at Ancona, Catania, Lecce, Messina, Parma, Pavia, Pesaro, and Pescara.

#### The Extreme Left

The political organizations which fall to the left of the orthodox Communists all have sought to profit from the student movement and to stimulate its protest activities. The Federation of Youth of the Proletarian Socialists has been reported the most popular political organization for the student extremists. The Proletarian Socialists have put their propaganda and organizational apparatus at the disposition of those in the university movement who would accept it. Many of the young people attracted by this party have concurrently put themselves at the head of anti-imperialist Castroist groups called "Che Guevara clubs" or at the head of associations of pro-Chinese or Trotskyite inspiration.

The pro-Chinese movement, represented by the three competing organizations--the Communist Party of Italy (Marxist-Leninist), the Federation of Marxist-Leninist Communists of Italy, and the League of Marxist-Leninist Communists of Italy--of late has obtained an unprecedented degree of support in the university milieu. Previously little success attended these groups' demonstrations, which were usually built around the theme of US involvement in Vietnam and complete with little red books and Maoist banners and maxims.

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The Trotskyite movement is represented by two feeble groups and has profited little as yet from the student agitation. In one city, however, several university students have founded a "League of Revolutionary Students" which proposes to link student and worker power and to organize street demonstrations.

Pro-Castro sentiment has not given rise to any disciplined organization in Italy. There has been an increase in the number of "Che Guevara clubs," however, where protest of a variety of ideological tendencies is reportedly expressed. A left-wing Italian publisher distributes a considerable volume of literature romanticizing Castro and Che Guevara and also disseminates texts on guerrilla methods and techniques. Several people in Italian Government circles have expressed fear that the spread of such literature could lend an increasingly violent cast to student demonstrations.

#### The Extreme Right

The extreme right--particularly the neo-Fascist movement--is divided between those with a nostalgia for the past and others who stress political survival in a time of rapid social evolution. The rightists fear that too reactionary a line will separate them from the mass of students, or that association with the far left will lead to their absorption. In fact, in some universities the far right led actions to evacuate or to prevent the occupation of the schools. In others, the rightists competed with the extreme leftists in occupying buildings. In general, however, the far right has not been a major factor in the student demonstrations.

#### Attitude of Moderates

The Italian students may have a better chance of winning high-level support than student agitators elsewhere. For example,



ANTI-WAR PROTESTERS ROME, MAY 1967

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Amintore Fanfani, a key Christian Democratic leader, has taught classes at Rome. Fanfani's lectures were based on his contemporary experiences as foreign minister and were designed to meet student demand for academic work relevant to the present day. The Unified Socialist Party directorate at a meeting on 27 May unanimously called for amnesty for students and workers under indictment for participating in demonstrations. Civiltà Cattolica, the influential Jesuit weekly, stated editorially that protesting students were substantially correct in their demands and new forms of democracy would have to be found to give everyone a meaningful role in society.

Before it was dissolved last spring the legislature had begun to consider university reforms that could result in early accession to some of the more basic student demands--such as the requirement that professors be forbidden to work full time outside the university. Willingness of the new legislature to take such action may well be enhanced by the recent French crisis.

#### Prospects

Student disorders, improbable during the summer recess, are likely to resume next November when winter terms in all the universities are under way. Their extent and seriousness probably depend on the prospect of sympathetic government action toward university reform and the degree of student-worker cooperation. This in turn probably depends at least in part on the attitude of the orthodox Italian Communist Party toward student unrest.

The incumbent government of Giovanni Leone has given to university reform priority. The Leone government is expected to last only until the Unified Socialist Party congress next October, however, and the results of that congress and the sort of government subsequently formed will determine the prospects for effective university reform. It is generally expected that reform will in fact eventually take place but that it will probably come about too slowly to forestall a new wave of serious student agitation.

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## JAPAN

INTRODUCTION

The expression of student disaffection with the Japanese conservative establishment in street demonstrations has been a problem since World War II. Student extremists have often provided the hard core of violence in demonstrations staged by labor and the "masses" as an extraparlimentary tactic against the conservative majority in the Diet. Because demonstrations have been chronic they have been accommodated in the existing social and political structure with both the police and demonstrators observing tacitly agreed rules of engagement and public opinion has come to support these rules. As an effective part of the political process, demonstrations have acquired a role in the opposition portion of Japan's political establishment and secured a quasi legitimate place in the legislative process.

The Higher Educational System

The Japanese place education high in their value system and regard it as one of the principal ways to enhance social and economic status. The importance of an academic degree as a vital key to employment and status has taxed the facilities of higher education. Competition in the entrance examinations for admission to the universities is intense, particularly at such prestige institutions as Tokyo, Kyoto, Waseda and Keio Universities.

Extensive reorganization of Japanese education during the Occupation produced a system closely modeled after that of the United States. Some changes have been made since Japan recovered her sovereignty in 1952, but basically the educational structure still rests on the framework of the Occupation-sponsored reforms.

In the field of higher education the prestigious national universities survived the Occupation with the least amount of revision--complete reorganization of the universities was never quite accomplished. A

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structural alteration did change the old three-year universities to four-year institutions to accommodate the revised system of lower education. A more significant change in terms of its impact was the creation of new universities throughout the country to provide an outlet for the vastly increased numbers of new secondary school graduates. The expansion of higher education has continued and in the 1966-67 academic year 194,997 students were enrolled in 413 junior colleges and 1,044,296 students attended 346 universities.

After two decades of experience with this expanding system there exists considerable ferment and discontent with "mass education" in contrast with the elite education at the higher levels before 1945. Shortcomings more frequently cited include charges that academic standards remain low in many fields, that there is too much conformity in universities, that the level of specialized schools has declined, and that literary courses are too numerous. People outside the university community attribute these alleged deficiencies not only to impractical and realistic curriculums but to the excessive number of universities and their burgeoning student populations.

The educational system places extreme pressure on students prior to rather than after entrance into higher education. Fierce competition to gain admission to select institutions is credited with contributing to one of the highest suicide rates among adolescents in the world. The competition is fair, however, as the evaluations based on physical and scholastic examinations do not discriminate between rich and poor.

The environment of the Japanese university is a significant factor in student political activity. Once entry to a university is assured, the student is relieved of the immediate urgency of competition and it is his presence in a particular school rather than his academic performance which enhances job prospects. A student is practically guaranteed graduation as it is considered a disgrace for a professor

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or a university to produce a student who earns poor marks or fails, because it reflects on the competence of his or its teaching. At most institutions no special honors are awarded for outstanding scholarship and consequently the students' motivation for study is minimal and a common complaint is that university students do not work. Classes are crowded and the lecture system prevails almost exclusively at the undergraduate level. Class attendance is not controlled. Students, left largely on their own, can use readily available inexpensive copies of lecture notes without attending class regularly.

Another factor is the lack of dialogue between professors and students, in class or outside, which stems from the impersonal method of teaching. Thus the politically interested student must look elsewhere, to either fellow students or professional activists which have infiltrated the campuses, for discussion of politics.

Japanese society throws the student out on his own at the university level, and unfortunately the overprotected, disciplined regimen of home and lower schooling inadequately prepares the student for this sudden independence. In this situation a variety of influences shape his thinking and action. At the outset the student comes in contact with a pure and thus not necessarily practical or responsible brand of idealism traditionally displayed by university students. Caught in a society still seeking new values to replace those destroyed by the humiliation of defeat and occupation, the destruction of older authority widens the generation gap between students and their elders. In addition, students are conscious of the class conflicts of modern industrial society and experience the typical modern discontent with mass society's aimlessness, vulgarity, commercialism and boredom. As a consequence students are especially intent on championing "intellectual integrity," largely in protest against prewar restrictions imposed on freedom of expression. Their thinking is also strongly influenced by their association with theoretically Marxist-oriented professors, who gained prestige and ascendancy in the postwar

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academic community by virtue of their prewar suppression and the liberal emphasis in Occupation policy. Marxism's ready-made one package explanation of history and society fills a felt need of both professors and students.

### Functional Value of Educational Training

Japan's educational system has functioned successfully as a channel for the indoctrination of Western technology and as an instrument for social modernization and economic development. The training provided in the past and that of today makes it possible for the Japanese to participate in a modern industrial society. In individual terms, however, formal education can be a limiting factor since job placement, income and prestige are largely determined by the amount of education a person possesses regardless of individual ability of skill.

At the university level, professional, scientific and technical training is certainly functional in preparing students for a place in society. Japan produces recognized scholars and scientists. The universities, however, are not training enough people to meet the demands of industry for technologists and there is a developing controversy over the issue of stressing such training at university levels.

On the other hand, the functional value of the training provided in literature and the social sciences and for students at women's colleges is questionable in terms of employment; the number of such graduates exceeds job openings. The overcrowding of educational facilities, the impersonal lecture methods, and the lax academic standards all contribute to a low functional value. The fact that students and society accord greater importance to attendance at particular universities than to academic achievement is another indication of low regard for the instruction received.

Functional training cannot be provided unless the society has clearly defined aims to which the purposes of education can be related. Japanese society has yet to define its aims. Direct on-the-job

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contact with the realities of the Japanese economy must raise questions about the credibility of Marxist economics expounded at the university level. A Japanese businessman has observed that it takes five or six years to reorient students who have been exposed to Marxist teaching.

#### Student Organizations

Zengakuren is the only nationally significant student organization in Japan and practically the only vehicle available to the politically-minded student for expressing his views. It provides a comprehensive system of elections, a framework for campaigning and policy formulation, and a sense of involvement in adult affairs. In addition the campus student association offers its members such practical services as cooperative restaurants, bookshops, tailoring and other facilities.

Zengakuren is a federation of student self-government associations, primarily those of universities although high school associations are eligible for membership. Initially envisioned as nonpolitical bodies designed to promote student welfare, these associations were granted a large measure of autonomy in student affairs and were subject to little or no direct supervision from government officials, the police or university authorities. Every student body had one or more associations which elected officers and exercised self-government under a charter. Marxist-oriented social science departments of several Tokyo universities provided the impetus for the organization of a national federation in 1948. Students from these universities continue to provide much of Zengakuren leadership.

Soon after its formation, Zengakuren applied for membership in the communist-dominated International Union of Students (IUS). Accepted as a member in 1949, Zengakuren or one of its competing factions has continued to be recognized as representing Japan. A Japanese has served as IUS vice-chairman and a Japanese student has been a member of the secretariat.

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Infiltrated and dominated at the outset by the JCP, the organization is characterized by a highly politically motivated leadership with a rather large but lethargic general membership. While most of the leadership is thoroughly Marxist, an estimated 40% of the rank and file membership does not support any political party. Only a small part of the membership actually identifies with the organization and it is believed that a cadre of about 2,000 students virtually controls the federation.

Zengakuren's power and influence have risen or fallen according to its leadership's success in promoting struggles widely popular among students. Consequently, the leadership is always striving to discover or create problems that will attract ordinary students. Each time a local issue arises, radical leaders endeavor to interpret it in a broader context and link it to a national or an international issue.

Factionalism has permeated Zengakuren from its start, and, despite JCP domination at the top levels, the desire for independence from established parties and dissatisfaction with changes in the JCP line often caused student leaders to resist JCP orders. During 1958, the federation began to move away from JCP policies after the president and 70 executive committee members were expelled from the Party for "left adventurist" tendencies. Since that time Zengakuren has been split into pro- and anti-JCP splinter groups of varying ideologies.

Three principal student groups presently claim to be the legitimate heirs to Zengakuren, one pro- and two anti-JCP. The JCP-affiliated body is by far the most powerful, claiming to control two-thirds of the 426 student associations totaling an estimated 372,000 members. The two anti-JCP groups, the Sampa Rengo (Three Faction Alliance) and the Kakumaru-ha (Revolutionary Marxist Faction) claim the support of associations with approximately 290,000 members.

The pro-JCP Zengakuren has won its leading position by emphasizing the improvement of student living conditions and opposition to tuition increases.

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This faction at the moment is notable for its stable and moderate political tactics, while Sampa Rengo and Kakumaru-ha are distinguished for their militancy and violent clashes with the police.

Although the leftists have dominated the postwar student movement, there is a possibility that the slow resurgence of Japanese nationalism is beginning to manifest itself in the formation of nationalistic student organizations. Chapters of the Nihon Gakusei Domei (Nichigakudo), the Japan Student Federation, have been formed at a few universities in Kyushyu to challenge Zengakuren for leadership of the student bodies. Nichigakudo is reported to have been offered support by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, but the offers were declined because acceptance would restrict its activities. Nevertheless, these groups remain on good terms with the conservatives, and the chapters tend to cooperate with the authorities of their respective schools.

#### Political Party Activity in Student Affairs

The efforts, or lack thereof, of political parties to influence students stem from the attitude of Japanese society toward youth in general. Japanese youth is unique compared to less developed Asian nations, particularly with regard to age factors. Due not only to the stability of domestic political and economic conditions but also to the persistence in Japanese society of traditions attaching importance and respect to seniority, young men do not expect to play an influential role in the direction of national affairs. Adults of demonstrated competence in the 30-40 year age bracket still have their future ahead of them.

With a generally stable "establishment" on both the conservative and renovationist sides, the routes of advancement to membership in it are rather clearly marked. Given the long time it takes for the slow climb up the ladder of seniority, the student period of a would-be leader is a brief span. In addition, the leftist influence to which students are exposed in the universities appears to have no lasting effect, since students in the Japanese view enjoy not only an ephemeral status of privileged political

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irresponsibility but also a transitory state of mind. As a consequence of these factors, the efforts of conservative political organizations among students are limited, and political party efforts to organize support among the younger generation have fallen short of their aims.

Communist involvement in student action, however, has been extensive prior to since the organization of Zengakuren. From the outset, the organization was infiltrated and dominated by elements of the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Communists have held important offices and JCP agents under student cover have actively promoted and controlled Zengakuren campus activities. During a period when the organization was flourishing, the JCP was reported to have had about 100 students on its payroll as "career workers." Communist influence has continued to be readily apparent in the national issues espoused and the tactics adopted by Zengakuren.

There is evidence that funds have been provided by the Soviet Union, Communist China and North Korea to help finance some demonstrations. In the case of Communist China, Japanese companies engaged in the "friendly firm" trade with China are required to turn over a percent of their profits from such trade to support the radical pro-Communist China factions of Zengakuren. Box office receipts from Chinese theatrical troupes touring Japan also are a source of funds. The protests of the extremist student groups against the Enterprise visit were reported to have been financed in part by pro-Communist China organizations.

#### Extent of Unrest

The extent of unrest among Japanese students is difficult to estimate and their snake-dancing in street demonstrations is not necessarily a valid criterion of disaffection. Although most students avoid direct involvement in political action, they are passively sympathetic to leftist causes, and it is true that Marxist influence on the campus is well established. Moderate element, even if motivated, are unable to activate their like-minded colleagues.

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Membership in Zengakuren, the all-Japan Federation of Student Self-Government Associations, also is not a valid measure of unrest. A decision by a university student body to join Zengakuren technically compels all students to become members, but the affiliation can well be engineered by a small radical group which has seized control of the campus association. It has been estimated that in general about 10 percent of students participate in student politics.

Student participation in the anti-Security Treaty disturbances of 1960 gives some yardstick of active expression of disaffection. At that time Zengakuren membership was nominally 290,000 less than half of the total college enrollment of 675,000. Only 20 percent of Zengakuren members were estimated to have taken part in demonstrations throughout the country. In Tokyo, with a student population of 300,000 of which 100,000 were in Zengakuren, large student demonstrations drew from 10 to 15 thousand students with a high of 26 thousand on one day.

More recently, the extremist Zengakuren groups were able to mobilize only an estimated 3,300 students for a demonstration opposing Prime Minister Sato's departure for a visit to the US. Participation in demonstrations on other issues has been well under this figure. These latest demonstrations provide a measure of the hard-core radicalism among students,



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suggesting that the vast majority of students stay out of active involvement in political activity and that the violence of the radicals tends to isolate them from the main body of students. Some students admit that their status makes an ideal cover for political activities and are eager to use this freedom to express themselves. Nevertheless, practically all students realize their future employers are unsympathetic toward political activism and are unwilling to engage in activities that might jeopardize their future careers.

### Issues

Issues which arouse student action fall into two broad categories: those affecting student life, usually involving campus conditions, and national or international questions involving government authoritarianism, war and peace, and relations with the US. Dissatisfaction with living conditions, and with overcrowded educational facilities, particularly Tokyo universities, has led to student strikes and violent disputes with university authorities. Students on occasion have fought for control of their dormitories, and violently opposed increases in tuition fees. They are devoted to the accepted version of "academic freedom" which holds that the university is almost immune from police action. Police incursions quickly arouse student resistance, and clashes with the police tend to enlarge student engagement in any dispute. Recurrent struggles over these personal and educational issues often expose the impotence of university and government authorities, but generally do not attract sufficient public support to pose a serious threat to the ruling establishment.

Sensitivity to a resurgence of government authoritarianism is usually involved in any issue which excites nationwide reaction. Measures for imposing greater government control of universities and for an efficiency rating system for teachers have provoked national student opposition. The Police Duties Law of 1968 which raised the spectre of a return to wartime police repression incited violent demonstrations which forced the Kishi government to shelve the bill.

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But the issues that have caused the most serious disturbances are those in which the Japanese government, the US and the possibilities of war involving Japan get linked together. It is in this context that US bases in Japan, the Japan-US Security Treaty and related military arrangements, the Vietnam War, nuclear weapons and rearmament evoke violent protests. Reviving nationalism with its resentment of alleged dependence on the US reinforces reaction on these issues. The issue that most stimulates public concern is the possibility of Japan being dragged into war on the US coattails.

### History of Student Involvement in Politics

Japanese students have attracted the most attention and exerted significant impact as an organized political force only since World War II. Student agitation and strikes occurred before 1945, but the government had little difficulty in controlling political activity. With the help of a highly centralized educational system, an elaborate police network, and an acquiescent public, officials were generally able to keep students politically passive or to enlist their support for government policies.

The situation changed abruptly after the war when students were freed from official repression and encouraged to participate freely in discussions of public affairs. Proposals for educational reform became political issues in which students became involved. Their interest in political matters was also stimulated by the desire to improve their own difficult living conditions and their general disillusionment with the old order.

In the first postwar year university students initially moved to oust teachers and professors who had cooperated in the prosecution of the war. A brief period of united action with the labor movement followed, after which the students again turned their attention to educational matters, specifically to opposing increases of tuition fees at national universities. The ensuing strikes and demonstrations by local student self-government associations led

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to the organization of Zengakuren in 1948. This organization has subsequently served as the prime vehicle for student political activity. In their political actions the students have been noteworthy for their turbulence and violence in demonstrations, both in those they have unilaterally staged and in those held in conjunction with labor and the leftist political parties. Generally, student political demonstrations are merely a nuisance unless other groups such as leftist labor unions or Communist organizations, which can turn out large numbers of people, provide mass support. Often organized labor and the leftist parties shun student participation in their demonstrations, fearing that the students' proneness to violence might alienate public opinion.

The US presence has provided a convenient focus for the polarization of discontent and a target for political action. Student antipathy toward this presence appeared during the last years of the Occupation in the form of protests against the "anti-Red" purges which excluded Communists from political and union activity. Students also participated in demonstrations against various Occupation policies which they considered as dictated by US interest. The stationing of US forces in Japan after the nation recovered its sovereignty in 1952 has continued to irritate sensitivities concerning national independence. Student actions against Japan's military ties with the US have been recurrent since 1952 and have ranged from street demonstrations to physical attempts to disrupt the operation of military bases or obstruct the transportation of US military supplies.

Zengakuren led a student movement opposing the 1952 Peace Treaty which was ineffective largely because of strife within the Japan Communist Party. Between 1956 and 1958 the federation joined other mass groups in advocating peace, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the defeat of such government measures as the efficiency rating system for teachers and the revision of the Police Duties Law. The high point of effective political action came in 1960 when Zengakuren spearheaded the opposition to the Japanese-US Security Treaty which toppled the cabinet of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and prevented the visit of President Eisenhower to Japan.

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Subsequently, adverse public reaction to the violence of the anti-Security Treaty riots and the restrained "low key" posture the government adopted toward the opposition deprived student groups of excuses for demonstrating, and their political influence declined.

Despite the decline of Zengakuren influence, student protest in the present decades has reflected themes emphasized in leftist and Communist politics. Students resisted the restoration of normal diplomatic relations with South Korea, finally achieved in late 1965, and continued to oppose the US presence in Japan to protest the expanding US role in Vietnam. Beginning with the first visit of a US nuclear-powered submarine in October 1964, students have sought to play upon Japanese fears associated with nuclear weapons. In January of this year, student activists engaged in violent clashes with Japanese police at Sasebo during demonstrations against the visit of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise. Previously, the Vietnam issue and US ties figured prominently in student violence in connection with Prime Minister Sato's departures in October and November 1967, to visit Southeast Asia--including a stop at Saigon. The attacks on a US military hospital in Tokyo for Vietnam casualties have been a further reflection of student antipathy toward the US role both in Vietnam and Japan.

Violent political action by extremist factions of Zengakuren has been directed at other segments of the left as well as against the government and the US. On one occasion ultra-leftist students invaded and disrupted a rally for the reversion of Okinawa whose sponsors included the Japan Socialist and Communist parties and Sohyo, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan. This incident was another facet of the extremists' effort to prove their militancy and contempt for what they call the "Left-Establishment" which they say has "abandoned revolutionary goals leaving the masses leaderless."

Despite the alienating effect their violence has upon the majority of students, other parts of the left-wing establishment and the public, the extremists persist in engineering violent clashes with

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the police. They regard these clashes as part of a process to raise general "political consciousness" and to improve their tactics and organization for the "decisive battle" in 1970 to abrogate the Japan-US Security Treaty. In contrast to this extremist behavior, the more powerful Japan Communist Party affiliated faction in Zengakuren has eschewed violence in pressing "Communist demands" aimed at destroying "reactionary education" and "resurgent militarism."

### Outlook

Barring a severe economic crisis, there is little prospect that students will bring about fundamental changes in the government and political parties. The Japanese establishment, buttressed by still tight, disciplined and group-oriented social structure and operating well within the limits of consensus, seems a long way from coming unstuck. Most Japanese share the benefits of the nation's economic progress through improved living standards, and have some chance of rising into the establishment. There is also an almost universal desire to see Japan excel as a nation. Consequently, the majority of the population has little inclination for drastic changes in the social-political-economic structure. Even the majority of youth shows little willingness to engage in a serious, determined effort to change the social processes by which leadership is presently attained, to resist conformity to the system--whatever its deficiencies or frustrations--or to insist on early participation in leadership itself.

The accommodation of student demonstrations within the political structure tends to maintain stability. Student action has been influential in the past and will be so in the future whenever students are joined by organized labor in mounting mass demonstrations on issues which the public supports. Student action in conjunction with left-wing labor and political elements was able to topple the Kishi cabinet in 1960, but not to replace it with a leftist administration. The conservative establishment simply responded to the display of unrest by elevating another conservative to the prime ministership and soft pedalling controversial issues.

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The likelihood, however, that the Japanese government will bend with the wind when faced with serious trouble portends difficulties for US interests, especially since most of the potentially explosive issues confronting it involve military security and relations with the US.

It is not clear just how enduring student allegiance to the leftist political cause really is. Polls indicate that a large segment of students support the "progressive" parties and candidates, but there is increasing evidence that a large number become more conservative as they grow older, and change their voting habits accordingly. Election results seem to confirm such a trend.

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## POLAND

Summary

Polish youth is pressing for recognition, responsibility, and a role in shaping the country's future. It is doing so against a regime which young people view as opposed to change, jealous of past "achievements," and increasingly repressive. The crisis between generations now facing Poland will grow worse.

Fifty percent of the population is under the age of 25 and sixty percent under the age of 30. Polish youth do not oppose the basic economic or social tenets of East European Communism as such. They do not, for example, favor a return to private ownership, nor the reintroduction of the pre-war social system based on wealth and semi-feudal influence. They do, however, want far-reaching changes in direction of a more democratic model of "socialism," and the fulfillment of some of the promises originally held out by the country's leaders.

The bleak, grey facade of the Communist establishment seems effectively to exclude youth from meaningful participation in the country's future. The regime, constantly harking back to a history which today's youth did not shape and much of which it wishes to forget, is viewed as an anachronism.

The youth appear most to oppose the stagnation and the lack of movement, the exclusiveness, and the corruption of the establishment. The Communist framework within which these features emerge, with its totalitarianism, significantly reinforce these attitudes, but do not appear to be a root cause of them. This is particularly true of the ideologically unmotivated members of the younger generation who have left school. Most appear to regard Communist ideology as irrelevant to the issues facing the country--a dead letter with only its institutional forms still prevailing.

Apathy Versus Commitment

Faced with the coercive power of the establishment, youth have become apathetic to the regime's goals and to Communism as an ideology promising

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consistent development. They view the established Communist regime in Poland today as a negation of the very ideas on which it theoretically rests. More than other segments of the population, youth have long been aware that the Polish party, like other Communist parties in power, has become the core of a stagnant society rather than a dynamic stimulant to change. This was made clear by the party itself, when politburo member Kliszko warned on 20 June that "anarchist-leftist" youth leaders in the "contemporary world" only fulfill a "diversionary role" on behalf of conservative elements against the "real" revolutionary forces of the left. In the eyes of Polish youth, the party's fear of "anarchism" neatly underscores its total identification with an intolerable status quo.

Generally, educated Polish youth tend toward a form of Western European social democracy as a political and social order, nonsectarianism in religion and experimental freedom in art. They favor individual rather than collective responsibility in social relations, and their nationalism is tempered by vague feelings of supranationalism and a strong allegiance to Europe as an entity.

In terms of specific domestic policies, they make it clear that they want a free interplay of ideas, and above all, a regime responsive to public opinion.

This whole range of demands was clearly embodied in a declaration passed by dissident Warsaw University students on 28 March, in the wake of the most recent student disturbances. The most succinct of numerous such resolutions passed by various student bodies that month, the Warsaw University thesis called for freedom of assembly and expression, freedom of political association, legal and institutional guarantees for such freedoms, true rule of law in the judicial system, the repudiation of and guarantees against abuse of governmental power, the abolition of censorship, and the repeal of repressive legal codes. It also called for popular representation in parliament, although it stopped short of calling for free elections. Finally, the students demanded an overhaul of the economic system and a thorough shakeup of the bureaucratic establishment.

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Although student demands during the initial stages of the unrest which surfaced in Warsaw on 8 March were limited to issues of academic freedom, the 28 March declaration illustrates the degree to which these demands were widened under the stimulus of stern repression by the regime. The government and the party were faced with no less than a demand that they divest themselves of a monopoly of power.

The "March Events"

The student disorders and the violence from 8 through 23 March gave climactic impetus to a political struggle already under way within the regime and may have irreversibly shaken Gomulka's rule within the party. The demonstrations began largely as a spontaneous expression of genuine grievances in the academic milieu and related issues of individual liberties. The students, however, clearly were aware of the almost simultaneous political events in Czechoslovakia, and had been emboldened by the resistance of the Warsaw Writers Union to dictates of the regime a month earlier.

The relative uninvolvedness of Polish students in previous regime crises stemmed from the wish not to be sucked into the intricate power rivalries within the party. Most of the party's factions, from Gomulka's old guard to their more hard line rivals, appear aware of the "mischief" potential of youth, and the uses to which dissident youth can be employed to advance a partisan cause in any factional infighting. Some party groups have courted youth's favor, even to the extent of placing themselves at the head of the party's critics. Others, correctly, see youth as the spearhead of a movement which could threaten the bureaucracy and as the driving wedge of "ideological subversion."

Thus, until March, the youth tended to avoid actions that would have been exploitable by the party factions just as they had rejected occasional courtship. In fact, the inability and unwillingness of the youth to view any party faction as a true champion of their interests was the fundamental reason that student disorders in March lost momentum. Students

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maintained action as long as the whole regime, i.e., all the party's factional strata, was "shaken to attention." It soon became apparent, however, that the student movement was being exploited for intra-party factional purposes. Conclusive evidence emerged when clearly excessive police force was used and "hooligan" provocateurs were employed among the students. This, together with the early and false allegations of "Zionist" instigation of the riots, reportedly convinced most of the student dissidents that the party's hard line faction, which controls the police apparatus, was more interested in having the disturbances run their course than nipping them in the bud. By the last week in March, most of the student resolutions and declarations passed at various universities throughout the country specifically included denials of "anti-socialist" intent and expressed strong desires to remain outside the framework of the "political arena," i.e., party factionalism.

Another major factor in ending overt student action was the failure to secure worker support. The regime's propaganda blaming the riots on Jews and revisionist intellectuals skillfully played to its residual anti-Semitic and anti-intellectual bias of the average Polish worker. Although there were strong expressions of moral sympathy from workers and other strata of the population, active support was limited to scattered instances of collecting funds to pay jail fines. The absence of an immediate economic issue around which worker discontent could coalesce also dampened labor support. In addition, many of the students--mainly those who did not take part in the disturbances--were working-class children whose parents evidently were fearful of jeopardizing their educations.

Currently, Polish youth remain on the watch for another chance to lend impetus to change within the system. In this sense, they are both evolutionary and revolutionary in their thinking. They appear to view open rebellion as counterproductive under present circumstances. They are, however, convinced that the regime has neither the ability nor the desire to evolve without carefully channelled external pressure. This they are willing and increasingly able to provide.

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Although there is abundant evidence of rapid coordination between groups of dissident students throughout Poland soon after the outbreak of demonstrations in Warsaw on 8 March, no information exists of prior planning. The peak of coordinated action appears to have come between 11 and 14 March, when sympathy demonstrations and student meetings in provincial cities closely echoed the action and demands of the Warsaw dissidents. Then, after 13 March, tactics in Warsaw were changed to concentrate on declarations and resolutions rather than on street action, student response at Krakow's Jagellonian University was quick. Elsewhere, however, sporadic demonstrations by that time continued until 17 March.

Student couriers traveling throughout the country during the demonstrations apparently were the principal means of contact, although there was one unconfirmed report that technical students in Wroclaw had attempted to use a shortwave radio. By 14 March, the regime had curtailed student travel, in order to prevent coordination; some student couriers reportedly were arrested.

Despite the arrest or intimidation of many of the leaders of the student disturbances in March, a viable, if temporary, underground network between students in Poland probably still exists. Following the cessation of all overt student action on 23 March, when sit-ins in Warsaw and Krakow were peacefully broken up by police, there were again reports of more sophisticated nationwide coordination, probably because of the relaxation of travel curbs. The fruits of such coordination have not become apparent, however, and it is possible that either dissension among students over the practicality of further action or infiltration of their ranks by provateurs may have shortcircuited any plans.

There is no hard evidence that prior contact with students in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere played a major role in sparking unrest in Poland, although during the initial stages of the student demonstrations in Warsaw slogans of "Greetings to our Czech brothers" and "We need a Dubcek too," were heard.

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Nor is there convincing evidence that Polish students sought or that Czech students were anxious to provide any "export" of their experience to Poland. Indeed, by March Czechoslovak students were caught up in supporting and consolidating the new regime in Prague, having little in common with the problems faced by their Polish counterparts.

Nevertheless, the Polish regime, in late March and early April, added stringent travel curbs on all but official travel to and from Czechoslovakia to the general restrictions and visa curbs on foreigners, specifically Western journalists. Most of these restrictions appear to have been lifted by mid-April, although a careful screening of student travel reportedly continues.

There is little information to suggest exchanges among Polish and Western European students influenced the ferment. Although Polish universities maintain lively exchange programs with several European countries, Polish students have remained relatively uninfluenced by the various student movements in the West. They are well aware of the writings of Marcuse and the ideas which motivate student syndicalist groups, but there is very little evidence to show that these had taken hold in Poland. Many students contend that the daily reality of "alienation" in Poland and specific indigenous issues facing Polish youth dictate goals, strategy, and tactics which can borrow from Western student experience only in the broadest possible terms.

#### Students and the Educational System

Despite the rapid growth and democratization of the educational system in interwar Poland, schools of higher learning before World War II were still characterized by exclusiveness and overemphasis on legal and humanistic studies. Interwar Poland, therefore, had its problems with a qualified, unemployed, and "alienated" intelligentsia long before the term became popular elsewhere.

One of the few real achievements of the postwar Communist regime was the rapid expansion of mass education. Universities and other schools of higher

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learning increased in number from 32 in 1938 to 76 in 1966 and the student body from under 50,000 to more than 250,000 over the same period. This virtual explosion in the numbers of educated youth within the framework of a system unable and unwilling to satisfy either their material or spiritual demands is central to the regime's current problems.

Children of the workers and the peasantry have made significant gains in higher education, although the party continues to decry their relatively low percentage in the total student body. Only 27 percent of the students are children of workers, and less than 17 percent are children of peasants. Since students from these backgrounds apparently were the least involved in the March disturbances, one of the regime's current goals is to increase their number, at the expense of the sons and daughters of the "affluent" or of middle-class background, who have been singled out as the ringleaders of the unrest.

Rumors that children of prominent party and government personnel played key roles in the March disturbances have been plentiful, although evident bias on the part of many of the sources of these rumors casts some doubt on their reliability. The children of influential Jews, for example, have been singled out for condemnation, by the hard-line party elements for clear political reasons. It is true, however, that students of middle class and intellectual backgrounds did in fact, play a central role in the unrest, and they have formed the majority of those who have been penalized by the regime.

The full impact of the regime's countermeasures against the students and the educational system in the wake of the "March events" has yet to be seen. Although no complete totals for arrests and trials have yet been published, party boss Gomulka revealed on 19 March that a total of 1,208 persons had been arrested up to that time. Only 367 of these were students. The remainder, according to claims of the regime, were "hooligans" and other "misguided elements." Over half of the students arrested reportedly were released within two days. Additional



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figures provided by the Ministry of Education in June showed that "disciplinary procedures" were initiated against 424 students, of whom 111 were "temporarily suspended." The cases of another 200 have not been decided; this number probably includes a smaller number of student leaders whose trials in camera reportedly will come during the summer. None of the figures so far made public appears to take into account 1,600 Warsaw University students who were required to re-register after March. Over 70 of these subsequently were expelled.

Repercussions in the educational system were quick in coming, partially because of political considerations. Influential liberal professors and other academicians, many of them Jews, were purged during April, and scores of graduate assistants were dismissed. Institutional changes, especially within the universities, may be longer in coming. As early as 1966, for example, the regime was considering some changes in the structure of Warsaw University's philosophical faculty, long considered the hotbed of dissent. It is likely that the faculty will now be closed. The regime has also floated plans for abolishing the traditional system of "chairs" at universities, which had up to now permitted a significant degree of internal autonomy to professors holding such positions. Measures to centralize control over teaching and academic staffs are likely--some before schools reopen this fall.



STUDENTS DEMONSTRATING AT US EMBASSY, 1965

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Organized Student Activity

The regime's main effort to prevent a repetition of the March disturbances is likely to center on propaganda activity by the mass youth organizations. The largest of these, the 900,000-member Union of Socialist Youth (ZMS), and the 850,000-member Union of Rural Youth (ZMW), have long been under the regime's direct control, and their effectiveness has been hampered by bureaucratic bungling and the unresponsiveness of the youth. The ZMW caters mainly to peasant youth in rural areas; while the ZMS has "academic" branches, its main appeal is to working youth for whom membership is a means of job advancement. Although the regime has tried to use both organizations as instruments of indoctrination, internal stresses and strains have gradually polarized their memberships into a handful of Communist zealots on the one hand and a mass of apathetic opportunists on the other.

Most university students belong to the 145,000-member Polish Students Association (ZSP), which had concentrated on catering to their material and recreational needs and has succeeded in functioning without undue regime interference. The ZSP appears to be divided into an officially approved leadership and a rank-and-file membership which pays little heed to directives issued from above.

The ZSP's leadership prides itself on its "cosmopolitanism," reflected mainly in the organization's membership in the Prague-based International Union of Students (IUS). A ZSP member receives an IUS identification card when travelling abroad. More importantly, there appears to be some interchange between ZSP and IUS leaderships. The present ZSP chairman, Jerzy Piatkowski--not a student, but a regime-installed leader--previously held the post of secretary in the IUS. He was replaced in this post early in 1966 by another ZSP functionary, Wlodzimierz Konarski.

Most students consider the ZSP, and to a lesser degree the ZMS, as useful vehicles for contacts among universities both within Poland and in foreign countries. Much of the students' more significant

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political activity, however, takes place on the periphery of the ZSP--in various "discussion clubs," only a few of which are sanctioned. The small minority of students taking active part in these clubs nevertheless have proved infectious sources of dissent for the rest of the student body.

The most active student political groups are thought to exist at the Universities of Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan, and Lodz. Although the political views of student members range from "democratic" through "revisionist" to various shades of unorthodox Communism--including idealistic Trotskyism--they share opposition to various aspects of the present regime, and concern themselves mainly with discussion and promotion of political, social, economic, and philosophical alternatives to the present system.

According to one source, in 1967 there existed at Warsaw University seven generally "democratic" groups, two "revisionist," and five "Communist," together totaling about 500 students. Other groups have been identified only when the regime broke up their activity. Among these were a "national-democratic" group broken up in April 1961, a small allegedly pro-Chinese "conspiracy" broken up in late 1964, and a Trotskyite "revisionist" group dissolved in 1965. During the student unrest in March of this year, the regime charged that students belonging to a "Zionist" group at Warsaw University, the "Babel" discussion club, were the ringleaders of the unrest there.

It is likely that the heavy hand of the regime has descended on all of these groups, perhaps forcing them to go underground. There are also hints that the regime may be planning to expand its previously sporadic and generally unsuccessful use of officially sponsored "political discussion clubs" loosely sponsored by both the ZSP and the ZMS. These clubs were generally regarded by students either as safety valves approved by the regime or as centers where students' political opinions could be monitored by the security apparatus.

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## SENEGAL

### Summary

Recent strikes at the University of Dakar in Senegal, although launched over a dispute on scholarship policy, are symptomatic of general student dissatisfaction with over-all political, social, and economic conditions in Senegal.

The students, like many other Senegalese, have become increasingly unhappy over the lack of improvement in living conditions since independence. They see neither the means nor the opportunity to pull their country out of the stagnation into which it has fallen.

### Lack of Opportunity

Fewer responsible positions are open to Senegalese university graduates than to graduates in many other African nations. Unemployment is high. The private sector of the economy is dominated by Europeans. Civil service positions, which provide sought after and meaningful outlets for the talents of many young educated Africans, are scarce. Political activity is effectively stifled by the existence of only one legal party directed by long-time political hacks who, through their dispersal of favors, have firmly embedded themselves. Thus, students are apt to feel, with reason, that there is little room for them in political circles.

Student complaints are long-standing. They have been recently aggravated, however, by the worsening economic situation and by President Senghor's increasing consolidation of power: his merging of all legal opposition elements into his party in the last two years. February's presidential and legislative elections, which marked the demise of multiparty political activity, were vehemently condemned in Marxist-flavored tracts prepared by Senegalese students in Dakar and in France.

### Educational Facilities

The center of student activity in Senegal, the University of Dakar, was founded by the French in

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1950 as the Institute of Higher Studies. It was upgraded to university status in 1957. It is the most important educational institution in former French West Africa. Although legal ownership of the university was transferred to Senegal in 1961, France, by virtue of its large subsidy--about \$4 million annually or between 80% and 90% of the university budget--and under the provisions of the French-Senegalese accords signed in 1961 and 1964, retains significant administrative responsibility, and, in effect, control of the university. The rector and the secretary-general of the university are French, as are the majority of the members of the faculty.

There are four major faculties. The largest number of students are enrolled in law and economics, with liberal arts, sciences, and medicine following. There are also several institutes for specialized study and research, among them the well-known French Institute for Black Africa (IFAN) and a recently opened Institute of Technology. Over-all enrollment is about 3,800, about 1,400 of them Senegalese, 1,400 African, and most of the rest French. There are probably between 100 and 150 full-time faculty, of whom less than 50 are African. The student-faculty ratio reportedly is the best in the francophone world.

The University of Dakar is administratively affiliated with the French university system through the University of Bordeaux and grants degrees that are fully equivalent to metropolitan French degrees.

#### Dissent

Student strikes and demonstrations are not new to the University of Dakar, which has a history of leftist turbulence.

The most recent disturbances grew out of a campaign against changes in government scholarship policy conducted by the *Union Democratique des Etudiants Senegalais* (UDES), a radical student group generally known to have the backing of the illegal, pro-Chicom *Parti Communiste Senegalais* (PCS). Although the number of students associated with the UDES and other militant, leftist groups--including the once legal pro-Soviet Communist party, the *Parti Africain de l'Independence* (PAI)--is probably small in relation

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to the size of the student body, the UDES' agitation ultimately received the support of most of the African and a few of the French students. Many members of the faculty were probably at least in sympathy with, if not actively involved. In the past, Communist sympathies have been noted among French members of the faculty, and former members of the PAI, some of whom undoubtedly retain opposition sentiments, have been reported among Senegalese members of the faculty.

Students at the university, as well as in the lycees, feel a close kinship with the metropolitan French students. Their sympathy for the French student protests apparently was encouraged by some of the French professors at the university.

UDES' tactics included small demonstrations, publication of a list of demands, and threats of a larger strike. Apparently in response to increasing support for its cause, the Senegalese minister of education, in a speech on the evening of 26 May, attempted to explain the rationale behind the policy changes. His announcement that the government would not accede to the student demands apparently triggered a general strike the next morning.

The mood of the strikers at first was carefree. Although students picketed the university buildings, teachers were allowed to pass freely through the picket lines. Sympathy strikes were launched in lycees in Dakar and other major urban areas. On the 28th, the government, caught by surprise by the lycee strikes, used police to clear out the lycees and closed all schools. The university was cordoned off, but police did not enter the campus.

President Senghor, whose concern over his own problems was probably heightened by the challenge facing his close ally, De Gaulle, reportedly convened the Council of the University--a group including the rector, deans of all faculties, faculty representatives, and the Senegalese minister of education--on 28 May and announced his intention to use force to end the strike.

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The rector, who feared this would alienate the students and faculty, persuaded him to offer a compromise to the students. The students, however, reportedly rejected the compromise. Police entered the university the next morning and rounded up the students. Senegalese students were detained, some for a week, and non-Senegalese were sent back to their home countries. To protest the government's use of force in breaking up the demonstrations, the labor movement called a general strike for 31 May.

The government-sanctioned student organization reportedly has few members. The pro-Chinese Communist PCS, which backs the UDES, is not recognized by the government and is, therefore, circumscribed. PCS reportedly has a small membership, composed mainly of foreign students. Militant members of the illegal pro-Soviet PAI reportedly have been active in the past among students. There are indications that former PAI members, many of them teachers throughout Senegal, and leftist-oriented members of the former legal opposition party, the *Parti du Regroupement Africain-Senegal (PRA)*, who are active in a major teachers union, may have encouraged the students to revolt in May. There is no evidence, however, that the demonstrations were controlled or directed by Communists or that local media played any role in encouraging the students.

Events in France and other countries certainly influenced the timing of the demonstrations. Correspondence between FEANF (the Communist-front Federation of Black African Students in France) and Senegalese students urging student uprising reportedly was found at Dakar, but this correspondence probably played only a minor role, if any, in encouraging the strike.

In the aftermath of the student and labor disturbances Senghor largely ignored the students and dealt instead with labor demands. After he had reached a limited accord with the labor movement, Senghor made his first gesture to the students, announcing on 13 June that the university would

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be Africanized. Senghor attempted to avoid using force to end student boycotts of newly reopened lycees during the week of 10 June, and closed all schools after a demonstrator was killed on 14 June. Although he is meeting resistance from the French, Senghor intends to keep the university closed next year. His strategy in contending with the crisis has been to isolate the students and other discontented elements and treat each separately.

The following information was obtained from a confidential source in Senegal. The source stated that the Senegalese government is attempting to isolate the students and other discontented elements and treat each separately. The source also stated that the Senegalese government is attempting to isolate the students and other discontented elements and treat each separately. The source also stated that the Senegalese government is attempting to isolate the students and other discontented elements and treat each separately.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****SOVIET UNION****SUMMARY**

Soviet leaders have, to judge by their speeches, worked themselves up into a state of high distress over what they call "the apolitical attitudes" of the country's youth. This "political apathy" contravenes the ideology of the Soviet regime, which defines every aspect of life in political terms and demands the active political support of all members of society. Moreover, the leadership seems to realize that what they choose to call "apathy" often represents absorption in less approved concerns, even with political questions of an unofficial nature.

As best it can be generalized, the attitude of Soviet youth is expressive of two aspects of its psychological condition, a mood of political pessimism and a preoccupation with personal discovery. The young suffer from disillusion with the political regime, despair over the possibility of working effectively through the political system, and lack of belief in any alternative to the system and its demands. At the same time, the young have been launched into a realm of individual discovery of personal values long repressed and of material comforts and pleasures long denied. While speaking with a Western journalist in Moscow recently, a young Soviet intellectual observed that for the past century in Russia every new generation has interested itself in something outside of itself: either revolution, or religion, or some special purity in relationships. Now, he said, for the first time members of the new generation, born about 1945, are interested above all in themselves.

The young in this regard, and also by their general acceptance of the basic elements of the social order, represent a force for stability. Interest in themselves, however, may grow into a desire to have the concerns of the young recognized within political councils. During the past year some young people

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conducted, in the form of a petition drive, the first organized, broadly based attempt at political action. There is little doubt that the young generation would make itself felt politically if controls were relaxed. How long the regime persists in its harsh enforcement of these controls will in large measure, determine whether the future holds evolutionary change or repression and violence.

### ~~Soviet~~ **POLITICAL PESSIMISM** ~~By~~ *John B. ...*

#### Disillusion

For most of the young generation of the Soviet Union today, those roughly between the ages of 15 and 30, politics is keyed to the revelations of Stalin's crimes in 1956. The message of Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress affected no group of Soviet people more than the young. It is the central cause of their disillusion with the Soviet regime, their alienation from the generation of their fathers, and their loss of purpose in national and world affairs.

Stalin's mystical and terrible image commanded the allegiance of the people more than any ideology or principle itself could. Then, in 1956, those who had written verses in grade school dedicated to Stalin's "glory" were told at Komsomol and party meetings that they had been duped. The desanctification of Stalin caused an emotional and political trauma. A God had slipped out of their universe, and the question remained: what can be believed?

The question went to the very heart of the regime's legitimacy. Young people wanted to know how the Communist Party had permitted the sway of such a tyrant for so many years, whether his tyranny was not the product of the system rather than of particular circumstances and an aberrant personality, and what guarantees there were against a repetition of such tyranny. Acknowledgement that these doubts persist twelve years after the "Secret Speech" can be found in the report of First Secretary I.I. Bodyul to the Plenum of the Moldavian Republic Party's Central Committee last May. Among a catalogue of problems concerning ideological work with youth, Bodyul

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the advantage of a better education and a growing sophistication. In 1962, only 29% of the population in the appropriate age group was enrolled in general secondary schools. This percentage rose to 36% in 1964, and to an estimated 45% in 1966. Eight years of schooling are now compulsory, and the regime has the goal of universal 10-year education by 1970. In 1967-68, the total enrollment in higher educational institutions was 4,311,000--1,887,000 full-time students, 654,000 in night schools, and 1,770,000 in correspondence courses.

The awareness of the young has also been expanded by increased contact with the West through the medium of Eastern Europe and directly through tourists, student and cultural exchanges, and foreign radio broadcasts. According to figures, the Soviet Union was visited in 1967 by 1.5 million tourists and 189 youth delegations. Student-travelers to the USSR number 180,000 yearly and 24,000 foreigners are enrolled in Soviet schools and colleges. The Soviets claim that 200,000 young Russians travel abroad every year, presumably for the most part to Eastern Europe on vacations, in delegations, or with the armed services. Delegation travel between the Soviet Union and East European countries, although based on careful selection and a programmed itinerary, can involve large groups. A Czechoslovak Cultural Festival traveled to the USSR this spring reportedly with 500 performers, and appeared in several important cities; 800 Soviet students went to Czechoslovakia in June for the Second Festival of Czech-Soviet Friendship.

Western literary works are translated (in 1966 Ionesco's Rhinoceros and Capote's In Cold Blood, for example) and reviewed in Innostrannaya Literaturaya (Foreign Literature), a popular publication among students. Za Rubezhom (Abroad) is a Soviet magazine which reprints a broad range of articles from the Western press. The choice of Western newspapers on Moscow newstands is limited to those published by Communist parties, but students seize what is available. An American exchange student remarks how students at Moscow State University rush down in the morning to get the British Communist Party's The Morning Star, the French Party's L'Humanité, and the Italian Party's L'Unita. They also buy papers from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. The Morning Star was the

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first paper to inform Soviet students that Western Communists had condemned the trial of Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel. During the trial copies of The Star and L'Humanité were snatched up immediately. The US exchange magazine, Amerika, is popular with students, but the number of copies put on sale does not meet the demand. Most other information from abroad comes by foreign radiobroadcasts. These appear to have an influence throughout the territories and among all the age groups of the Soviet Union. Nowhere is their influence greater, however, than among students and intellectuals. Radio Liberty estimated that in 1967 40% of its audience in Communist countries was 30 years old or under and that another 28% was 31 to 40 years of age. The intelligentsia, including members of technical, scientific, or cultural professions and university students, comprised 58% of its audience. Other stations, VOA and the BBC, which are not jammed and are equally popular, reach comparable audiences. Soviet students report that these stations provide a chief source of information on events such as the defection of Svetlana Alliluyeva, the trial of underground writers Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yuri Galanskov, and unrest in Eastern Europe.

Attempts to ensure the ideological purity and zeal of this new generation have failed woefully, a fact attested to by the constant laments of officials. Some students in secondary schools and universities are plainly bored with the compulsory courses in ideology and party history, and with the study sessions on the same subjects conducted by the student youth organization, the Komsomol. There are reports that they converse, write letters, or sleep during the classes, if they go at all. Excitement comes only when the students take to baiting the lecturer and to displaying what officials call their "snorting skepticism." At one institute, this note was handed to the propagandist presiding over a dispute on the theme "Communism and I": "I want to interrupt you. Who needs your primitive philosophy interlaced with little quotations--your examples so distant from real life?" Complained one party secretary: "Today's youth is certainly different from those...of ten or fifteen years back. They have a different level of knowledge, a different view of the world. They don't like trite and outdated forms of political work."

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The lack of relevancy to their own lives is the primary cause of the indifference of youth, whether workers in factories with incomplete educations or graduate students at universities, to the doctrinal lessons of the Party. Belief in the party line is eroded by its own flip-flops and by a knowledge of alternative interpretations gained through studies or contact with the outside world. Finally, for the more sophisticated, it is increasingly clear that Marxism-Leninism simply cannot answer the changing and complex problems that challenge society in such fields as economics, science, and sociology.

#### Exclusion from Politics 31 to 40

The political pessimism of the young generation is fostered also by its exclusion from political processes. To some extent this is an exclusion traditional to the authoritarian government that Russia has always known, but there is an added sense of not being a part of the commanding elements in society similar to that felt by many during the earlier years of Soviet rule.

An American who spent most of the 1930's working in the Soviet Union at a mill in Magnitogorsk notes that his fellow workers used to talk of our mill, our government, and our Party, but now speak only of the mill, the government, and the party. In the thirties, young people could plausibly identify plants as "theirs" because of the good chance of becoming executives while still very young. Now the plants are more complicated and more highly "organized"; controls are more pervasive. The same is true of the political institutions, including the Komsomol. The American describes the Komsomol of the 1930's as a vigorous organization with a largely voluntary membership whose activities, particularly at the factory level, were supported by large numbers of young people. There was an *esprit de corps*, a feeling of belonging to the elite. There was some spontaneity and not a little enthusiasm in the organization and its activities, even though everyone knew that the Komsomol was run by the Party.

Mass membership and stultifying bureaucratic control have killed off these feelings, and the enthusiasm of the few has been replaced by the apathy of the many. The Komsomol has some 23 million members, including most

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urban youths between the ages of 14 and 25, all those enrolled in school at those ages, and 80% of the army conscripts. In official eyes the purposes of the Komsomol are to monopolize the field and prevent any other spontaneous youth organizations from springing up, to organize youth for "voluntary" participation in construction jobs in remote areas of the country as well as production campaigns nearer home, and to cajole, inspire, persuade, or force Soviet youth into absorbing Marxism-Leninism and becoming loyal servants of the Party. A huge bureaucracy, including many paid functionaries, has grown up to enforce the Komsomol's program. Leadership in the Komsomol appeals mostly to the very naive or to the would-be party careerists. Most young people keep their distance from those who take these positions, and they especially despise the *druzhinniki*, the volunteer auxiliary police, whose duty is to maintain a "revolutionary" discipline among the young and to fight against Western cultural influences.

The young fully understand the power of the authorities and their own helplessness. Innocent attempts to form groups outside the control of the party as well as more purposeful attempts to demonstrate or petition authorities are quickly suppressed and have disastrous results for those involved. Simple dismissal from a university, for example, can mean banishment from cities such as Moscow and Leningrad, and the loss of any chance for more than a work-a-day career. Outward conformity is thus the rule. Moreover, it is the response encouraged by the entire educational system, which is based on theories that stress the importance of the conscious in human control and the ability to manipulate it while scoffing at the subjective aspects of human behavior.

In short, it is precisely this emphasis on the political (and political sanctions) and the state's monopoly on the exercise of political power that has caused the young to turn their backs on official politics. Common responses by young people to questions of national or foreign policy are, "That's a political question," and "They will decide it." Most of all they wish to be left alone, free to occupy themselves in activities of personal interest and to have politics intrude as little as possible.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~No Alternatives

Finally, the political pessimism of youth is induced by the absence, in their opinion, of any attractive alternative to the present social order. If the regime has not been able to rear a generation full of ideological fervor and the conviction that they live in the best of all possible worlds, it has accomplished something equally, if not more, important to the stability of society--the rearing of a generation that does not seriously question the basic elements of the social system. There seems to be no significant body of opinion among the young that would favor scrapping collectivized farming, the denationalization of industry, alteration of the welfare state, political independence for the nationalities, or, even, an end to generally centralized and authoritarian government.

There is a relationship between boredom and acceptance in the attitudes of youth toward the government and its policies. When an American exchange student remarked to a Soviet friend how little *Pravda* was read by students at Moscow University, he was warned not to leap to the wrong conclusions. "*Pravda* is a dull, pompous paper full of propaganda," said his friend, "and you must read our more serious journals to get a more objective view. But that doesn't mean that Soviet people don't believe a lot of what's printed in *Pravda*. They simply don't like to wade through all of it every day. It's as if you had to read a Fourth of July oration every morning. You'd be bored, but you'd accept most of it."

The young do not want to have anything to do with capitalism, despite all that attracts them about the West. Although well aware of the high standard of living of the American worker, they are convinced that Soviet workers enjoy, for example, better and fairer medical care through their state health service. Although they will admit that full employment in the Soviet Union is achieved in many instances by underemployment, they believe that this is better than no employment at all for a segment of the population. Students cannot conceive of the private or otherwise haphazard means that an American must employ to finance his college education.

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In thinking about alternatives to basic elements of the social order, the Soviet youth is hampered, of course, by inhibitions in his mental process, by unfamiliarity with modern developments in the disciplines of political, social, and economic sciences, and by ignorance of real conditions in the rest of the world. The catechism taught in the school does not encourage creative thinking along political lines, the social science disciplines remain at a woefully primitive level by Western standards, and the many barriers maintained against the flow of information from the West obscure a person's vision. Thus, a student may mock his "choice" when it comes time to vote in an election. But when he replies to a question by an American about the two-party system with the observation that the system is meaningless in the US because both parties represent the ruling class while it would be purposeless in the USSR because one party already stands for all that could be desired, he is, in addition to repeating the party line, probably also representing the only understanding that he has of the subject.

Whether it derives from indoctrination, moderate satisfaction, or ignorance, the acceptance by the current youthful generation of the basic elements of Soviet society has profound implications for the future, far more so than the generation's present disaffection from political processes to which it contributes. It indicates that whatever political turmoil arises from this generation will be directed at modifying the system and will not be an attack on its essential features.

#### AWAKENING INTERESTS

##### Personal Discovery

In frustration over political issues, the young have tended to withdraw into more personal worlds. This flight has been encouraged by the lifting of Stalinism and the consequent awakening of concerns long repressed in Soviet life. The "socialist morality" of their parents discredited, the students have undertaken a search for more personal, humanistic ethics. The fact that their parents made enormous sacrifices, often to no good end, has engendered among youth no gratefulness or desire of imitation, but, rather, an

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insistence that a better and more just life must be had in the here and now even at the cost of ignoring ideology and distant goals.

Rare is a young Soviet who accepts his low position in society, who is not trying his desperate best to struggle up the stairs. There is often acute embarrassment among the lower classes over their humble status. The young display an aversion to physical labor and have a clear idea of what constitutes "dirty work." A 25-year-old worker, in his fifth year of correspondence courses at a technical institute, bluntly admitted: "I am studying only because I don't want to be walking around in dirt and swinging a sledge hammer forever. . . . I am tired of being shoved around, of being assigned dirty work. . . . So much easier to command others." "To know how to live" (umet' zhit'), a favorite expression of Soviet citizens "on the make," means to achieve status, a comfortable home, a car, and other tangible symbols.

The results of this attitude are the flight also of young people from the farms; conniving to be allowed to live in the major urban centers, especially Moscow; fierce competition for admission to universities, especially those of great prestige; and widespread study in technical schools, by correspondence, or on a part-time basis as alternatives. These efforts, whether undertaken by workers in the factory or graduate students at the university, are directed toward achieving competence in science or engineering, fields that offer the greatest prestige, remuneration, and freedom from politics on the job. To the extent that mobility remains possible, the competition is open and just, and talent and work receive their reward, this "rat race" effectively channels the energies of the young and, to a considerable extent, satisfies their ambitions.

Frustrations arise, however, because of several flaws in the system. Entrance into institutions of higher education is a highly competitive process. In 1965 there were vacancies in higher educational institutions for 20% of the appropriate age group in the Soviet Union (39% in the US, 14% in France, 7% in Denmark, and 7% in West Germany). For some of the more prestigious Soviet institutions there were as many as 26 applicants for one vacancy.

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The competition is intensified by the popularity of certain courses, and many applicants have to accept positions in the social sciences, or, worst of all, in agricultural sciences. In addition, the fairness of the competition is undermined by the influence the party, government, and intellectual elite are able to wield on behalf of their children. The situation is the subject of many complaints and the cause of much bitterness.

Even for those who are admitted to the university and are awarded a diploma, happiness does not necessarily follow. There is a general dislike of the three years compulsory service that awaits every graduate of an institute of higher education. Often the assignments take students out into the provinces and involve work which they feel is inappropriate to their training. There is universal conniving by students and their parents to avoid the worst hazards of the system. Those who graduate in the less favored fields find that their pay is low and prospects for raises unpromising. Even engineers complain that their superiors assign them to dirty work in the plant instead of the administrative or research work in clean offices they think they deserve.

Many, of course, are excluded from higher education by their lack of talents, ambition, or "pull." Those who must work find themselves bored with dull jobs in the factories without recreational facilities and amusements after work. These young people soon begin to contribute to the drunkenness and hooliganism that plagues the regime. A growing number of youths from better families do not have to work and can live off the affluence of their parents. These the regime rails against as "idlers," and they are apparently another source of crime and unapproved behavior.

Beyond their preoccupation with material wants and career advancement, Soviet youth are involved with the rediscovery of themselves as individuals. Throughout society, but most strongly among the youth, there is a growing and self-conscious return of the repressed--a rediscovery of the personality denied during the long night of Stalinism. The

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values of individualism, of questioning, of the religious spirit, of the ethical personality, of human relationships transcending party comradeship are returning to the Soviet psyche.

Youth's fascination with things Western--clothes, gadgets, music, slang--and their attempts to imitate Western styles are apparent efforts to break out of the impersonal mold decreed by the authorities and to assert their individuality. They appear to be trying to create something of a youth culture similar to those that adorn Western societies, but which has been long impeded in the USSR by the Party's control over youth organizations and dictation of behavior. Similar urgings probably account for the popularity of the poll or questionnaire which is enjoying great vogue in the pages of Komsomolskaya Pravda. The polls offer anonymity and an opportunity to speak one's mind not available at official gatherings, where conformity is the rule.

The concerns of youth are reflected by their cultural tastes. Two of the most talked about recent films at the universities were Twelve Angry Men and Inherit the Wind, in which the individual was shown in conflict with the collectivity, and in which the collectivity turned out to have been wrong. "Surprisingly, the most popular and respected writer among the general public is Somerset Maugham," notes the radical Yugoslav writer, Mihajlo Mihajlov. Above all, the Soviet reader finds himself fascinated by such of Maugham's heroes as Strickland in The Moon and Sixpence, who forsakes bourgeois society for the "heavenly beauty" of Tahiti, "still yet untrampled by the iron heel of civilization." An American professor who spent some time at a leading Soviet university noted that Salinger was popular and that in the fall of 1964 everybody suddenly discovered Kafka, whose works had been banned until the early 1960's. It was too early, however, for students to grasp all the implications of the worlds of Salinger and Kafka in terms of their own society. Nikolai Berdyaev and Mikhail Bulgakov (Master and Margarita) are the most popular Russian authors, Bulgakov, a brilliant playwright and novelist of the 20's and 30's, died in disgrace in 1940. Some of his works were finally revived in 1966. There is

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a crush to get into lectures on Bulgakov, whose biting satire, flights of the absurd, and Stalin parodies are widely appreciated. The popularity of Berdyaev (1874-1948), one of the foremost representatives of "Christian existentialism," and of his message concerning the world of the spirit and the creativity of the individual indicates the survival of religious values.

One of the most striking failures of the regime has been its inability to instill a fighting atheism among youth. Atheism is a satisfying creed so long as one is fighting *l'infame*, an oppressive clerical organization. But when *l'infame* is gone, and one simply has one's irreligion to live by, a certain disaffection arises with atheism, along with a distaste for its dogmatism. The result is an evolution toward a kind of religious agnosticism. There are reports of growing numbers of young people attending religious services, apparently more out of curiosity and for the atmosphere than out of belief. At the same time students do admit to their own or their friends' religious beliefs. Religious urgings are felt perhaps more strongly among the working class. The Baptists have gained since the end of the Second World War.

Much of the interest in religion stems from a potent nationalism not connected with the Soviet experience. Among Russian youths such nationalism expresses itself in a fascination with prerevolutionary Russian history and culture. A citizens' group devoted to restoring architectural monuments of Old Russia received publicity in Komsomolskaya Pravda during 1965. Youths from all over the Russian Republic, in a rare example of voluntary endeavor, enlisted in projects to restore and preserve old churches. The Party seems to have been taken aback by the mass appeal of the movement, for it quickly subsided, suggesting official displeasure.

Nationalistic feelings are evident among most of the minority groups of the USSR. Here, however, they take on a more serious anti-Russian character. Non-Russian youths, like their Russian counterparts, are annoyed by the bureaucratic control imposed on every aspect of their lives. But precisely because this control comes from Moscow, they resent it all the more and speak of it as Russian-made. In

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Georgia a graduate student and a young playwright, angered by their inability to obtain Moscow's approval for a subscription to the London Times, complained: "Why should Moscow decide everything?" and "These Russians are impossible. They want everybody to be like them and what Georgian wants to be like a Russian?" Greater bitterness is engendered by Moscow's official policy of Russification. Pamphlets and leaflets circulate in the Ukraine filled with hostility over the educational and job favoritism shown Russians and the discrimination against the Ukrainian language enforced in the fields of education, publication, and official usage.

Among the cultural intelligentsia of the nationalities, the struggle to transcend the confines of "socialist realism" dictated by the Party is combined with an effort to play-up the national heritage and patriotic feelings, which results in both an anti-Soviet and an anti-Russian literature. Champions of this cause in the Ukraine during the early 1960's were a group of young poets, prose writers, and literary critics who became well known as the shestidesyatnyky, The Men of the Sixties. The mood of protest is also apparent in demonstrations that frequently occur on the birthday of Taras Shevchenko, a nineteenth century national hero in the Ukraine.

#### Political Beginnings

Soviet youth have elaborated no well-defined philosophy behind which they can rally a majority of their number. Their opinions, however, contain common elements which suggest a basic similarity of outlook. An American exchange student came to the conclusion that the majority wanted "a more humane, more democratic, more efficient Communism, which would live up to its own promises, obey its own strictures, and abide by its own constitution." The suggestion that there should be more than one party, made to a Communist official at a Moscow University meeting, startled students in the audience who replied: "Don't ask ridiculous questions. Don't be naive." The American student found that Kосygin is particularly respected because of his frankness in admitting the need for economic

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reforms and his cautiousness in predicting future achievements--in contrast to Khrushchev.


The outlook of students varies, of course, most generally in accordance with field of study and geographic location. Progressives are more prevalent in the physical and mathematical sciences, which admit the brighter individuals and offer greater freedom of inquiry. Progressives may also be found in some of the humanities and in recently rejuvenated sciences, such as sociology, cybernetics, mathematical logic, and genetics. In general, the youth one meets in the provinces are more conservative and cautious than those in Moscow and Leningrad, while the Komsomol activists are more strident and dogmatic. Scientific universities and institutes at such provincial cities as Novosibirsk and Dubna, however, are centers of more liberal thinking. Radicalism at Kiev, Lvov, Tallinn, Tbilisi, and Yerevan is linked to nationalism.

Any attempts by the young to influence government policy are hampered not only by the vagueness of their political concepts, but also by their lack of organization, leadership, and plan of action. Reports of clandestine organizations, whether devoted to the study of Berdyaev or to terrorist activity, indicate that they are easily broken up by authorities before they can achieve much even organizationally.

Perhaps the most successful sustained activity conducted without official sanction has been the underground circulation of unpublished literary works and political tracts. For years such materials, written by prominent intellectual figures as well as by budding artists, have been passed around and recopied individually or gathered together and printed in various underground magazines. The magazines appear to be the product of loosely knit groups of young nonconformist intellectuals such as the well publicized SMOG group in Moscow. (The initials in Russian stand for "courage, youth, form, depth.") Official crackdowns on traffickers in this trade have failed to stop it. The American exchange student said "everybody" at Moscow University reads the underground literature, although

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FOURTEEN THOUSAND PEOPLE HEAR READINGS BY YOUNG POETS



COUPLES FRUG IN YOUTH CAFE



VOLUNTEER PATROL OFFICER  
REPRIMANDS FELLOW STUDENT

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he knew of no one who would acknowledge membership in any group or organized underground such as SMOG. It may be assumed that this traffic, by providing a means of communication and a common enterprise, helps to foster a feeling of community among the young of nonconformist leanings.

In some ways it was out of this situation that an open and, by Soviet standards, widely supported confrontation between young people and the authorities developed during the past year. The widely reported trials of the past three years have been conducted against writers connected with the literary underground who sent materials abroad for publication: Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel in 1966 and Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yury Galanskov in 1968. The first trial aroused general disapproval among the young, but no unified response. By the time of the second trial in January 1968, however, a form of protest was being elaborated and was gaining wide support. Its substance was a protest against the illegal and unconstitutional nature of the proceedings and a warning of the dangers of a return to Stalinism. Petitions were sent to government and party officials and passed to the West for publicity. The movement seems to have developed out of the trial in August 1967 of a demonstration leader, Vladimir Bukovsky, who pleaded the constitutional right to demonstrate and to criticize the government. Before the trial, some prominent intellectuals circulated a petition calling for open and legal proceedings, and at the trial a few perennial agitators audaciously distributed ringing declarations to the Western newsmen.

Within two months after the trial at least 17 documents had reached the West containing the names of over 300 signers. At least 10 of the signers were intellectuals of national stature whose names would be recognized at once by the man in the street. Another twenty or more would probably be recognized by other intellectuals. Otherwise, the signers were predominantly students, young researchers, and engineers. The majority were from Moscow, but Leningrad, Magadan, Kharkov, Dubna, and Novosibirsk were also represented. An appeal on behalf of the rights of man was presented to the Budapest

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consultative conference of Communist parties in February.

The petition episode indicated the willingness of youth to enter political battle. For the first time an open, spontaneous movement was able to attract support among various elements of youth and the intelligentsia and to gain a life and momentum of its own. Motivation came not so much out of sympathy for the accused as out of an emotional reaction to the repressive turn of government policy and to the specter of Stalinism reborn. Demands and tactics were elaborated that could unite many groups and that seemed to have some chance of success in influencing the political powers.

#### Regime's Response

By Western standards, it is difficult to explain the regime's anxiety over the current activities of Soviet youth. The distress is apparently a measure of what the regime thinks it owes to ideology as a justification of its rule. Implicit in the indifference and personal preoccupations of youth is a protest against the official order. The regime seems to fear that even the small demands for change that may arise out of such attitudes will work in the long run to undermine the fundamentals of the system and the prophecy of its doctrine. A totalitarian system regards any erosion, however small, as being of cosmic significance. Furthermore, Communists, always future-minded, are determined not to leave the development of their doctrine either to chance or to objective laws. Important, finally, is the character of the collective leadership that now rules in the Kremlin and the conservative bent of their personalities. At any rate, the regime has not hesitated to answer the smallest fault that it detects in the younger generation with more ideological indoctrination and more police control.

One official explanation for the shortcomings of youth argues that, because they have not suffered the hardships and struggles of past generations, they are not sufficiently appreciative of past achievements of the Soviet Union and have

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unwarranted expectations for the present and future. This official analysis lies behind the patriotic campaign launched in 1965 and directed specifically to the Soviet period of history. During the year 10 million youngsters allegedly visited battlefields, talked with old Bolsheviks and war heroes, and gathered materials for local patriotic museums. In August 1966, thousands of youngsters marched in Moscow with World War II weapons to climax the affair. The theme was, nevertheless, continued in saturation portions during the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Revolution in 1967.

A series of measures have been taken since 1965 to improve the ideological training of the young. The role of the Komsomol has been expanded and repeatedly underlined in official pronouncements. In 1966 the entire system of ideological instruction in Marxism-Leninism was revised to put more stress on reading the "classics" rather than secondary sources. There is growing emphasis in military training on improving political discipline and attitudes. A new military law that went into effect in January 1968 makes premilitary training compulsory for all Soviet males under the age of 18 and, by shortening the length of military service, assures that nearly all young men will experience the ideological benefits of service in the armed forces.

Most recently, apparently under the influence of events in Eastern Europe, the role of the West in subverting Soviet youths has received special attention. Official pronouncements have named the young and politically immature as the special target of Western propaganda and have complained of Western attempts to split the generations by theories that replace the class struggle with the struggle between generations. The efforts to promote ideological purity and to root out any bourgeois tendencies have been focused on the young in a series of nationwide youth and teachers' meetings this spring.

Where preaching has not been successful, the regime has not hesitated to employ the police. In July 1966 the internal police administration was re-centralized in a new national Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order (MOOP) to deal *inter alia*

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with the problem of hooliganism. The same decree also strengthened the hand of the police in dealing with youthful criminals and specified harsher penalties for common crimes such as disturbing the peace and assault. Simultaneously, pressure was brought to bear through the press against those factories, farms, and other institutions which seek to protect members of their collectives who have fallen afoul of the law, and judges were urged to levy sterner sentences in cases of hooliganism.

Dissidents of a more intellectual cast have suffered a series of trials and sentences to prison camps. Over twenty Ukrainian intellectuals were tried in various cities beginning in 1965. Their activities apparently involved the circulation of underground literature and materials that branded them as nationalists in the eyes of the authorities. Censorship has been applied with an increasingly heavy hand since the ouster of Khrushchev and has been backed up by prosecution of writers who circulated materials surreptitiously or passed them to the West. Protests over these proceedings have been met by official demands for recantations, denial of privileges such as trips to the US and showings of modern art, and dismissal from professional and Party positions.

Authorities, finally, have sought to limit contact between Soviet citizens and foreigners. The vigilance campaign has stressed that all visitors from the West are potential spies and subversives. Newsmen from Communist and non-Communist countries have been warned against unauthorized contacts with Soviet citizens. Similar warnings to Soviet citizens have practically dried up the American Embassy's contacts with young intellectuals. A Polish cultural counselor in Moscow has complained that relations between Poland and the USSR in the fields of music, sculpture, and the theater have dwindled to almost nothing. There are now reports that foreign students at Moscow University will be housed in separate dormitories next year.

Two things may be noted concerning the tactics of repression: they are aimed across the board at intelligentsia, young and old, and they are designed to keep the symbols involved smaller than the message

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conveyed. These characteristics are well illustrated by the case of Ginsburg and Galanskov. The regime chose to move against younger dissidents, of little prominence, involved in the not entirely honorable business of smuggling written material to the West, on charges of subversive activities in collusion with an "enemy" emigré organization. All these factors limited the appeal of their case among the population at large. Protests were nevertheless heard, but they were confined to questions of legal procedures. The trial, however, was understood by all segments of the intelligentsia as a signal to maintain strict discipline in their own profession or activity. The regime did not hesitate to react to the protests, and, according to reports, did so most swiftly and severely against the prominent signers of the petitions. What punishment, if any, was suffered by the students and young researchers is not known, but, after witnessing the submission of their better established elders to the administrative rod, little was probably needed. It is evident that students are the target, not of a particular policy of repression, but of a general policy. While this fact works to unite the generations of intellectuals and youths, so far this has been a unity in weakness. There has been no repetition of students assaulting authority in the streets while professors in the conference room stay the hand of authorities, such as occurs in other countries, both Communist and non-Communist. The authorities' hand will not be stayed.

#### PROSPECTS

As a whole, the young generation in the Soviet Union is not out to force sweeping changes in the Soviet system. This does not mean that they are pillars of the *status quo* or that the modifications they may encourage will not in the long run produce some fundamental changes. But their role will likely be an evolutionary one--one of reform, rather than revolution.

Pressure is building, however, to carry this role onto the political stage. This is a natural consequence of the conditions, the disillusionment with the political regime and its ideology and the development of personal ethics and concerns, that led

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originally to a withdrawal to the wings. Organized political activity on the part of the young, as the petition drive has demonstrated is showing its first stirrings. Its realization is obstructed now only by the repressive power of the regime. Political action by the young, therefore, will have to wait until there is either a change in regime policies, the appearance of a faction within the leadership willing to champion the cause of the young, or a weakening of governmental authority until it can no longer hold off the young.

The likelihood of such transformations occurring behind the Kremlin Wall is a matter of speculation. The regime, however, is running some definite risks by its current heavy-handed exercise of power. Compromise with the young generation and their assimilation into the power structure becomes more difficult. There is the danger that under present conditions pressures may build and antagonisms may fester to the point where they may carry the ranks of youth to extremes of action far beyond their essentially conservative concepts. The current leadership's policy of retrenchment, following a period of compromise and hope, has already sharpened the urgency felt by many for guarantees and reforms. It is also encouraging the use of demonstrations and broadsides to attain these ends.

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## THE ARAB WORLD

Summary

Student strikes and demonstrations long have been part and parcel of the Middle Eastern political scene. During the time of the Western mandates, they were conducted to oppose European domination. Recently, their objective has been not to raise education standards or ameliorate conditions of student life, but rather to make the acquisition of degrees easier, or to demonstrate opposition to Western "imperialism" and to Israel--and, at times, to oppose government policies. Frequently the demonstrators are paid or directed by the regime in power or by opposition political groups--the Baath or Communists.

Egypt

Egyptian students were intensely involved in political activities before the advent of the Nasir regime. Following Nasir's rise to power in 1954, however, the students were suppressed and there ensued a period of quiet, unbroken until the brief flurry of student and worker demonstrations in February 1968.

Approximately 145,000 Egyptians are enrolled in five universities located in Cairo, Alexandria, and Asyut--and a score or more "colleges" and technical institutes. Until recently, they exhibited a total disinterest in political affairs and were concerned primarily with bread-and-butter issues, such as suitable employment upon graduation. What interest they had in politics was centered on regional issues, mainly Arab nationalism and the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Students' zeal for Nasir's revolution has steadily declined as his revolution has stagnated, and the aftermath of the Arab defeat in June 1967 brought to the fore their accumulated grievances. The leniency of the sentences handed down in February 1968 to a group of military officers charged with negligence during the June debacle provided the spark for demonstrations in Cairo and other university centers. Students from the faculties of engineering apparently took

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the lead as the students voiced dissatisfaction over the continued Israeli occupation of Arab territory, the lack of meaningful political freedom, and the repressive nature of the Nasir regime. Underlying these complaints were issues of greater personal concern i.e., the paucity of meaningful job opportunities and the loss of draft deferments.

Nasir responded with a vague program of political reform which, while not completely answering the student complaints, served to placate them, at least temporarily. Over the longer term, however, Nasir's conciliatory reaction could stimulate further demands as the students sense their latent political power. Thus, the prospects are for more, rather than less, student unrest. Given the lack of channels for the peaceful expression of discontent, one of the few avenues open to the dissatisfied in Egypt is to take to the streets.

The recent demonstrations appear to have been almost wholly spontaneous. There is little evidence that any political organization was involved. Egypt's only legal political organization, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), was one of the targets; students reportedly view it as merely another regime mechanism for restricting their political freedom. The youth organization of the ASU has been relatively unsuccessful in its efforts to organize youth along its leftist-oriented, Arab nationalist, and anti-Western channels.



ARAB STUDENTS PROTESTING ISRAELI  
"AGGRESSION," 6 JUNE 1967

Egyptian students do not appear to have been influenced by the student uprisings in other areas of the world. Egyptian students abroad reportedly were highly pleased with the activities of their counterparts at home but are themselves often reluctant to return there because of poor employment prospects and a

lower standard of living than they enjoy in Western countries.

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Lebanon

In Lebanon, students unrest is almost a phenomenon of spring. This year's demonstrations, as in the past, essentially were nonpolitical and the student demands centered largely on education issues. Student political demonstrations in Lebanon generally are sparked by Arab nationalist aspirations. The Israeli issue is a highly emotional one to many and the cause of sporadic public demonstrations throughout the Arab world. Recently, however, the students demanded lower educational fees, better faculties, and stricter controls over private schools.

Foreign, often Egyptian, influence is frequently in evidence in Lebanon's political problems, and student unrest is no exception.

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downtown Vondel Park where they could congregate, placed one abandoned theater at their disposal for meetings and happenings, and provided \$8,600 toward restoration of another theater for poetry readings and dramas. The Council also established several "beat cellars" where the youth could meet, play music and dance. At the behest of the Council a team of graduate sociologists began in April 1967 to solicit from several youth and athletic groups suggestions for meeting the social needs of young people.

#### Higher Education

Foreign, often European, influence is strong in higher education in the Netherlands retains many vestiges of what might be termed a classical European outlook--a relatively small number of institutions training an upper class elite for the future leadership of the nation's political and economic life--even though the educational system as a whole is undergoing rapid expansion and re-orientation. Although less archaic and unchanging than the country's political system, the educational system is not yet as progressive as the country's modern and diversified economic system.

There are thirteen institutions of higher learning, ranging from centuries-old universities sponsored by the Roman Catholic or Calvinist churches to post - World War II technical colleges supported entirely by the state. Utrecht, Leyden and Groningen and the Municipal University of Amsterdam--are the oldest and largest. Amsterdam also is the most liberal of the Dutch universities--as much because of its location in the Netherlands' most liberal city as to its lack of a sectarian background.

The basic statute governing higher education is the Higher Education Act of 1961, under which the state has standardized for private and public institutions certain requirements concerning organization, degrees, and qualifications of students. The public universities have boards of governors and senates which, supported by the faculties, administer the universities. Private universities are autonomous as to form of government, but in practice parallel the public institutions. In addition, there is an inter-university Academic Council, consisting of

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representatives from each of the universities plus a number of delegates appointed by the Crown. The Academic Council provides coordination among universities and between the universities and society.

Although the public and private universities retain a good deal of traditional Dutch autonomy, they all subscribe to the sociological underpinnings of the Educational Act. The Act reflects a set of goals defined at the time, which includes the inculcation of civic and moral virtues. Thus, the universities find themselves in the position of defending the traditional right of freedom of speech and inquiry, deeply ingrained in Dutch history, and the equally traditional Dutch views of civic and moral virtue. The potential divergence here has not yet led to any great strife in the Dutch universities, but has caused some trouble in public life generally, where the Provos in 1965 and 1966, and the anti-Vietnam protesters in 1967, challenged several pillars of custom.

A unique feature of Dutch education is the government's recognition of the necessity and desirability of long-term planning to meet future economic and social needs. This function is performed by the Department of Research and Planning of the Ministry of Education and Science, and involves a dialogue with other agencies of government, the learned academies, various private institutions, and the universities which annually work out, and rework, four-year plans.

This entails a willingness to spend money. In 1950, for example, 8.5% (555 million guilders = \$153 million) of the national budget went to education; by 1965, this percentage had risen to 25% (3.75 billion guilders = \$1.05 billion). In terms of Gross National Product, this amounted in 1965 to 5.7%. The percentage of GNP devoted to education is expected to rise by 1975 to at least 7%, and more likely to 8 to 10%. Expressed in still other terms, the Netherlands government spent about \$351 per pupil in 1965.

Dutch educators are striving to become involved in "social engineering," to produce the doctors, lawyers, chemical engineers, and other skilled persons which the Dutch economy and society are likely to

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require five or ten years hence. The planners admit a possible conflict between such programmed goals and freedom of choice for students, but hope to enlist cooperation by the use of vocational information and guidance programs which set forth the country's needs and the role of education in meeting those needs. They are also prepared to restrict entry to certain fields of study.

Manpower surveys and forecasts are made regularly by official and private organizations. Such planning enabled the universities to turn out sufficient trained personnel by 1965 in many fields in which there were severe shortages in 1960. In some areas, such as dentistry, law, and technology, the number of graduates by 1980 will still be anywhere from 11% to 43% below the nation's anticipated needs.

The expected shortfall in the number of graduates in technology by 1980 (13%), despite massive government efforts to expand training in this area, testifies to the magnitude of the nation's economic expansion and modernization. More than 50% of the government's investment in education in the period 1965-70 is being channelled into university-level education (\$497 million of a total of \$955 million); in the subsequent five-year period, about the same ratio will persist, although the absolute figures will increase (\$690 million of a total of \$1.127 billion). Much of this investment in university-level education, furthermore, is being channelled into technological education--the newest of the Netherlands' 13 universities, which opened at Enschede in 1964, is a technological university, and another technological university is to open in Amsterdam within the next year or so. All of the universities built since World War Two have specialized--technology, economics, sociology--rather than liberal arts faculties.

Until the War, higher education in the Netherlands was the privilege of youth whose parents could afford the considerable expense of university training. Thus, total university enrollment in 1900 was only about 3,000, and in 1938 was still only 12,500. The six or seven years a student spent at the university were generally regarded as a time for diversion as well as for study--which tended heavily toward rote learning--and student fraternities were the only

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organizations on campus. While membership in these groups was always voluntary, only a few students remained unaffiliated. The fraternities were purely social, and eschewed political or sociological causes. Thus, organizationally and individually, students were expected to, and did, remain aloof from politics.

After World War Two, however, university enrollment began to rise sharply; in 1955, there were 29,500 students; in 1960, 40,000; in 1967, about 72,000 and authorities estimate there will be about 80,000 students in Dutch institutions of higher learning by 1970. The Municipal University of Amsterdam is the largest, with an enrollment of 14,204 in the 1967-68 academic year. Dutch university population is still less than 2 percent of the 18-29 age group, and as a proportion of the total population (72,000 of 12.5 million) falls far short of France (600,000 of about 50 million) or Italy (375,000 of about 52 million). The rise in university enrollment since the War is the result not only of the government's encouragement, but also of the growing affluence of the middle class, and the beginning of a blurring of class distinctions throughout Dutch society.

There are, of course, several serious problems facing Dutch educators. The drop-out rate today averages 32% after five years of study in the university (most degrees require 6 to 9 years of study). The rate is higher in the fields of theology, agriculture, economics, languages and technology, and lower in dentistry, the social sciences, medicine, the natural sciences and psychology.

The ratio of students to teachers also remains a problem. Although the ratio of students to over-all university staff has been improving steadily since 1950 (10 to 1 in that year; 6 to 1, hopefully, by 1970) the proportion is less favorable between students and teaching personnel. For the six of the 12 universities providing complete data, there are 1,503 teaching staff personnel for 37,667 students, or a ratio of 1 teacher per 25 students. Authorities, furthermore, see little hope of preventing a widening of the gap in the next decade.

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Although the government proclaims that education shall be open to all, and underwrites up to 95% of the universities' budgets, the expense of university education remains too great for the poorer class. Only an estimated 30% of the students receive financial aid, and only about 7% of the students come from the "poor class." Part of the reasons why broadening of university education has not yet reached the poorer classes is that Dutch universities are, for the most part, not located in the major centers of population. And, with one exception, they are not dormitory schools; students must find accommodation in the public economy where housing is a critical problem. Part-time jobs also are scarce, and those students who do find employment appear to put in full work weeks, suggesting that most are able to find only nighttime and weekend jobs.

#### Student Organizations

Student radicalism in the Netherlands is only a recent development. With the rapid increase in enrollment after World War II, Dutch educators encouraged the formation of general student associations which would include not only the fraternities that had dominated campus life, but also other new groups and individual students on each campus on a voluntary basis. Fraternities controlled these student associations, which in turn delegated representatives to the National Student Council (*Nederlandse Studenten Raad - NSR*). The NSR was highly conservative, and its leadership was self-perpetuating.

Some student dissatisfaction with the NSR's failure to tackle student grievances finally led, in June 1963, to the formation of the Student Syndicalist Movement (*Studenten Vakbeweging - SVB*) under the leadership of Ton Regtien, a student at the Municipal University of Amsterdam who earlier had been dismissed from the University of Nijmegen because of his radical views. Especially strong from the start at Amsterdam, the SVB quickly seized control of the local student association and, by April 1964, had forced the NSR to accede to national leadership elections. By 1965, however, conservative reaction to the SVB had coalesced within the NSR, and the SVB fought for its life for the next two

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years. Thus, in the crucial two-year period of the Provo's greatest activity, and perhaps because of the Provos, their natural ally among the students, the SVB, was in a decline.

The SVB now is on the rise again. It is the largest single student party in the NSR, and has given the NSR its current chairman. In the spring of 1968 it scored sharp and unexpected gains in the student elections, winning 22 of the NSR's 50 delegate seats. With its new-found pre-eminence, the SVB has finally found the necessary support for withdrawing the NSR from the International Student Conference (ISC) on grounds that the ISC received financial backing from CIA.

Even the SVB's severest critics admit that because of its activities Dutch students generally have become politically active--either for or against its programs. The SVB's first focus, expressed in its Democratic Manifesto of 1963, was student problems. A 10-point program called for increased scholarships, freer relations between student and professor, "democratization" of student governments (the NSR elections issue), more student housing, better counselling service, and improved athletic facilities.

Although student welfare remains the SVB's first priority, the organization has come to devote its attention to certain non-student-related political issues. Because the SVB still is a minority within the NSR, it has come to express its most extreme views through the Municipal University of Amsterdam's general student association, the ASVA, the only broad student organization it thoroughly controls. For two years, ASVA has actively opposed the Vietnam conflict, demonstrated in support of Spanish students and against apartheid in South Africa.

The SVB has eschewed domestic political and social issues in making the transition from purely student concerns to international problems. While the SVB has applied to the university establishment for redress of student grievances, and demanded that the government adopt a more critical stance toward the US position in Vietnam, it has not taken the government to task on such matters as unemployment, wages or housing, or

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condemned wholesale the government or "power establishment."

To date the SVB also has been satisfied to work within the institutional framework and traditional rules of Dutch society. Unlike the undisciplined Provos, the SVB and other organizations through which it works have refrained from violence. Except to defy a legal ban against impugning leaders of friendly countries, via their banners "Johnson-Murderer," the SVB and its affiliates have abided by the rules governing other public demonstrations. Furthermore, the SVB obviously has decided to capture existing student groups, rather than to set up competitive organizations. Moreover, several recent SVB leaders have moved upon graduation onto the national political scene by running on or supporting the Labor or Pacifist-Socialist tickets.

Even the SVB's most ardent critics admit that the

#### Youth and Vietnam

The anti-Vietnam movement in the Netherlands is not a campus movement, but rather a big city movement, one that concentrates in Amsterdam where it draws strength from young workers, clerks and professional leftists as well as students.

The SVB is one of several organizations that came into existence because of, or turned their attention to, the Vietnam war in the last few years. The belief that the US policy is not entirely correct in pursuing that war has come to be held by most students and by much of Dutch society. And while most of the above-mentioned organizations consisted of youth, just as was the case with the Provos, university youth were a minority of the total membership.



PRO-VIET CONG RALLY, SEPTEMBER 1967

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Some of these groups are, or were, young people's branches of the established political parties: the General Netherlands Youth Federation (ANJV) founded in 1945 by the Communist Party; the Socialist Youth (SJ), originally supported by the Labor Party but now independent; the Federation of Youth Groups of the Labor Party; and the Youth Work Group of the Pacifist-Socialist Party. They existed before the Vietnam War became a burning issue, and they will no doubt survive the end of that conflict.

~~However, The Role of Labor~~

Despite the fact that almost one-third of Amsterdam voted for the Communists in the first post-war elections, the Dutch labor movement, which is strong in Amsterdam, does not have a tradition of radicalism. Like other elements of Dutch society, labor tends to be conservative. The division of the trade union movement into Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Socialist federations, and the absence of nationwide industrial unions, inhibit nationwide, mass protest.

The three trade union federations provided financial support for the SVB during the first year of its existence, granting the fledgling student organization between \$550 and \$1,375 with allegedly no strings attached. The Socialist trade union has continued to grant financial aid and encouragement to the SVB. There is, however, no indication that labor has placed any conditions on its aid, nor any indication that the SVB agreed to support any of labor's goals. Indeed, as was noted above, one of the curious phenomena of the Dutch student and labor scene is that the two have so far failed to make common cause in a broad protest movement.

An ominous portent for the future, however, was an unprecedented joint protest meeting of the three labor federations in Utrecht on 18 May. The meeting was called when the government proposed to institute an unpopular wage pause. As a result of this expression of labor's opposition, the government quietly decided to postpone formal consideration of this measure in parliament. The new found ability of the three federations to act in concert, and

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the success of this first effort, presumably will not be lost on student as well as labor leaders. Yet rarely would labor's and the SVB's interests appear to coincide, and labor would seem to have a long way to go before it is prepared to foster social revolution.

### The Political Establishment

There is little in the structure of Dutch political life in the way of a safety valve for youthful dissatisfactions. Political parties rest on social or sectarian foundations, and even the left of center Labor and Pacifist-Socialist parties have a certain venerability about them. So unchanging are Dutch politics that there is almost no uncommitted vote and a shift in voter preferences of more than 1% is almost unheard of. Coalitions are the rule, usually the same coalitions.

There is a certain dissatisfaction, mainly on the part of younger people in general, with the rigidity and changelessness of the system. One form the expression of this dissatisfaction has taken is an effort on the part of reformers, in most of the established parties to "renew" political life by creating a two-party system composed of a conservative and a liberal party. Party leaderships have successfully quashed most such efforts for the time being. As a consequence, a group of six parliamentary deputies has defected from the coalition Catholic People's Party to form an independent radical organization.

The creation in 1966 of a new political party, the Democrats '66 (D'66), was another major expression of dissatisfaction. Believing that the older parties were increasingly divorced from the people, and dominated by an older generation, D'66's founders hoped to gain wide acceptance at the polls. The D'66 is a loose amalgam of talented, energetic younger people, mostly in the professions. Evidently too bourgeois for SVB members, who tend to support the Labor or Pacifist-Socialist parties on the national scene, the D'66 nonetheless has adopted some of the more moderate demands first voiced by the Provos. In fact, D'66's success at the polls in

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February may have contributed to the subsequent disappearance of the Provo movement.

Recent local elections suggest a loss of momentum by the D'66. At the same time the success the leaderships of the other political parties have had in sealing off left-wing radical "renewal" advocates does not augur well for the short-run prospects of renewal.

There are certain features of the Dutch scene which may explain why student activism is so far not a major phenomenon in Dutch life. The Dutch establishment, in the form of the government, is actively supporting a modernization and expansion of higher education, although progress to date may not satisfy all students. Dutch University students, by custom restricted to an ivory tower, have begun only recently to be activists and so far have not raised their sights from student problems to issues of Dutch social and political life. What activism there has been in the Netherlands has enlisted the support of only a minority of the population; and only a fraction of university students support this activism, while the general population, work-oriented in the best Protestant tradition, is quite satisfied with Dutch society. Student leaders, for whatever reason, have chosen so far to limit their activism for reforms in education and student welfare to the battlefield of student political organizations, and have not attempted to coerce individual university administrations or the government through public demonstrations. Finally, youth leaders have been content until now to wait until graduation to press their causes within the political framework of the country, becoming activists in one or another political party contesting for popular support in national and local elections.

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## TURKEY

Youth became a potent force in the last days of the Ottoman Empire and reached their zenith during April 1960 in the antigovernment demonstrations that opened the way for the military revolution the next month. Turkish youth are well-organized, although not united, and have a high degree of political awareness. They have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to take their cause--whether local, national--or international--into the streets. ~~is actively~~

In general, the young intellectual elite is sanctioned through government subsidization and is consequently subject to a degree of government control. Politicians of both the left and right of both government and the opposition, and of incipient subversive elements all make overtures to the "Young Turks" in the hope of attracting their support.

Nature and Scope of Youth Activism in Turkey

For nearly four decades--1923 to 1960--the Republic of Turkey maintained its independence under relatively stable civilian government and also moved constructively, if somewhat sporadically, in the direction of economic, social, and political modernization. There were no coups d'etat and only one major domestic eruption--the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul in 1955, which were apparently government inspired and, at least in part, government engineered. The students per se were not a major factor, but the youth certainly played an important role before the rabble took over and armored military units were required to restore order. But this event, which virtually all Turks regard as a blemish on Turkish history, was an exception.

Nonetheless, Turkish youth frequently have been an element of dissidence. They have used public rallies--usually at Taksim Square in the center of Istanbul or at Kizilay Square in Ankara--and fiery speeches, followed by attempted marches on the centers of government or to embassies and consulates, to make known their grievances. Placing a black wreath at some strategic location, as at the Ataturk monument in Taksim Square, is often a symbol of opposition. This tactic has been used in recent years by leftist students to protest

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visits of units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Leftist groups opposing NATO or the U.S. presence in Turkey often are countered by rightist student demonstrations--sometimes leading to clashes and police intervention.

Recent grievances have included the Cyprus amnesty for political prisoners from the 1960 revolution, Turkey's membership in NATO, labor troubles at American installations, and close ties with the United States. Except for antigovernment demonstrations during the last days of the Menderes administration, the student organizations generally have remained aloof from strictly domestic politics. Individual student leaders allegedly have been linked from time to time with subversives, but the student movement as such has not been involved.

The students are generally agreed on the need for extensive educational reform. Even Prime Minister Demirel has publicly acknowledged the need for extensive changes in the educational system, especially at the college and university level.

#### University Conditions

The quality and, indeed, the quantity of institutions of higher learning, especially the universities, have failed to keep pace with the demands of a rapidly changing society, especially since the end of World War II. These changes have included rapid population growth, increasing contacts with foreign countries, extensive foreign economic input which has brought the economy almost to the "take-off point," the spread of literacy and urbanization, and the growth of the middle and working classes. A social-cultural lag has led to tensions among all elements of society but especially among the youth. These tensions are aggravated by the growing disparity between the need of a rapidly developing society for highly trained manpower, and the limited number of qualified graduates from schools, colleges, and universities. Another source of tension is the limited number of universities and technical colleges available to the swelling ranks of lycee graduates.

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In recent years only about one third of the qualified lycee graduates have been able to enter college or the universities. Other student grievances, some of which surfaced in the June 1966 student boycott and sit-in, have been the badly overweighted pupil-teacher ratio (many university lecture classes have over 1,000 students, many regular classes have 50 students, some laboratory classes have as many as six working together on the same experiment); overcrowded classrooms; lack of text books, stereotyped lectures, poor testing programs, virtually no chance for personal attention by members of the faculty, accompanied by a serious "brain-drain" of those students who graduate.

It is estimated that out of a total of some 12,300 medical doctors trained in Turkey, 2,250 are working or studying abroad. About 500 engineers, architects, and scientists are believed to have left Turkey for more promising prospects. Despite the great need for trained specialists there is also a lack of flexibility and receptiveness on the part of the universities toward students who have graduated from foreign schools.

It is difficult to gain admission to a Turkish university because of space, quotas, entrance examinations, and lack of housing. Once admitted, the chances of graduating are slim. A study of Istanbul University between 1957 and 1963 revealed that the percentage of graduating students never was higher than 28 percent and has been as low as 11 percent.

While the students, and would-be students, contend that reforms are necessary, university professors and administrators insist that the institutions long-standing ills can only be cured by cutting down on the number of students, and by insisting on higher levels of performance.

This year students representing practically every university and school of higher education struck for two weeks to protest the archaic methods, lack of facilities, the system of fees, and generally to indicate their united displeasure with

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higher education in Turkey. They occupied university buildings, boycotted classes, sent representations to Prime Minister Demirel, and allegedly even threatened to burn down the University of Istanbul. Government and school administrators finally promised that the students' demands would be studied and changes would be made.

It is worthy of note here that while there were rumors of involvement by opposition parties and attempts by both the Marxist Turkish Labor Party and the clandestine Communist radio station *Bazim Radyo* (Our Radio) located in Leipzig, East Germany, to exploit the situation, there is no firm evidence that the unrest was planned, organized, or promoted by politicians at home or abroad. It was a bona fide student action aimed at correcting legitimate grievances; student leaders agreed to call off the strike when they were satisfied that an honest effort would be made to improve the educational system.

There can be little doubt that the student eruptions in Europe, France particularly, and in the U.S., encouraged the students to resort to a boycott and the occupation of school property. Turkey's universities are autonomous, for the most part; therefore, the government remained aloof. If the demonstrations had become violent or had spilled into the streets, the security forces undoubtedly would have moved to bring them under control.

A more typical example of Turkish student action on substantially the same grievances took place in 1964 when students got their message across by stretching a black ribbon across the main entrance gate to Istanbul University. The ribbon bore the words "OLD FASHIONED IDEAS." The student leaders then symbolically broke the ribbon and placed a black wreath in front of Ataturk's monument within the university grounds.

Educational deficiencies are equally bad at the secondary level where there is also a serious shortage of teachers. Basically the problem is one of tradition and cultural lag. The Ottoman heritage of rote learning pervades contemporary Turkish education, as

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does the authoritarian role of the teacher. Little value is placed on discussion and deductive reasoning. Program content, especially in the social sciences, is the product of Turkish ethnocentrism and the deliberate effort of the government to instill a sense of nationalism.

In a 1960 report, the Turkish National Commission on Education underscored the major deficiencies in the educational system. These included: imbalance of male and female students; need for program diversification; almost total lack of extracurricular activities; failure to encourage individual initiative; unsatisfactory teaching methods due in part to poor training; overemphasis on factual memorization at the expense of personality and character development; and the rigid examination system. The Commission expressed the fear that frustration and discontent, resulting from an inability to continue their education, might render some students "dangerous to society."

#### Turkey's System of Higher Education

The fundamental distinction between peasant and elite in Turkey is one of education. Traditionally speaking, few doors were ever closed to the Moslem youth of whatever origin who could write and speak properly--and few were opened to those who could not. This was especially true by the end of the 19th century when Turkish society was divided between the ruling elite and the peasant masses. To a large extent this same division is present today, although there is greater opportunity to attain the educational prerequisite for membership in the intellectual elite and a high government job. Among the educated elite there are those who hold high office in government, and those who think they should.

The history of westernization or modernization in Turkey is largely the history of the development of secular education. It wasn't until 1900 that a civilian university was opened to train students for other than official careers. The French Lycee, exemplified by Galatasary, became the model for educational institutions at the secondary level, and French culture soon became the dominant influence.

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In the universities, however, German concepts prevailed. (Now after more than a decade of US assistance, including the establishment of a new university in the northeastern city of Erzurum, American educational concepts have become competitive).

By the end of World War I, and the ensuing Turkish War for Independence, the Turkish educational system contained, at least in rudimentary forms, all the basic components of the educational systems in what were then regarded as the "advanced nations." Ataturk closed the religious schools in 1924 and a National Ministry of Education assumed responsibility for all levels of public education. Today most of the universities are autonomous.

The largest university, the University of Istanbul, was established in 1933, and Ankara University, a consolidation of several previously unrelated faculties, was chartered in 1946. The growth of the university system has been accelerated as demands increased for university training. A university degree is a virtual prerequisite for a high-level government job; and teachers and bona fide students constitute two of the highest status groups in Turkish society. But it is the lycee degree which has become the dividing line between the upper and lower ranks of Turkish society. By Turkish standards, the graduate of the academic high school is an intellectual.

There are over 1,00,000 students, out of a total population of about 34,000,000, pursuing higher education. There are over 68,000 students enrolled in eight state universities, and about 26,000 others attend private, mostly technical colleges. Another 8,000 attend teachers colleges and theological schools, and several thousand are enrolled in technical schools at near-college level.

While autonomous, Turkish universities are chartered by the Grand National Assembly, and receive the bulk of their financial support from supplemental appropriations attached to the budget of the Ministry of Education. While only a nominal fee is charged, the cost of books and room and board must be borne by the student. These are not too onerous for those who can live at home but clearly are beyond the

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resources of the youth whose family does not live near a university.

Since 1946, Turkish universities have been patterned largely after the German model with each subject within a faculty being grouped around a chair held by a professor, who in turn is supported by a cadre of junior faculty members. This method of organization, combined with the absence of a mandatory retirement age, severely limits promotion possibilities and lowers morale.

Enrollment is determined by each university faculty, which administers its own placement tests. A candidate often registers for several separate examinations. Students with lycee diplomas contend they are automatically entitled to admission, and the resulting clamor often forces university officials to allow still more students to enter already congested faculties. Overenrollment is probably the most serious problem. In a Law faculty at the University of Istanbul a teaching staff of 40 attempts to instruct 8,000 students. Existing resources such as libraries are often underused because of the emphasis on lectures. Except for a small core of able teachers, the bulk are mediocre and underpaid.

Istanbul University is the largest and most influential educational institution in Turkey. Built to accommodate 12,000 it has an enrollment of more than 30,000. According to the rector of the university, there are only 14,000 "real" students at the university; most of the others enjoy the fringe benefits of student status.

An estimated 3,000 Turkish students attend foreign universities each year, with US schools attracting a number second only to West Germany. Since World War II Turkish students abroad have concentrated on science and engineering courses. None are officially enrolled in schools in Communist countries, although probably there are some Communist exiles attending schools in Eastern Europe. The government has discouraged students from traveling in Communist countries but concedes that a few probably go via indirect routes. Student exchange may become an area of Communist exploitation now that relations with Turkey have become somewhat more amenable in the new

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age of detente. Underlying Turkish suspicions of the Russians, however, will probably hold down the number of students studying in the USSR.

### National Youth Organizations in Turkey

There are three major youth and student organizations. While most youth are affiliated with one or more of the national organizations, there is no acknowledged central leadership among the nation's youth. In addition to the student unions, there are also youth branches of many of the national political parties, especially the ruling Justice Party (JP), the major opposition Republican People's Party (RPP), and the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP). There are also smaller, somewhat less organized groups, possibly cutting across party lines, drawn to individual political leaders.

The three national organizations are the National Youth Organization of Turkey--(*Turkiye Milli Genclik Teskilati*--TMGT), the National Student Federation of Turkey--(*Turkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu*--TMTF), and the National Turkish Student Union--(*Milli Turk Talebe Birligi*--MTTB). The TMGT, officially recognized in 1960, includes both student and other youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts Union, the Women's Union of Turkey, the Turkish Reform Hearths and the Textile Workers Federation. It has nine member bodies, of which the TMTF is the most important, and is government subsidized. In 1964, the last year for which we have statistics, the TMGT claimed a membership of some 274,000.

The TMGT is leftist dominated, despite persistent government efforts to gain control. Most of its present leadership is said to be friendly to the opposition, hostile to the Demirel government, and, although basically pro-West, critical of the terms of Turkey's relationship with NATO and the US.

With a membership at least of 100,000, and chapters on all college and university campuses, the National Student Federation (TMTF) is the larger and more politically active student organization. The TMTF was founded in 1946, has its national headquarters and over half of its members in Istanbul, where the Istanbul University Student Union (IUTB) with 21,000 members often is able to play a dominant role in TMTF affairs.

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The TMTF is today split into left and right factions--both of which elected slates of officers in separate congresses in 1966. Since then, the Federation has been rent by internal strife, court action, and open clashes.

Leftist control of the TMTF was temporarily ended in January 1967 by a court order which appointed trustees to administer it. The leftists subsequently defied the court and were arrested. They nonetheless established a rival TMTF headquarters in Ankara and probably have the larger national following. The Istanbul leadership reportedly still controls the organization's teletype system, bank accounts, and the bulk of its files. The government has announced that it will seek legislation to end control of student organizations by "professional student" politicians. A similar attempt to tighten control of the student organization leadership in 1964 failed.

The National Turkish Student Union (MTTB), founded in 1916, is the oldest student organization and with some 60,000 members in 27 separate affiliated organizations, is more conservative than the TMTF and is comparatively free from government control. Whereas the TMTF is more interested in student problems, the MTTB is oriented toward such political questions as Cyprus, East Turkestan, and the Orthodox Patriarchate. It tends to be strongly nationalistic and has tried to maintain close bonds with the military hierarchy.

Both the TMTF and the MTTB utilize press conferences to proclaim how the "Young Turks," in the sense of the Youth of Turkey, feel about hot issues of the day. Both publish periodicals and both, on occasion, send deputations to the prime minister or other government officials in an attempt to make the influence of youth felt by the leaders of government. Talks regarding the merger of the two national student organizations have been going on intermittently since 1963 with the conflicting ambitions of the various leaders apparently constituting the chief obstacle. The development of a strong leftist movement in the TMTF would seem to preclude any serious hope of merging the two organizations in the near future.

It has been suggested that leftist influence among the teaching staff at Istanbul University has

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grown in recent years and that newcomers have been variously identified with the left-wing. It has also been alleged that these leftists have sought, with some success, to take over the leadership of the students as one element of the so-called "alert" or "standing forces" which include the intellectuals, the press, and the military.

Little factual information is available on suspected Communist groups although they probably exist and are probably concentrating on recruitment, infiltration of existing groups, and exploitation of student interest in left-wing ideas. But Istanbul University is not hotbed of Communism, and any such groups are probably very small.

Prospects

Turkish youth have the incentive, the political awareness, and the organization to play an increasing role. They lack only a full sense of direction and an awareness of their capability.

While, in contrast to many countries, there seems to be little cynicism or alienation, there does appear to be a growing uneasiness--probably due in large part to the frustrations inherent in an outdated educational system. But recent disturbances have had no obvious political overtones. That is not to say rebellious elements may not seek to exploit student dissidence for ulterior motives. There have been some warnings of more serious trouble at the Turkish universities this fall.

Forty-two percent of the population of Turkey is under the age of 15. Therefore the youth are, and will continue to be, a major factor in the country's political life. The youth of Turkey have been given a heady assignment--to be "guardians of the Revolution." Where this leads to responsible political activity it is an asset. Where it leads to narrow chauvinistic nationalism or leftist adventurism, as in the near catastrophe over Cyprus, it is potentially dangerous.

There are many imponderables and no clear-cut indicators of the direction the young will take. The

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former president of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara said a few years ago that "U.S. foreign aid was going to taper off gradually and the U.S. would be forced to pull back from supporting its friends and allies. Therefore... (rather) than face the ignominy of the gradual U.S. withdrawal, (Turkey) should immediately adopt a neutralist foreign policy and accept offers of assistance from the Communist bloc."

The bulk of the politically active students, those in the TMTF, can be expected to remain anti-JP, anti-American and to call for closer relations with the socialist countries. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that while all shades of the political spectrum are now represented in Turkey, in the educational field where the real pitch is made to the youth, those who represent the left apparently are more numerous, more vocal and enjoy more publicity than those who support the West.

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## YUGOSLAVIA

Summary

A decade of apathy on the part of the youth of Yugoslavia ended in June of this year, when Belgrade University students rioted and a week-long university sit-in followed. Although partially inspired by the example of rioting students in Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and other European countries, the Belgrade riots were, as Tito admitted on 9 June, largely domestic in origin. The regime's slow reaction to a deteriorating economic and social situation and its sluggishness in dealing with youth and educational problems had been at fault.

High party officials have realized for some time that a large portion of Yugoslav youth was becoming increasingly alienated from the economic and political system within which it lived. Sensing the increasing tension, their spokesman, Veljko Vlahovic, attempted to identify the students with the regime, but probably helped stir them to action, by reminding them, nine days before the riots, that they must fight for changes--"revolution does not tolerate weeping," he said, "it demands action."

The student unrest emerged at a time when the regime is embarked on a difficult reform meant to decentralize and liberalize economic and political life while retaining control by the party. The program has faced determined opposition from conservatives and those who stand to lose status and income from the reforms. Although the regime hopes to use the students' enthusiasm to speed up its program, Tito is well aware that his opponents may attempt to use the riots to stop the regime's efforts at change.

Students Versus the Regime

The June riots started with a trivial clash between young people at a musical performance on 2 June. The disturbances soon took on a political character when student anger at police tactics and pent-up frustration over the lack of job opportunities led to sweeping demands for change. An ad hoc

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student action committee quickly formulated a four-point program which demanded:

- Removal of all antisocialist manifestations and economic and social differentiation.
- Steps to remedy unemployment and reduced job opportunities for university graduates.
- Greater democratization of all social and political organizations, a more independent press, and quicker removal from office of antireform "conservatives."
- A thorough reform of the university, to provide greater autonomy, a student voice in university affairs, and improvement in the living conditions of students.

The regime opted for conciliation combine with firmness. Its spokesmen were quick to conceding the justice of the students' demands, but deplored the demonstrations and violence.

Several Serbian officials, including the President of the Serbian parliament, were appalled by police brutality and promised to investigate and punish the guilty. Cognizant of the developments in Paris, the regime set out to keep the students and workers from uniting on the basis of mutual economic grievances. The Belgrade press was filled with telegrams--probably regime-inspired--from factory committees who supported the students' "just" demands, but denounced student violence and pledged adherence to the regime's reform programs. The regime succeeded. No workers joined the students or started sympathy strikes.

The sit-in at Belgrade University did not end, however, until 9 June, when Tito admitted on television that there had been delays in implementing the economic reform, in eliminating "shocking" salary differences, and in dealing with youth problems and educational reform. Reminding his audience that the party had been debating all these problems for many months, he asked the youth to push his reform programs. Tito promised new party guidelines

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to deal with domestic problems--indicating that they would be final, thereby giving the students no alternative acceptance. Although Tito implied that if he and the rest of the leadership could not solve Yugoslavia's problems, they should resign, he gave no hint that he would bow to the students' demand that those responsible for police brutality be sacked.

The economic guidelines, in preparation since 20 May, were published five days later. In part an elaboration of the themes in Tito's speech, they called for economic reform and reorganization of the party. They also echoed student demands for limits on income acquired in a "nonsocialist" way (leasing of villas, for example) and a reduction of differences in wages. They allowed for educational reform and more student participation in the management of the universities.

Again there was a note of firmness. The resignation of incompetent officials was implied, but there was a clear warning that "enemy forces," such as antiregime emigre groups, antireform conservatives, and ultraliberals, were seeking to undermine Yugoslavia. Emphasis was put on using and improving the existing Yugoslav system, albeit with a major effort to make room for more young people. The guidelines reemphasized the party's determination to oppose the creation of the multiparty system proposed by some liberal intellectuals.

Student unrest had occurred at a trying time in the regime's 3-year-old drive for economic reform. Although the students exhibited no separatist tendencies, the regime in meeting the students' demands must take into account the currently tense nationality situation. Republic economic rivalries have increased. Many Serbs believe that they have suffered by the reform, while the Croats generally believe that the process must be speeded up. For the first time in many years Tito is under pressure from both the conservative and liberal wings of the party to go slow and to move ahead faster on the reform, respectively.

Economic reform has brought increasing unemployment and labor unrest, with workers resorting to

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short strikes to push their grievances. Both the Belgrade students and many workers are angry at the high salaries and large bonuses paid factory administrators while workers in some enterprises are poorly paid or paid only after long delay.

#### The Generation Gap

The student's demand for a job after graduation reflects more than a narrow-minded self-interest. There is a profound difference in outlook between the young and old and the regime must cope with a widening generation gap.

The bulk of the leadership at all levels in Yugoslavia has remained the same for over 20 years. Despite the purges of Cominformists in the years immediately following 1948 and the ouster of Djilas (1954) and Tito's former heir apparent Rankovic (1966), the hard core of the party still has great numbers of older ex-partisans and prewar members. The upper levels of the party hierarchy are particularly laden with this older generation. "Older generation" here, is relative: Most of these "older" people are in their fifties, some still in their late forties. Tito at 76 is by far the oldest of the hierarchy.

The regime has attempted with only limited success since 1963 to enforce a policy of "rotation" in office in order to bring up younger men. While the average age of the party leadership has declined slightly, the old guard has departed only slowly in a Yugoslav version of political musical chairs. Thus the party reorganization of October 1966 resulted in an executive committee (politburo) of relatively younger and less politically influential men, while almost the whole old-line leadership was shifted into the policy-making presidium.

What has been true of the top leadership has been even more evident at the lower levels of the economic and political ladder. Many factory directors and lower level bureaucrats owe their positions to their prewar party and wartime partisan service. Many are ill-educated and not equipped to deal with the sophisticated socialist market economy which the

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regime hopes to create. Understandably, they do not wish to give up the income and status they feel that they deserve.

Partly as justification for its privileged position, the older generation has exploited wartime sacrifice and glory for years. The values of many of these older people are an admixture of unsophisticated Communism, middle class aspirations, pride in what they have accomplished, and in some a residual local nationalism.

Meanwhile universities have been turning out thousands of better educated young technicians. Many are impatient with the bungling of their elders and with the barriers to jobs and influence which the latter have created. Tito himself has publicly admitted many times that the Yugoslav economy badly needs thousands of better trained men, but that many enterprises refuse to hire them.

The slogan "Down With the Red Bourgeoisie" which appeared at Belgrade University in June underlines the younger generation's disenchantment, their wish for an end to privilege built on party or partisan service. This demand is not new--it has simply become louder. In the months after the ouster of Rankovic the Yugoslav press burgeoned forth with reports of illegal building of villas and the accumulation of art treasures and private wealth by party functionaries.

The restlessness of Yugoslav youth reflects the success of the regime in its liberalization program. The curtailment of the power of the secret police following Rankovic's fall, the enhancement of parliament, more open elections, and curtailment of direct government control of the economy--all have fostered a more permissive atmosphere. Many of the students' demands are inspired by the hopes engendered by the liberalized Yugoslav constitution of 1963 and by promises implied in the current party program. Conversely, the regime's compromises in the face of opposition by conservatives who still hold in influential positions, and the objective difficulties of the economic reform probably seem intolerable obstacles. When the chief of the Belgrade

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party organization, Veljko Vlahovic, a leading ideologue and presidium member, attempted to speak to the rioting students last month he was howled down by the cry of "Enough words--action is needed."

### Fathers and Sons

It can be assumed that some children of party officials were involved in the riots. Their presence did not inhibit the police, but it may help explain the regime's forbearance in the face of the sit-in at the university and the release of all the students arrested earlier during the riots.

### The Youth Organizations

The student union revealed the ineffectiveness of the two main regime sponsored youth organizations --the Federation of Youth of Yugoslavia (SOJ) and the Federation of Students (SSJ).

Both federations originally were created to perform as "transmission belts" for party directives and propaganda. Numerically at least, the SOJ has been a success--its membership (2,034,523 in December 1965) includes about two thirds of all Yugoslavs between 14 and 25. Resentment over the Federation's "transmission belt" role has grown steadily over the years, and much of the organization's membership is pro forma. The SOJ became a byword for careerism and a haven for young party hacks.

The party's decision in 1965 to change its role from that of an all-powerful directly ruling organization to one of ideological leadership led to confusion about the role of the SOJ. Many young people wanted the Federation to reflect the views and interests of its membership, not those of the party. The SOJ, however, was not organized to respond to pressure from below. Its leadership, moreover, was all over 30 years of age, which led to charges of overprofessionalization.

In the aftermath of the fall of Rankovic the youth federation secretariat was dissolved (November 1966) for incompetence and heavy handedness. The Federation was put into a form of "receivership"

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in order to prepare for its reorganization, which took place over a year later at the Eighth SOJ Congress in February 1968.

Tito's speech opening the Congress offered nothing particularly new. It was a call for more of the ideological guidance the young had already come to dislike. Indeed, instead of innovation, Tito pointed with alarm to the need for more ideological political work by the SOJ among intellectuals, among whom he detected apathy and "alien concepts."

To restore the SOJ's effectiveness, a new statute was enacted decentralizing administration, presumably to make the federation more responsive to its membership. What emerged was a compromise between the old strongly centralized organization desired by the conservatives and the loose coordinating body called for by the ultraliberals. The age limits were widened to include 14 to 27-year-olds, a 27-year-old was elected president.

The considerably smaller (110,000 members in 1966) Federation of Students suffers from much the same malady as the Youth Federation. If the regime grants the SSJ the autonomy necessary to attract large numbers of activist students, the party risks losing control. Tight regime control, however, results in further alienation of the future intelligentsia and technocrats and an organization steeped in apathy.

Regime control of the students through the SOJ and the SSJ broke down at the time of the Belgrade riots, when the groups were reduced to supporting, post facto, the student demands while condemning demonstrations and violence. Effective leadership had passed to the student action committees not in the party's sway.

The regime's concern with the ability of the student federation successfully to channel student political activity in the face of such competition is mirrored in a debate over the further existence of these action committees. Most party officials are against the continuation of such groups.

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The committees, however, have insisted that they will continue to operate. Speaking before the opening session of the Yugoslav trade union congress on 26 June, Tito undoubtedly had the action committees in mind when he said there was no room for the creation of a special movement within the universities.

### Youth and the Party

The alienation of youth from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) has been viewed by its leadership with growing alarm. Historically, the party's large and effective youth component contributed such leaders as Djilas and Rankovic. Recently, however, the number of those 25 or under in the party has dropped from 23.6 percent in 1958 to 11.5 percent in 1966. Compared to the 1951 figure of 38.5 percent, the decline has been precipitous.

The decline has occurred over the same period that has seen overall party membership top the million mark. In the process, the composition of the party has been altered significantly. According to Yugoslav figures, the new members are mainly white collar administrators, factory directors, and bureaucrats. The percentage of workers, women, and peasants in the LCY also has declined. Many of the younger generation probably regard this trend as a further sign of the party's *embourgeoisement*.

Public opinion surveys in the last two or three years have pointed out that many young people would not join the party if asked, and many local party organizations have admitted practically no young members in recent years.

The regime's answer to its accelerated aging process has been a drive to recruit young people. So far no figures are available on the success of this effort. However, many liberals evidently are hoping that a successful recruiting drive will help consolidate the reformists' hold on the party and the party congress in December 1968.

### The Students and the Schools

Early in 1968 the youth periodical *Mladost* revealed that out of 3.5 million employees in Yugoslavia, about 200,000 have had no schooling, over 1.2 million

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have never finished the eight-year elementary school, and only 800,000 have an elementary school education. The drop-out rate for elementary schools is about 50 percent. The illiteracy rate remains high, about 20 percent, with about 50 percent of the illiterates under 50 years of age.

In part, the problem stems from limited financial resources. Under legislation passed in 1966, local communities are responsible for financing most basic education. Local enterprises are encouraged to contribute loans and scholarships. Decentralized financing has resulted in uneven quality in the primary and secondary school systems. Poorer areas naturally have inferior schools, particularly in the villages. Peasant youth are at a disadvantage if they wish to pursue university studies.

University education is tuition free. Cost of living grants are available and many students receive loans, repayable in a ten-year period after graduation. The debt is reduced for those with good academic records and those who finish their studies early. Although university entrance examinations were instituted for the 1966/67 school year, they will be abolished in September 1968. Poor preparation and personal financial problems probably are the main reasons so many students take extra years to earn a degree.

The increased cost of living since 1965 has been another factor barring the way to higher education for the children of workers and peasants. In 1965 the average stipend for students at Zagreb University, in comparatively wealthy Croatia, was 15,000 old dinars (OD) per month. At the current exchange rate of 1,250 old dinars to one dollar, this amounts to \$12. Living expenses, however, reached the level of 29,000 OD (about \$23). In the past three years stipends have not kept pace with the cost of living. The average worker's wage (not including self-employed peasants, the bulk of the rural population) in January 1966 was 57,000 OD (about \$46). Moreover, the highest average salaries were in the more developed northern republics. This economic inequality is transforming Yugoslavia's universities into preserves for the



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children of highly paid business managers, professional men, and party and government bureaucrats. According to one Yugoslav source, in February 1968 only 13 percent of the children of blue collar workers were receiving higher education.

Student discontent also has been stimulated by the party's reluctance to loosen its grip on the universities. Although "self-management" and university control of its own finances has been constantly ballyhooed, university party organizations have usually had to bow to the wishes of their LCY superiors. Party influence in faculty appointments has resulted in providing sinecures for second-rate but "safe" intellectuals. Only in the past four or five years have liberal professors become more publicly outspoken in their criticism of the regime's policies. Yet as late as June 1967, a dogmatic, authoritarian, second-rater, Dr. Dragisa Ivanovic, was elected rector of Belgrade University over his liberal opponent, Dr. Veljko Korac. Korac had made the mistake of publicly doubting the ability of ill-educated workers to manage ever more complex business enterprises and to contribute meaningfully to the solution of complicated social and economic problems.

Korac is an example of the type of critical intellectual who is anathema to the anti-intellectual elements in the regime. The party has been particularly vehement in denouncing those who attempt to transform the intelligensia and students into an elite that would usurp the leading role of the party. It is a measure of the regime's desire to win support through liberalization, however, that such critics have been given ever freer reign, despite periodic threats by Tito to deal with their "alien concepts."

#### The Effects of the Student Revolt

Although the revolt lasted only one week and there was only one riot outside Belgrade, in Sarajevo, its effects may be permanent. For the first time the regime caved in to pressure from below. Not only that, it admitted the legitimacy of that pressure, even while quarrelling with the methods used by the students. Practically overnight the

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students--among them the children of the elite--made themselves into a significant political force which demanded that the regime live up to its promises. They are unlikely to be mollified by token concessions.

Tito faces the difficult decision of further alienating many conservatives and centralists by fulfilling the students' demands, or a possible further student violence if reforms are not forthcoming by fall. He is well aware that antireformists may try to make use of the student demands to stem the tide of the regime reforms. Despite their socialist humanist character, some of the student demands, such as wage limitation, full employment, and reduction of material incentives run counter to the methods of the economic reform. Given the unrest among the poorly paid workers, a student-worker coalition against the economic reform would be a conservative's dream and a liberal's nightmare. For many conservatives it would be proof of the failure of the reform drive and proof that relaxation of party control of society leads to rejection of party leadership and economic chaos.

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